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MEDIEVAL POOR LAW IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY AMERICA: LOOKING BACK
TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF
MODERN AMERICAN POOR RELIEF
Larry Catd Backert
"Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou
eat of it all the days of thy life.... In the sweat of thy
face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the
ground."'
"That which hath been is the same which will be, and that
which hath been done is the same which will be done. So,
there is nothing new under the sun."2
I. INTRODUCION
The twentieth century has witnessed the continuing evolution of
a variety of governmental programs3 aimed at providing aid of
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3. For an overview of the American welfare system, and a description of the pro-
grams in place, see Low INcOME OPPORTuNrTY WORKING GROUP, DoMEsTnC PoLiCY
CouNciL, UP FROM DEPENDENCY: A NEW NATIONAL Punic ASSIsTANCE STRATEGY
(Supp. 1 1986) (Report to the President) [hereinafter Low INcoME OPPORTtNITY WORK-
ING GROUP]; SAR A. LEVITAN, PROGRAMs IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1980's (4th ed.
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some kind to the poor There are also a number of such programs
that are the creatures of private efforts;5 however, in contemporary
America, the most significant sources of poor relief are provided
by civil government at the local, state and, principally, at the fed-
eral level6
For able-bodied unemployed men, for women without children,
or for two-parent families, the only source of help, besides private
charity, is state or local programs of general assistance! These
1980). For a brief discussion of the problems relating to the notion of a consistent or
uniform definition of the term "poor," see CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERI-
CAN SOCrAL POLIcy, 1950-1980, at 57 n.2 (1984); Victor R. Fuchs, Redefining Poverty
and Redistributing Income, 8 PUB. INTEREST 88, 89-94 (1967).
4. Essentially, there exist two steady sources of poor relief in the United States which
are publicly funded. The first, with which this article is concerned, is entirely local reve-
nue which is administered by the state, county, or locality from which it is derived. The
other is from the federal government, which matches funds contributed by the states. This
latter form of poor relief is limited to certain categories of the poor (as defined in the
particular federal statutes implementing the particular programs of federal matching grants);
and, though administered at the state or local level, is subject to substantial administrative
guidance from the federal government. See Irene Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of
the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CoRNELL L. REV. 825, 851-57 (1974).
The other general source is private charitable efforts. Although private charity is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is an important element in the relief of the poor in the
United States. See infira text accompanying notes 160-76. For a general discussion of pri-
vate charity, see Robert H. Bremner, Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Historical
Perspective, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS: HISTORY, TRENDS AND CURRENT MAGNITUDES 89-
114 (1977); Wilbur L Cohen, Some Aspects of Evolving Social Policy in Relation to Pri-
vate Philanthropy, in 2 RESEARcH PAPERS: PHILANTHROPiC FIELDS OF INTEREST 657-62
(1975); Ellen Wimston, Some Aspects of Private Philanthropy in Relation to Social Wel-
fare, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS: PHIANTHROPIC FIELDS OF INTEREST 662-97 (1975).
5. This is accomplished primarily through voluntary private charity. See infra text
accompanying notes 410-17. See generally Bremner, supra note 4, at 89-114 (analyzing
the development of private charity in America, examining the development of philanthrop-
ic ideas from the colonial period on).
6. These programs include all that we commonly associate with modem governmental
"welfare" programs. On the significance of these programs, see generally LEVrrAN, supra
note 3, at 18-94; THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERCA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE
STATE: PERSwENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALmIEs 84-96 (1990); WALTER L TRATrNER,
FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELARE IN AMERICA
284-339 (3d ed. 1984). In this category, too, perhaps, belong all experimental programs or
programs which exist only as long as governmental or private grant funds are available.
The federal government funds a great number of limited life programs. The purpose of
the grants is to promote experimentation, the theory being that successful "experiments
will generate a stable funding source." For an analysis of several current experimental
programs, see JoDrTH M. GURItoN & EDWARD PAULY, FROM WELFARE TO WORK 107-20
(1991).
7. The term "general assistance," as used in this article, means public programs, fi-
nanced from state or local funds, which furnish financial assistance or assistance in-kind
to needy families or individuals, primarily, though not necessarily, in their homes. This
definition is similar to that historically used by the federal government. See OFFICE OF
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programs are the oldest of American systems of poor relief,8 and
the least well understood.9 They have become, in certain states at
FAMILY ASSISTANCE, DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAtE, CHARACTER-
ISTICs OF GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1978). Assistance is not limit-
ed to cash payments.
[A]ssistance may be given in the form of money payments, assistance in kind
provided directly to recipients, vendor payments for medical or remedial care,
or vendor payments for other goods and services. It may include assistance to
recipients living in boarding or nursing homes or in certain public or private
institutions, with the exception of transient care given through shelters or over-
night lodging houses. It does not include cases in which only vendor payments
for burials are made.
Id.
8. See discussion infra part IV.
9. State general assistance programs have yet to be extensively studied. Perhaps be-
cause they lack the cachg of the study of federal efforts, relatively little work has been
done recently respecting the general assistance provisions of the several states. For the
few studies that have been done, see, e.g., Kerry R. Bensinger, From Public Charity to
Social Justice: The Role of the Court in California's General Relief Program, 21 LOY.
LA. L. REV. 497 (1988) (California); Stephen E. Kravit, Standards for General Assistance
in New Hampshire: An Analysis and Proposal, 16 N.H. BJ. 135 (1974) (New Hamp-
shire); Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Develop-
ment, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964) (California); Nancy S. Blanton,
Note, General Assistance in California, 12 SAN FERN. V. L. REv. 31 (1984) (California).
The most extensive research in recent years has been in the area of the rights of the
homeless, which has focused generally on the right to benefits for all people in need.
This study has, for the most part, focused on the right to shelter. See Curtis Berger,
Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAM L. REV. 315 (1990-91);
Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case For an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (1992); Eric Hirsch & Peter Wood, Squatting in New York
City: Justification and Strategy, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 605 (1988) (discuss-
ing effectiveness and need for squatting strategies to solve the housing problem in New
York City); Florence W. Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: A General Guide, 25
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203 (1991) (presenting an overview of statutory arguments in sup-
port of right to shelter).
However, an increasing body of work has focused on other areas of the
homelessness problem. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Chackes, Sheltering the Homeless: Judicial
Enforcement of Governmental Duties to the Poor, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEw. L.
155 (1987); Kim Hopper et al., Economies of Makeshift: Preindustrialization and
Homelessness in New York City, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 213, 213-16 (1985) (describing
the nature of homelessness and the possibility of providing public shelter); Michael L
Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,
28 HOUS. L. REV. 63 (1991) (arguing that because of the condition of some of the
homeless, providing only shelter is insufficient to solve the homelessness problem); Harry
Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to
Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TL. L. REV. 631 (1992); Donald E.
Baker, Comment, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to Punish the
Homeless, 45 U. MIAIM L. REv. 417 (1990-91) (suggesting that cities ought to concen-
trate on eliminating the causes of homelessness rather than expending resources on the
enforcement of anti-homeless legislation); Camilla M. Cochrane, Comment, The Homeless
School-Age Child: Can Educational Rights Meet Educational Needs? 45 U. Miahu L.
[Vol. 44.871
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least,'" the last resort of the homeless and destitute who are able-
bodied but jobless.
These programs also form the basis for the elaborate system of
federal/state welfare programs, of which Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) forms a significant part, and which pro-
vide the bulk of poor relief in the United States." Unlike their
state and local counterparts, most sources of federal governmental
aid are available only to those who meet substantially restrictive
threshold criteria." Although the single-most important criteria
was financial or medical need, the provision of aid has become
increasingly contingent on other criteria.'3 These other criteria can
REv. 537 (1990-91); Michael R. Smith, Note, Limiting the Discretion of the Administrator
of Poor Relief in Indiana, 26 IND. L. REV. 631, 643-46 (1993) (arguing that the local
administrators of relief in Indiana have too much discretion, concluding that state regula-
tion is necessary to curb it).
10. See discussion infra part V; cf GILBERT STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLI-
TICS OF WELFPAE 8-17 (1966) (explaining that the decline in competitors in the welfare
market means that the dominant source of assistance is federal funding).
11. Federal programs account for the largest expenditures by far on aid to the poor.
The largest program is Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC), Title IV of the
Social Security Act of 1935, amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (1988 & Supp. II 1990),
which creates a system of federal grants to the states for programs formulated and admin-
istered by them in accordance with the fairly detailed requirements and supervision of the
Department of Health and Human Services. Most other federal programs follow roughly
the same pattern. For a general description of the available federal programs, see sources
cited supra note 4.
12. The formal criteria employed for categorizing the poor in this manner vary consid-
erably. These criteria can be as simple as proving a certain income level for eligibility
under the Food Stamp Program. See Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030
(1988 & Supp. H 1990). For a description of the Food Stamp Program, see STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON AGRIC., NuTRITION AND FORESTRtY, 99TH CONG., IST SESs., THE
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM; HISTORY, DESCRIPIMON, ISSUES AND OPT7ONS (Comm. Print
1985); Michael Lipsky & Marc A. Thibodeau, Domestic Food Policy in the United States,
15 . HEALTH POLITICS, POL'Y & L. 319 (1990). Such criteria can also be based on a
certain physical or mental condition for eligibility under the Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI). See Supplemental Security Income Program Social Security Amendments of
1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (providing monthly payments to
people who meet the income and assets eligibility criteria and who are also over 65 years
of age or blind or disabled). The criteria used to determine eligibility are codified at 20
C.F.R. § 416.920-4 (1992). See also The Medicaid Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 &
Supp. H 1990) (providing in-kind medical benefits to people meeting the income eligibility
criteria set forth in the statute).
13. Note, however, that even the ability to meet these eligibility criteria does not guar-
antee participation. As William Simon effectively argues, the formalization of entitlement,
bureaucratization of administration, and the proletarianization of the work force has virtual-
ly made a game of attaining benefits, even by those qualified. See William H. Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE LJ. 1198, 1198-99,
1200-22 (1983); cf Smith, supra note 9 (arguing that township trustee's discretion is
limited by due process and equal protection considerations). Simon's conclusion is pointed-
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include marital and family status,'4 physical or mental condi-
tion,'" age," and perhaps even race and ethnicity (although these
criteria are not overt).' 7
ly demonstrated in litigation filed against the County of Los Angeles, alleging, in part,
that the county effectively reduced its welfare caseload by implementing a complex system
filled with traps for the unwary and unsophisticated applicant. See First Amended Com-
plaint For Declaratory Relief, MlJ 6-41, City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles,
(No. C-655-274) (Cal. App. Dep't Super. CL, LA. County. Oct. 19, 1987) (unpublished,
on file with author)[hereinafter First Amended Complaint], and discussion infra part III.
Also, income eligibility criteria may vary from program to program. Them does not even
seem to be a uniform definition of poverty or need across programs. See, e.g., Low IN-
COME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 62-66.
14. For instance, AFDC, the largest cash assistance program in the United States and a
pillar of the American system of public assistance, excludes most indigent two-parent
families and all indigents who are not responsible for minor children. Simon, supra note
13, at 1200-01. For a discussion of the other major federal categorical aid programs
which discriminate on the basis of marital or family status, see MICHAEL BARTH ET AL.,
TOWARD AN EFECTivEs INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND CHOICES
15-19, 36-42 (1974); SAMUEL MENCHER, POOR LAW TO POVERTY PROGRAM: ECONOMIC
SECURInY POLICY IN BtrFAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 388-403 (1967) (comparing the
programs in Britain and the United States); TRATrNER, supra note 6, at 257-339 (provid-
ing a short history of welfare programs, including AFDC).
15. See, e.g., Supplemental Security Income Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1988
& Supp. 11 1990); Medicaid Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988 & Supp. U1 1990).
16. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. H1 1990) (providing benefits
to aged persons who meet certain criteria).
17. "The standard interpretation, at least in liberal intellectual circles, is that the United
States has always been an inegalitarian society in which the myth of equal opportunity
has obscured a reality of submerged class conflict, racial discrimination, and tolerance of
economic inequality." Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox,
in Tim URBAN UNDERCLASS 3, 10 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
See also Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Anti-poverty Strategy: Getting Be-
yond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEo. L.J. 1697, 1743 (1993) ("Another aspect of the dispro-
portionate poverty of African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans is the continuing,
pervasive racial discrimination in America.").
Writers stressing the racial considerations of poor relief systems and the delivery of
aid include DOROTHY L. NEWMAN FT AL., PROTEST, PoLTrrcs AND PROSPERITY: BLACK
AMERICANS AND WHITE INSIrtUTIONS 1940-1975, at 262-64 (1978); CAROL B. STACK,
ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMuNrrY 127-28 (1974); Ken-
neth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race & Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 8-24, 31-49
(1988); cf. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
(1965); STEImR, supra note 10, at 246-48 (observing that federal programs are set up in
a manner to minimize federal intrusion in state handling of racial issues); Lynn R.
Osborn, Language, Poverty, and the North American Indian, in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY:
PERSPECnVES ON A THEME 229, 229-47 (Frederick Williams ed., 1970) (providing an
overview of how the lack of language skills contributes to the poverty of Native Ameri-
cans); Robert L. Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1017
(1989) (arguing that civil rights laws removed the racial barriers to success for Blacks in
America and that race-specific remedies can do nothing to remove the remaining barriers
which are economic).
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American systems of poor relief"s are both a product of, and
limited by, a precisely definable set of critical and fundamental
assumptions which this article describes as the static paradigm.
This paradigm 9 is useful for understanding American approaches
to the reform of poor law systems, and the limiting manner in
which Americans conceptualize the notion of poverty and the ap-
proaches to its alleviation. It also provides a framework through
which one can comprehend the actual effect and orientation of
society's approach to the periodic reform of its poor relief system.
"Reform" can thus be understood as the means by which society
inflates the language of system reform in order to appear to imple-
ment lofty goals (the eradication of poverty) by recharacterizing
traditional approaches as new, untried, or otherwise divinely in-
spiredV '
The ethnic bias of current public assistance is explored by a number of studies. See,
e.g., UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL AND ETHNIC rENSIONS IN
AMERICAN COMMUNITIES: POVERTY, INEQUALTrY AND DISCRIMINATION (1 MOUNT PLEAS-
ANT REPORT) 91-101 (1993) [hereinafter MOUNT PLEASANT REPORT] (studying the delivery
of services to a Hispanic community in Washington, D.C.). The study points out that
"[e]qual access to public benefits is particularly problematic for the Latino residents of the
Mount Pleasant and Adams Morgan communities, not only due to the dearth of bilingual
personnel and materials but also to the geographical accessibility of the applicable service
center." Id. at 147. See also Vera P. John & Vivian M. Homer, Bilingualism and the
Spanish-Speaking Child, in LANGUAGE AND POVERTY: PERSPECrIVES ON A THMME 140,
140-50 (Frederick Williams ed., 1970) (arguing that the lack of bilingual education pre-
vents poor children from achieving their potential); Note, Into the Mouths of Babes: La
Familia Latina and Federally Funded Child Welfare, 105 HAPV. L. REV. 1319, 1319
(1992) (arguing that the dependent care tax credit should be expanded beyond paid child
care because this discriminates against many low-income minority families).
Other writers have emphasized the patriarchal underpinnings of the system of public
assistance and its adverse effect on women. See, eg., Martha L. Fineman, Images of
Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE LJ. 274; Amy B. Hirsch, Income Deeming in
the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713 (1987-88); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare,
and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249 (1983); Martha Minow,
"Forming Underneath Everything that Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985
Wis. L. REV. 819; Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" From a
Different Ground, 81 GEO. LJ. 1961 (1993).
18. The term "poor relief," for purposes of this article, will include all forms of aid
made available to the poor, including governmental and private voluntary institutional aid
as well as individual acts of charity. See infra note 30.
19. "Paradigm" refers to a system of interrelated fundamental and critical assumptions
upon which theories and models of behavior can be derived. The word refers to critical
assumptions which have been articulated and to others which may be critical but unrecog-
nized. See JOHN D. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION: NEW DIMEN-
SIONS OF PoLITCAL ANALYSIS 10 (1974).
20. See id. at 10, 25-27 (discussing the normative and positive value of paradigmatic
thinking and the blinders that such thinking creates). In this sense, the parameters a poor
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But the usefulness of the static paradigm is not limited to
understanding the nature of American poor law reform; it should
also provide insights about current systems of American poor re-
lief. At a minimum, the insights derived from the static paradigm
can take us beyond the confines of traditional analysis. Academic
and political debate respecting the value of these programs and
their utility has centered on the operation of the existing systems
of poor relief: Whether the U.S. Constitution guarantees to each of
its citizens the minimum necessities of daily living?2 If not,
should the poor be provided with monetary or other forms of phys-
ical aid to meet these requirements?'a If so, who should give, and
law system builder relies on help shape and limit the range of plausible choices available.
Once a generalized conception of societal ground rules for system building is accepted,
certain ideas become out-of-bounds or outside the consciousness of the builders. For in-
stance, the static perception accepts the notion that unemployment is a volitional act on
the part of the unemployed: if an unemployed person would seek a job, that person
would find one. As a result, it would be somewhat inconceivable for such a system to
treat the problem of unemployment of the able-bodied by adjusting labor policy. Since the
problem is the volitional choices of the unemployed, the problem could not be primarily
one of lack of jobs, but, rather, one of providing incentives for the jobless to look for
jobs. A non-static view might support adjusting labor policy. See FRANCES F. PPIEN &
RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLC WELFARE
345-46 (1971). The static view does concentrate on work incentives-job and interview
training, financial incentives to work, etc. See, e.g., WHrE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON
THE FAMILY, THE FA mY: PRESERvING AmERiCA'S Furu n (1987) [hereinafter WHnTE
HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY] (Report to the President); MURRAY, supra note
3. For a discussion of the nature of the critical assumptions which make up the static
paradigm and its effect on the manner in which Americans formulate the debate about
"welfare reform," see Larry Catf Backer, Of Handouts and Worthless Promises: Under-
standing the Conceptual Limitations of American Systems of Poor Relief, 34 B.C. L. REV.
997 (1993).
21. Compare Berger, supra note 9 (arguing that all Americans should have a funda-
mental right to shelter); Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty, and State Constitutions, 38
EMORY LJ. 577 (1989) (concluding that state constitutions may guarantee certain rights to
the indigent); Frank L Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One's
View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (arguing that a consti-
tutional right to "welfare" should be recognized) with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility
of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695 (arguing that no
entitlement to welfare can be read into the Constitution); Ellickson, supra note 9 (arguing
against the creation of an unconditional constitutional right to material aid because such a
right would discourage work); Ralph X. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (arguing that the Equal Protection
Clause should not be used as a vehicle for achieving greater income equality).
22. Compare MILTON FRmDMAN, CAPiTAISM AND FREEDOM 191-95 (1962) (arguing
for the creation of a negative income tax as a means of providing for the poor, give
them money and the freedom to spend or misspend it as they choose); ALLAN SHEA-EN,
GUARANTEED INCOME: THE RIGHT TO ECONOMIC SECURITY (1983) (proposing a negative
income tax); Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of
(Vol. 44.871
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what and how much should be given?'s How should the state de-
termine eligibility or otherwise deliver to its poor relief services?"
What is the nature of the rights of the poor to such relief as may
be granted by the state?'s Do those who receive aid want to
work? Should they be encouraged or forced to work? Should they
Distributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 877 (1976) (arguing that each person has the right
to have his basic material needs met by society to the extent he is unable to meet them
by his own efforts) with MARMOR Er AL., supra note 6 (arguing that the system of cate-
gorical aid consisting of transfer payments and payments in-kind works better than gener-
ally supposed); Berger, supra note 9 (arguing that affordable shelter should be a funda-
mental right).
23. See TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE
CHAMBER, A NEW SOCIAL CONTRAC. RETHINKING THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PUB-
LIC ASSISTANCE (1986) [hereinafter NEW YORK TASK FORCE] (arguing that government
should provide financial assistance, education, and training to the poor while providing
incentives for self-sufficiency); NORMAN FuRNiss & TIMOTHY TILTON, THE CASE FOR TM
WELFARE STATE: FROM SOCIAL SECURITY TO SOCIAL EQUALITY 192 (1977) (arguing that
the purpose of American welfare policy should be to provide at least some degree of
equal opportunity); MURRAY, supra note 3 (arguing for the dismantling of substantially all
current systems of poor relief to force recipients to become self-sufficient); Richard A.
Cloward & Frances F. Piven, A Strategy to End Poverty, 202 NATION 510 (proposing a
right to a guaranteed annual income to alleviate poverty); Ronald Dworkin, What is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981) (setting forth
a theory of national welfare based on distributional equality).
24. Compare HERBERT BISNO, TIE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL WORK (1952) (suggesting
that social workers should be given more discretion); CRARL.OTirm TOWLE, HELPING:
CHARLOTIE TOWLE ON SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL CASEWORK 45-46 (Helen H. Perlman
ed., 1969) (suggesting that social workers should have the discretion to make determina-
tions of need and decisions about which programs are best in individual cases); Mildred
Rein, Social Services as a Work Strategy, 49 SC. SERV. REV. 515 (1975); Simon, supra
note 13 (arguing that the welfare system has evolved into a routinized system of rules
administered by robotized clerks and has lost much of its ability to respond to the indi-
vidual needs of recipients who should be of primary importance); Norman L Wyers,
Whatever Happened to the Income Maintenance Line Worker? 25 SOC. WORK 259 (1980)
(proposing that income maintenance workers do more than determine an applicant's eligi-
bility by assuming more of the traditional duties of a professional social worker) with
KENNEH C. DAvis, DiSCRErIONARY JUSTICE: A PREumiNARY INQUIRY (1969) (arguing
for a legally based, detailed, and routinized system of aid to the poor, with ultimate dis-
cretion left to the legislature or regulatory arm of government); Joel F. Handier, Control-
ling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1966) (suggesting
that statutory and administrative controls be exercised over welfare functionaries who
determine the eligibility of applicants); Jerry L Mashaw, The Management Side of Due
Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,
and Tuneliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L REv. 772
(1974).
25. Chackes, supra note 9 (examining situations where nonresidents may have a right
to use state-rn homeless shelters and situations where they may not); Richard A. Epstein,
The Uncertain Quest For Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 201; Craig M. Fullen,
Note, A Home Away From Home: An Analysis of a State's Duty to Provide Services to
Nonresident Homeless, 23 RUTGERS LJ. 117 (1991).
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be punished for refusing to work?' And, does or should society's
determination of the place of certain members of society-for
instance, women, the visually challenged, the educationally disad-
vantaged, ethnic or racial minorities-determine the manner in
which society ought to respond to the needs of those segments of
society?" Most such analyses have been based on an unconscious
26. Compare Low INcOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 51-58
(arguing that work requirements can save money, increase work experience, and raise
earnings of welfare recipients); GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981) (arguing
that a return to traditional economic and social organization will solve the problem of the
permanence of poverty); MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALTY 136-48 (1992) (replacing
cash welfare with work would end the indignity of receiving welfare; as such the state
ought to distribute benefits based on labor); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ErEmENr.
TiE SOCIAL OBUGA-TONS OF CMZENSM, (1986) (arguing that the unemployed recipients
of welfare are unlikely to work unless required as a condition to the receipt of benefits);
MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-33 (arguing that the able-bodied should be forced to work
by denying them access to all welfare programs) with MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OnmR
AMERICA: POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1971) (observing that poverty is in
part the result of cultural factors; therefore, work requirements would fail because they do
not address the factors causing poverty); ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN: AN EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE NATION'S NEw POVERTY (1988) (arguing that
the government can deal efficiently with economic inequality efficiently without creating
the disincentives to work inherent in previous and present welfare programs); S.IL
Danziger et al., Antipoverty Policy: Effects on the Poor and the Nonpoor, in FIGHTING
POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 50, 50-77 (S.L Danziger & D.IL Wein-
berg eds., 1986) (proposing antipoverty policies that seek to reduce poverty and also
reduce dependence on the welfare system); Francis Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The
Contemporary Relief Debate, in TIE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON TRE WELFARE
STATE (Fred Block et al. eds., 1987) (proposing a right to a guaranteed annual income).
27. See, e.g., UNrE STATES CONSUiSStON ON HUMAN RIGHTS, WOMEN AND POVERTY
(1974) (arguing that women's place in society requires a special program, AFDC, to meet
their needs); KEN AUL=mrA, THE UNDERCLAss (1982) (examining the social and cultural
dynamics of a group of people receiving or eligible for public assistance); CIIISTOPER
JENCKS, RETHNKING SOCIAL PouCy: RACE, POVERTY AND TIM UNDERCLASS (1992) (ar-
guing for welfare policy based on cultural conservatism and favoring traditional social
norms about how people ought to behave, economic egalitarianism (moral obligation to
distribute goods and services more equally), and incremental reform (a long-term strategy
implemented in stages); on that basis exploring the problems of so-called ghetto culture
and its contribution to poverty); Martin Kilson, Black Social Classes and Intergenerational
Poverty, 64 PU. INTEREST 58 (1981) (arguing that data on African American social mo-
bility from the 1960s and 1970s reveals a pattern of social stratification characterized by
a tendency toward intergenerational perpetuation of poverty among African Americans);
Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 187 (Daniel P.
Moynihan ed., 1987) (describing cultural sources of poverty); Anthony Monaco, Blacks,
Immigrants, and the Roots of Poverty in America, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 297 (1985) (exploring the basis for differences between African Americans and
immigrant groups of other races and ethnic groups in economic achievement); Joanna K.
Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare" Programs and Poor Women, 26
NEw ENG. L. REV. 415 (1991) (implementing work requirements on AFDC recipients
presumes the autonomy and independence of women, a presumption which may be at
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acceptance of the fundamental critical assumptions of the static
paradigm.s Questions are raised and answered within-the context
of the static paradigm itself; the paradigm provides the unseen
limits on the scope of analysis. Analyzing the basis of American
variance with reality); see also supra note 17.
28. Not all academic analysis rests comfortably within the bosom of the paradigm. A
number of commentators have struck out on different paths. Many have been characterized
as welfare universalists. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Political-
ly Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERcLAss
411, 428 (Christopher Jencks & Paul B. Peterson eds., 1991) (arguing that "rather than
devising new programs narrowly focused on low-income people or the urban poor, and
rather than seeking to reform or expand aid to families with dependent children and other
means-tested public assistance programs, policy makers should work towards displacing
welfare with new policies that could address the needs of less privileged Americans along
with those of the middle class and the stable working class.'); see also SAR A. LEvrrAN
& CLIFFORD M. JOHNSON, BEYOND THE SAFETY NET. REVIVING THE PROMISE OF OPPOR-
TUNITY IN AMERICA (1984) (arguing that governmental entitlements to the middle class
ought to be reduced to fund programs designed to eradicate poverty, primarily training
and public employment projects); Piven & Cloward, supra note 26, at 45-108 (arguing
that current categorical relief programs should be eliminated and replaced by a uniform
national system of social provision for the poor).
Other interventionists favor an approach based on redistributing income for the pur-
pose of ameliorating or even eliminating income or wealth inequality. See, e.g., FRIED-
MAN, supra note 22, at 191-95 (advocating negative income tax to provide income supple-
ments unrestricted as to use); HAVEMAN, supra note 26, at 156-71 (proposing the creation
of guaranteed minimum income programs, a national child support program, employment
subsidies, and capital accounts for youth to be used for education or training); William A.
Klein, Some Basic Problems of Negative Income Taxation, 1966 WIs. L. REV. 776, 776-
800 (advocating a negative income tax). A recently emerging group argues that simple
solutions to poverty do not exist because there is more than one problem. They argue,
instead, for comprehensive programs requiring a number of different approaches, ranging
from universalist to targeted. See, eg., Edelman, supra note 17, at 1742-44 (advocating a
holistic approach to combating poverty because of the multitude of factors that contribute
to it).
Others argue that not only is redistributing wealth or income necessary, but that this
redistribution can become permanent only with a substantial redistribution of political and
economic power. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Anthnonies of Poverty Law and a
Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 659, 678-90
(1987-88) (arguing that poverty lawyers should address the marginalized social role of the
poor to facilitate their empowerment); Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From
Here, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARIN
LtHEtR KING, JR. 245, 245-52 (James M. Washington ed., 1991) (text of presidential
address delivered in 1967 by King to the Southern Christian Leadership Council) (arguing
that the attainment of economic and political power was essential to the struggle for civil
rights and the amelioration of African American poverty). In this, certainly, one has trav-
elled as far as one can from the fundamental assumptions and outlooks of the static para-
digm. For that reason, perhaps, such proposals are viewed as quixotic. See, e.g., Robert
Greenstein, Universalist and Targeted Approaches to Relieving Poverty: An Alternative
View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLAss 437, 437-59 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 1991) (criticizing the universalist approach to poor relief reform as being unrealisti-
cally ambitious).
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poor relief with a conscious understanding of the fundamentals
animating such systems and approaches to their formation and
continuity is essential for those who seek real understanding of
such systems and their rhetoric, goals, and reformation.
This brings us to the purposes of this article. The first is to
develop a theoretical discourse with which one can discuss Ameri-
can approaches to poor relief. For purposes of brevity I will refer
to this discourse as a "general theory" of contemporary American
poor relief. To develop this discourse, this article will explore the
manner in which the critical assumptions of the static paradigm
(our generally accepted objectivist and absolutist rendition of the
reality of the condition of the poor) shapes the way we actually
craft and implement poor relief programs and the implementation
issues about which we seem to go round and round. This theoreti-
cal discourse will provide a contextually based method of analyz-
ing, predicting, and explaining the nature and behavior of modem
American systems of poor relief? The second is to employ this
29. In doing this, I acknowledge the debate regarding the definition and existence of
"theory," at least in its guise as general hermeneutics. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Consequenc-
es, 11 CRmCAL INQUIRY 433, 437 (1984-85) (recognizing that defining theory as a proce-
dure whose steps, if they are faithfully and strictly followed, will always yield correct
results, is an impossible project because "the primary data and formal laws necessary to
its success will always be spied or picked out from within the contextual circumstances of
which they are supposedly independent"); Josu6 Harari, Nostalgia and Critical Theory, in
Tim LlMrr OF THEORY 168 (Thomas M. Kavanaugh ed., 1989) (conceiving of theory as
an attempted negation or false ordering of reality); cf. MtRuAY KRiEGER, THEORY OF
CRmciSM: A TRADrnON AND ITS SYSTEMS 7 (1976) (arguing against the possibility of
being against theory: "Our choice is rather between having an awareness of those theoreti-
cal issues which our criticism inevitably raises or going along without such an aware-
ness:).
Theory, as I use the term, is closest, perhaps, to the notion of antifundamentalist
theoretical discourse which Stanley Fish describes as in contradistinction to fundamentalist
theory that promises to put our calculations and determinations on a firmer footing than
can be proved by mere belief or unjustified practice (an objectivist and absolutist herme-
neutics). Mine is more a historicist theorizing that demonstrates "that the norms and stan-
dards and rules that foundationalist theory would oppose to history, convention, and local
practice are in every instance a function or extension of history, convention, and local
practice." Fish, supra, at 439. In this, my theoretical discourse owes much to Thomas
Kuhn. THOMAs S. KUHN, TBE COPERNICAN REVOLTnON 74 (1957) ("Logically, there are
always many alternative conceptual schemes capable of bringing order to any prescribed
list of observations; but these alternatives differ in their predictions about phenomena not
included on the list"). By revealing the history, convention and local practice of poor
relief, I seek to engage in explanatory and predictive discourse that might help clarify
how American society understands its poor law and uses its understanding to fashion and
justify those systems. My theory is not directed towards truth (writ large) but rather to-
wards an understanding of an accepted conception of truth (reality) that is rooted in the
circumstances of which it believes itself independent. "There is no wholesale,
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general theory as a tool for understanding the dynamics of modem
institutional systems of poor relief; the guinea pig, so to speak, for
the examination is a critical, but generally ignored area of Ameri-
can institutional poor relief-state general assistance programs3 I
articulate the critical set of assumptions making up the static para-
digm in Part IL21 Part III is devoted to the exposition of the gen-
eral theory of American poor relief. Parts IV and V test the ex-
planatory and predictive potential of the general theory from both a
historical and a contemporary perspective. Part IV critically exam-
ines the antecedents of modem American poor relief, medieval
ecclesiastical poor relief and the Elizabethan Poor Law, in light of
the general theory. Part V then examines contemporary systems of
state general assistance on the basis of the theory.
The threads of the preceding analysis are woven together in
Part VI. Unquestioning acceptance of the underlying notions of the
static paradigm tends to create fuzzyheaded analysis of fundamental
questions of poor relief. You tend to be what you believe, and if
you control the mechanisms of popular culture, society, and gov-
ernment, what you believe tends to define and limit the reality in
which issues are perceived and debated. Our reality is described by
the general theory. The foundation of our modem, secular poor
relief in the United States has much more in common with the
hierarchic, religiously based medieval ecclesiastical poor relief
systems fully developed almost a thousand years ago than it does
with the mythological American poor relief which has formed a
epistemological way to direct, or criticize, or underwrite, the course of inquiry. ... VIt is
the vocabulary of practice rather than of theory... in which one can say something
useful about truth." RICIIARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMAISM (ESSAYS 1972-80)
162 (1982).
30. See supra note 7 for the definition of general assistance as used in this article.
State general assistance programs have been somewhat neglected in the academic literature.
I suspect this is because such programs are not "national" in scope, nor much debated in
the more "important' national policy fora, and are therefore seen as less interesting or
important (at least in terms of their impact). Such conceptualizations are shortsighted, as I
attempt to demonstrate, since state programs tend to be fairly single-minded (with some
local variation) and have had a significant effect on the limited, though more uniformly
applicable, federally administered programs. Despite the differences between them, federal
categorical relief programs can be characterized as merely complex elaborations of the
basic systems created to distribute general assistance. Much, therefore, can be learned by
studying state general assistance systems of relief, especially when considering that the
current federal categorical aid programs do not meet their goals of eradicating poverty.
31. For a fuller treatment of the static paradigm and its utility in understanding the
limitations on any attempt to reform American poor relief systems, see Backer, supra note
20.
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staple in the diet of the American public since the days of the
"New Deal." Anglo-American society, despite periodic protests to
the contrary, is a society convinced of the soundness of its ap-
proach to poor relief. It is part of a larger society that has devoted
the last thousand years to refining-not replacing-its poor relief
institutions. Poor relief remains a reflection of the society from
which it derives, and this society demands above all else that its
members be productive. We do not question the need to provide
for oneself and of the right to keep what one produces; our system
of relief reinforces those notions. Any form of poor relief which
fails to affirm these principles (for example, relief based on con-
cepts such as a negative income tax, or an unconditional right to
income) will be perceived as a threat to the stability of the social
order and on that basis suppressed (if only by ridicule, silence, or
inattention).
This state of affairs is not a bad thing if you subscribe to the
critical assumptions of stasis (and it is hard not to in this culture).
If, indeed, all people must toil for their bread (with certain limited
exceptions) and may keep what they "earn" (as well as what their
forbears earned), and if poor relief systems are a function of these
critical .social choices, then the fundamental patterns of poor relief
are both fundamentally limited and inalterable and right. As long
as the basic assumptions of the static paradigm itself remain un-
questioned, there is unlikely to be anything substantially different
in the manner in which our society relieves its destitute. It is un-
likely that those assumptions will be questioned by society anytime
soon. As such, for those uncomfortable with the message and im-
plications of stasis, for those who actually believe the rhetoric of
poverty, the picture is, therefore, quite gloomy.
II. THE CRICAL AssuMpTIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE STATIC
PARADIGM
From the settling of the American colonies, the task of formal-
ly dealing with the poor in Anglo-American society has been dele-
gated to the legislature, which, in turn, has devised and redevised
self-contained systems for the regulation, control, and elimination
of the problem of the poor. The first visible manifestation of this
legislative approach can be traced to the development in the medi-
eval canon law of a self-contained system for identifying the poor
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and regulating the manner of their relief?2 Its earliest modem
manifestation was the Elizabethan Poor Law system inherited by
the American colonies, which has passed essentially unchanged to
the present.
At the core of this approach are a governing set of assumptions
about the "poor" and their relief and maintenance. The static para-
digm provides a coherent intellectual framework for the resolution
of conflict or deficiencies respecting society's response to the
"plight" of the "poor."'33 It should not be surprising, then, that
whenever, in the course of Anglo-American history, a "welfare"
crisis looms, the assumptions and modes of conceptualizing inher-
ent in the static paradigm have framed (limited) the manner in
which critical problems are "discovered" and debated by students
of the subject. The debris of this debate litters the twists and turns
of recent public policy. Ironically, the means of resolving all of
these crises, the evidence of which is embodied in statutory sys-
tems for the regulation of the poor, has remained un-
changed-identifying a group of people to be labelled "the poor,"
isolating this group, and applying legislated restrictions, benefits,
and coercive measures to this group.
In an important sense, stasis affects unconscious notions of the
limitations of the system. It also affects the characterizations, as
reasonable or unreasonable, of the cognizable range of goals, strate-
gies, and approaches to poverty and the poor, making what might
appear reasonable to other societies anathema to this one24 My
32. See infra part i"1.
33. See Backer, supra note 20. In examining the symbolic and mythologizing effect of
modem forms of welfare policy, primarily federal categorical relief, Joel Handler and
Yeheskel Hasenfeld have argued that social welfare policy cannot be fully understood
without recognizing that "it is fundamentally a set of symbols that try to differentiate
between the deserving and undeserving poor in order to uphold such dominant values as
the work ethic and family, gender, race, and ethnic relations." Join F. HANDLEa &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF PovERTY: WELFARE REFORM iN
AMERICA 11 (1991).
34. A good example, perhaps, is the irreconcilable difference in economic world view
between a theoretical Marxist and an orthodox Calvinist. The former conceives of the
world as striving towards a political economy of income equality, and on that basis as-
sumes that poverty will be eradicated. See Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, ManIfesto of
the Communist Party, in THE PORTABLE KARL MARX 203, 218-28 (Eugene Kamenka ed.,
1983). A Calvinist cannot conceive of a world where the sweat of the brow of one per-
son is taken to provide sustenance for another person, except under very narrowly defined
circumstances. Income inequality is a measure of the relative attainment of eternal salva-
tion-an earthly sign of the favor of God on earth for those who heed the biblical com-
mandments. Poverty will be eradicated not when all people are able to live alike, but
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moral: Progress is an illusion. Reform is manipulation of system
parameters within the bounds of the assumptions from which the
system springs. Efficiency is indeterminate. Liberal and conserva-
tive discourse have far more in common than their respective rhet-
oric admits. All spring from and are bound to the paradigm vision
to which I now turn.
The static paradigm, at the broadest level of generality, is
meant to connote the unchanging, the passive, the inactive-the
term implies the fundamental acceptance of stasis. Notions of stasis
and passivity infuse the choices available in approaching the struc-
turing of relief, and limit the perceived range of the possible. In
other words, stasis implies a world view, a notion of action, which
is limited to the existing, the actual, the traditional. It is a back-
ward-looking conceptualization of the nature of things, at least in
the sense that there is little faith in progress or the notion of the
positive overall constancy of change for the character of human-
kind.' It is a view which finds contentment with the temporary
amelioration of that which is otherwise unacceptable but cannot be
changed.
In concrete terms, the social and economic order is taken as a
given-poor law programs do not challenge the status quo' In
when all people heed God's call and work for their keep. See infra notes 273-82 and
accompanying text. Obviously, the type of eradicative program which might be champi-
oned by the Marxist would appear destructive to the Calvinist. Likewise, the type of pro-
gram best suited to the world view of the Calvinist might seem little more than a form
of oppression and the institutionalization of poverty to the Marxist.
35. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 15-43 (discussing the myths
and ceremonies of welfare policy). There is an extraordinary sense of immutability run-
ning through the authors' analysis of these myths and ceremonies. See also Backer, supra
note 20, at part uI.A; Peterson, supra note 17, at 10 (noting how the American welfare
system has lagged behind other countries' systems and suggesting reasons for America's
resistance); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,
79 GEo. U. 1499, 1509-10 (1991) (and articles cited therein) (stating that a central
theme in the rhetoric of poverty is "helplessness," which is expressed by the societal
feeling that poverty is an avoidable social condition).
36. This notion has a long pedigree going back in modem form at least to the ecclesi-
astical system of poor relief in Western Europe during the Middle Ages. See BRIAN
TIERNEY, MEDIEvAL POOR LAW: A SKETCH OF CANONICAL THEORY AND ITS APPLICA-
TION IN ENGLAND 26-35 (1959) (detailing the various justifications offered by the church
to allow it to hold private property). The notion has been popularly expressed in this
century as well. President Harding, in opening the 1921 Conference on Unemployment,
stated
It is fair to say to you that you are not asked to solve the long controverted
problems of the social system. We have builded [sic] the America of today on
the fundamentals of economic, industrial and political life which made us what
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contemporary guise, any argument that the economic and social
system currently in place is not the best possible is substantially
taboo. Argument, as a result, is reduced to conflicts between those
who have different notions of the means by which this current so-
cial and economic system, shorn of its impurities, is to be imple-
mented. It also holds some logic for those who value social sta-
bility over other goals 8 This is reflected in the enormous amount
of literature devoted to the so-called "culture of poverty," which is
meant to explain the medical or psychological or social basis for
the inability of the poor to overcome their condition 9 Poverty is
thus primarily a function of the actions of the poor themselves, or
of a host of other conditions, all of which could be remedied by
them-for instance, the inability to speak or learn standard Eng-
lish, or the tendency by some to bear "too many" children at
"too early" an age.4' Indeed, culture of poverty rhetoric expresses
we are, and the temple requires no remaking now .... I would have little
enthusiasm for any proposed relief which seeks either palliation or tonic from
the public treasury.
Quoted in William L. Chenery, Unemployment at Washington, 47 SURV. 42 (1921). See
also JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS AND PoL-
TCS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 6-7 (1988) (arguing that the social organization
of production determines the nature and form of relief programs).
37. Compare GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 151-54 (1992) (arguing that pov-
erty is a function of the abandonment of traditional notions of marriage and the gender
roles of males and females; the result is the loss of the work ethic); MEAD, supra note
26, at 241-58 (arguing that poverty is a function of the failure to impose a work obliga-
tion on paupers); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 150-53 (arguing that poverty is a function of
indiscriminate institutional charity) with HARRINGTON, supra note 26, at 1 (arguing that
the cultural forces that create cyclical poverty need to be attacked to eradicate poverty);
ROBERT J. LAMPMAN, ENDS AND MEANS OF REDUCING INCOME POVERTY 33-42 (1971)
(arguing that poverty is a function of income inequality); Frank 1. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 659-62 (1979) (arguing
for the constitutionalization of the right to welfare); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) (arguing that welfare entitlements ought to be treated as forms
of property rights). Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 436-38 (3d
ed. 1986) (arguing generally that government entitlements are a form of property). Of
course, not everyone shares these views. Modem scholars have argued from a different
perspective. See supra note 28.
38. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 45-46 (arguing that welfare policy ensures
social and political stability through income and work relief); Alfieri, supra note 28, at
678-80 (arguing that the practice of poverty law embodies particular assumptions and
expectations about the poor which further the status quo).
39. See EDWIN C. BANFiELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CrrY REVISITED (1974); DANIEL P.
MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING (1969); JAMES Q. WILSON, THINK-
ING ABOUT CRIME (1975); Lewis, supra note 27, at 191-92; and discussion infra, part
V.B.
40. See, eg., Osbom, supra note 17.
41. See, e.g., STUART BtTLER & ANNA KONDRATAS, OUT OF THIE POVERTY TRAP: A
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society's belief that poverty is evidence of the failure to conform
individual behavior to strongly held societal norms and expecta-
tions--evidence, indeed, of a fatal character flaw.' The popular
press and our political leaders are always interested in presenting
anecdotal accounts of this "fact." Thus, the recent notoriety of
Dwight Hobbes, a person who, homeless and destitute for a time,
overcame his economic condition and in the process (and based on
his experiences) began to publicize his view that the problem of
poverty, at least as affects the archetypal homeless person, is a
problem of the character of the person who finds himself in that
condition."3
CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY FOR WE.FARE REFORM 138-39 (1987) (referring to AFDC, the
authors argue that "now the program finances a subculture whose citizens argue.. . that
they want children but not marriage, because 'you don't want the commitments' and
'male figures are not substantially important in the family.'"); Lorraine V. Kerman, The
Association Between Adolescent Parenting and Childhood Poverty, in CHILDREN IN POVER-
TY: CmLD DEvELOPMENT AND Puluc PouCY 79, 87-91 (Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991).
42. Thus, in describing the manner in which states were beginning to fight the "narcot-
ic" effect of the present state of welfare, former President George Bush explained the
assumptions under which such programs ought to operate:
That when able-bodied adults receive government assistance they have responsi-
bilities to the taxpayer. A responsibility to seek work, education, or job train-
ing. A responsibility to get their lives in order. A responsibility to hold their
families together and refrain from having children out of wedlock. And a re-
sponsibility to obey the law.
George H. Bush, State of the Union Address, Address before the Congress of the United
States (Jan. 28, 1992), in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at A16. Both President Clinton and
the Congress have proposed to design a program that would induce the poor to act "re-
sponsibly" by forcing the poor into jobs after a limited number of years on the dole.
Larry Catfi Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: An Essay on the Futility of "Ending
Welfare as We Know It", 30 HARV. C.R.-C.. L. REV. 339, 342 n.16, 374-77 (1995).
Thus, at the root of concerns about intergenerational transfers of poverty "is the paucity
of employment among welfare mothers and how this affects attitudes of their children
towards work." John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501
ANNAlS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scz. 26, 44 (1989); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, The
Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy, in ON CHARACTER: ESSAYS
BY JAMES Q. WILSON 11, 16-17 (1991) (describing as evidence of a change in the char-
acter of people in American society the fact that being on welfare is now seen not as a
temporary and rather embarrassing expedient, but as a right from which recipients will not
be deterred). But see HARRINGTON, supra note 26, at 171 (arguing that "being poor is not
one aspect of a person's life in this country; it is his life. Taken as a whole, poverty is
a culture").
43. In Hobbes' own words:
The homeless in Minneapolis, America's social services nirvana, are for the
most part blithely disinterested in solving their problems and are content to see
their well-being as someone else's responsibility. You must be steadfastly dedi-
cated to a down-and-out lifestyle to remain flat on your behind in the Twin
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Acceptance of the immutability of the status quo has several
important consequences for the parameters of poor relief. First, it
implies an acceptance of the existence, value, and immutability of
income inequality and its derivative notions.' Foremost among
these is the notion that a person has the right to the substantially
undisturbed enjoyment of the fruits of his or her labor. "There has
always been the underlying contention that, as a matter of natural
law and equity, what a man has received save by proven larceny is
rightfully his."' Second, it suggests that there exist generally ac-
Cities - a fact that the Captains of every city in America should take note of.
Dwight Hobbes, Down, Out and Overindulged: The Case Against Helping Guys Like Me,
WASH. PoSr, Feb. 14, 1993, at Cl. Political speeches are littered with examples of the
well behaved and successful poor. President Clinton's speech announcing the introduction
of his welfare reform attempt, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, HR. 4605, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) ("WARA"), was peppered with references to other welfare success
stories who had evidenced similar outlooks. William Clinton, Remarks at the White House
by the President to Officials of Missouri and Participants of the Future Now Program
(Tune 14, 1994) available in 1994 WL 258369.
44. This is not the place to argue the merits (or demerits) of income inequality. The
debate is long standing. On one side are those who champion the notion that at least
some form of income inequality is a societal good as it provides incentive to achieve,
survive, and increase the net benefit of individuals and society. On the other side are
those who view anything but the most limited income inequality as a societal wrong
which creates exploitation, unfavorable advantage, waste of human resources and potential,
and aggregate societal unhappiness. Compare HAVEMAN, supra note 26, at 156-71 (pro-
posing the creation of a guaranteed minimum income program, a national child support
program, employment subsidies, and capital accounts for youth to be used for education
or training); LAMPMAN, supra note 37, at 33-42 (describing the causes of inequality, and
the arguments in favor of reducing it) with ADoip A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REPUBUc 51 (1963) (suggesting that income and wealth inequality are a fundamental
underpinning of American economic success); JOHN K. GALBRAH, THE AFnezr SocI-
ETY 29-40 (3d ed. 1976) (arguing that Western competitive economies are based on in-
equality and poverty); cf. GILDER, supra note 26, at 64-74 (arguing that the number of
poor can be reduced by creating incentive for the wealthy to invest).
45. GALBRArrH, supra note 44, at 68. The benefits of income or wealth inequality (at
least based on productivity) are deeply embedded in certain segments of the American
psyche, and are part of American mythology.
Neither the Founding Fathers nor the American economic system was so stupid
as to assume that men should remain equal through life. The industrious should
go farther than the idlers; men of integrity should outpace rascals. All, through
their own efforts and in accordance with their own moral and intellectual ca-
pacity, should settle their inequality by achievement and result.
BEREA supra note 44, at 51. This notion is more bluntly put by Charles Murray:
Some people are better than others. They deserve more of society's rewards, of
which money is only one small part. A principal function of social policy is to
make sure that they have the opportunity to reap those rewards. Government
cannot identify the worthy, but it can protect a society in which the worthy
can identify themselves.
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ceptable methods for determining what bundle of necessities are
important and ought to be possessed by all, and what is enough of
each element of the bundle. This we call "poor relief."' As a
corollary, we belike we can also objectively identify people who
do not possess sufficient quantities, in the aggregate, of the ele-
ments of this bundle. These we style the "poor."'47
MURRAY, supra note 3, at 234. See also HAROLD L. WILENSKY & CHARLES N.
LEBEAuX, INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE: THE IMPAC" OF INDUSTRIALIZA-
TION ON THE SUPPLY AND ORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 33-48 (1958) (arguing that the basic notion of the American social and economic
order is embodied in the concept of the rational, acquisitive, self-interested individual who
is rewarded for his or her hard work with wealth and private ownership of the means of
production and minimal interference by the government in its use); Ellickson, supra note
9, at 17-22 (arguing that people are entitled to what they earn through their efforts and
that establishing such constitutional rights as the right to housing provides a disincentive
to work); tenBroek, supra note 9, at 286-87 (arguing that poor law developed from a
notion that the poor as a class will always exist, so when society decided to shoulder the
burden of this class, it did not seek to eliminate poverty, but merely minimize the cost
associated with helping the poor).
46. Thus, in the fourth century Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, devised an elaborate system
of categorization of the poor for determining eligibility for aid. To decide whether aid
was appropriate, Ambrose determined the social position of the recipient. For example,
people of high station were worthy of aid to the extent that their standard of living fell
to the point where they were unable to maintain their position in the community. This
relational conception of need and poverty was carried over into the Canon Law system of
poor relief, and then inherited by the colonies. TIERNEY, supra note 36, at 56-57.
This view finds modem expression in the writings of commentators such as Michael
Harrington, who have argued that the key to eradicating poverty lies not in attacking
absolute poverty, but in reducing relative poverty. Poverty, thus, is defined as an inevita-
ble product of income inequality, and measured as a function of the income of society's
most well off. See HARRINGTON, supra note 26, at 158-59 (arguing that although the poor
in the United States "do not suffer the extreme privation of the peasants of Asia or the
tribesmen of Africa . . . the mechanism of the misery is similar"). Poverty viewed in
this light is characterized as a deviation from social and economic norms in need of
correction. Mencher quotes the pithy comments of LM. Rubinow in that regard-
Luxuries become comforts, comforts become necessaries; and repeated emphasis
of the fact that in comparison with civilizations of the past or more backward
contemporary cultures the poor in the United States now enjoy what would
have constituted unusual luxuries a thousand or even a hundred years ago may
lead to an entirely barren conception of the problem of poverty as an aspect of
distribution of wealth. Thus an increase in perceived poverty is a phenomenon
particularly characteristic of American life during periods of so-called prosperity.
I.M. Rubinow, Poverty, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOC. So. 285 (1934), quoted in MENCHER,
supra note 14, at 367.
This view is shared by some current scholars who argue for the eradication of pov-
erty through some form of wealth redistribution. See, e.g., HAVEMAN, supra note 26 (ar-
guing that government still bears the responsibility for economic inequality and proposing
more efficient methods to handle the problem); LAMPmAN, supra note 37, at 33-42 (argu-
ing that wealth redistribution is necessary to minimize income inequality).
47. But note the tenuousness of even this seemingly straightforward definition and the
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Third, since wealth is necessarily a function of the ability of
people, by their own efforts, to accumulate it, those who cannot or
do not accumulate it in quantity sufficient to meet their needs are
labelled (branded?) life's losers, social and economic deviants who
cannot or will not conform their behavior to that generally pre-
scribed. And what is generally prescribed is that people are person-
ally expected to provide for their necessities from their efforts or
wealth. Genesis 3:17-19 sets forth the basic American command-
ment to work and "earn their keep."' They are those who found
it unnecessary to hold a job or to properly arrange their personal
affairs to avoid unwanted pregnancy, drug addiction, and the like.
The badge of their deviance is their poverty, to be wom (much
like Hester Prynne's scarlet letter was to be worn as a badge of
her sexual deviance),49 until they "reform" themselves.50
Thus, the desperately poor are not like the rest of the laboring
population; they are akin to a different subspecies of humanity.
The very labels society uses to "describe" the poor separate them
from the rest of society and make it easier to decree the necessity
of changing them (for their own good), to hold them responsible
for the ills with which they are plagued, as well as those (societal
or economic) ills which gave rise to their poverty in the first place;
poverty is a matter of choice 5 ' They are the "lower classes," the
fundamental mutability of the concept. Having defined poverty in terms of income, the
government continues to wrestle with the question of what ought to be included in the
calculation.
The answer to that question is shaped by cultural assumptions so embedded
that they are not even recognized. We do not, for example, consider the possi-
bility of combining the income of parents and their adult children in reaching a
judgment about whether either ... should be considered impoverished. Other
cultures would do so as a matter of course.
MURRAY, supra note 3, at 57 n.2. See also Backer, supra note 20, at nn.74-77; Fuchs,
supra note 3, at 89-94 (suggesting a new definition of poverty due to the limitation of
the present one); Note, supra note 17 (arguing for the expansion of the dependent care
tax credit beyond child care).
48. See also Backer, supra note 20, at nn.96-102.
49. See NATHANIAL HAWrHORNE, THE SCARLEr LmETER (Fredson Bowers ed., 1962).
50. For an interesting analysis of the direct effect of labelling the poor on the nature
of relief crafted, see Ross, supra note 35, at 1499-1510 (exploring a number of ways in
which the poor are isolated from the rest of society and recharacterized as a sort of pari-
ah class); cf David P. Farrington, The Effects of Public Labelling, 17 BRrr. J. CRIMINOL-
OGY 112, 117-20 (1977) (testing the hypothesis that increased deviant behavior occurs
when one is labelled a criminal); David P. Farrington et al., The Persistence of Labelling
Effects, 18 BRIT. . CRIMINOLOGY 277, 277-80 (1978) (examining the persistence of delin-
quent behavior in those who have been adjudicated to be delinquent).
51. Ross, supra note 35, at 1509-10 (arguing that such notions make it easy to con-
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"underclass," the "dangerous [classes], discontented and potentially
revolutionary."2 The poor, especially those perceived to be able-
bodied, have assumed an almost mythic quality. "While the tradi-
tional American folk-hero has been the self-made, rags to riches
man, as deeply ingrained into the American system is the belief in
a folk-villain, the self-made poor man, lazy, immoral and irrespon-
sible."3
And society has not failed to use the sciences to convince
people of the inevitability of this inferiority. As Herbert Gans has
noted, "Underclass is a particularly nasty label, however. Earlier
terms such as pauper, vagrant, and tramp were openly pejorative,
but underclass is a technical-sounding word that hides its pejorative
clude that poverty is irremediable). Consider in this light Charles Murray's story of Har-
old and Phyllis. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156-66.
52. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA oF PovERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUS-
TRIAL AGE 381 (1984); see also AULEITA, supra note 27, at 272 (discussing the disasso-
ciation of the underclass from society); JENCKS, supra note 27, at 143-203 (examining
whether the American underclass is growing); Peterson, supra note 17, at 10 (providing
an overview of the urban underclass); Ross, supra note 35, at 1517-39 (analyzing the
marginalizing rhetoric in judicial decision making which treats the poor as a class apart).
As Gertrude Himmelfarb clearly demonstrated, this notion of separateness, of the barbarity
of the poor, and their difference from the rest of society, has been well-developed in
Europe for almost 200 years. Indeed, by the early 19th century, the isolation of the poor
was substantially completed. HIMMELFARB, supra, at 390-93.
The lower classes are gradually expelled from the usage and laws of civilized
life and are reduced to the state of barbarism through the sufferings and priva-
tions of destitution. Pauperism is tantamount to exclusion from society. The
destitute resemble the bands of Anglo-Saxons who took to a nomadic life in
the forests to escape the Norman yoke. They are outside society, outside law,
outlaws, and almost all criminals come from their ranks. Once distress has
brought its weight to bear on a man, it gradually presses him down, degrades
his character, strips him of all benefits of civilized life one after another and
imposes upon him the vices of the slave and the barbarian.
EUGENE BuREr, DE LA NMSERE DES CLASSES LABORIEUSES EN ANGLEIERRE Er EN FRANCE
(1840), quoted in Htmma.FARB, supra, at 393. Similar expressions are common in the late
20th century. See AtIL=A, supra note 27, at 275 (citing a study that concluded that
even guaranteeing a job would not lure all poor people out of the "culture of crime and
hustling" to which they had grown accustomed); GILDER, supra note 26, at 64-74 (arguing
that in response to being excluded from mainstream society, the poor develop their own
culture); see also infra notes 90-92.
53. SHEAHEN, supra note 22, at 122-23. The reactive approach of stasis is, then, in a
large sense, a means of reinforcing the perception that the aid-eligible poor are inferior,
defective, or otherwise not like the standard American. Of course, to the extent that the
plight of the able-bodied is caused by a temporary loss of work, such person might be
considered the "helpless" or "deserving." Both state and federal governments have ex-
plicitly recognized this exception by creating and fairly generously funding programs of
unemployment insurance. For a general treatment of unemployment insurance, and the
work requirements of these programs, see MEAD, supra note 26, at 128-32.
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meaning. '54 They are the type of people who worry us because
they do not feel stigma, and because they cannot be prodded to
productivity. "They seem to be passive, accepting, satisfied, and
unable to take advantage of the few things that the AFDC program
has to offer."' We despise them because they seem incapable of
feeling the stigma of public assistance. We provide relief for them
yet despise them for actually taking it 6 "Every time I see a bag
lady on the street, I wonder, 'was that an A.F.D.C. mother who hit
the menopause wall-who can no longer reproduce and get money
to support herself."' They are the poor, needy by their own
hand; they have gotten what they deserve.
Fourth, it follows that poverty is a pathological condition of
each individual pauper rather than a symptom of a malfunctioning
society or economic system. Poverty is presumed to be as substan-
tially ineradicable as individual free. will. The poor, therefore, make
up an inevitable element of the stable social and economic or-
der5 Note that this view of the permanent state of poverty is
different from the Marxist notion of the lumpenproletariat, the
reserve army of the unemployed. 9 From the perspective of Marx-
54. Herbert J. Gans, Fighting the Biases Embedded in Social Concepts of the Poor,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1992, at A56.
55. JOEL HANDLER & ELLEN J. HOLLrNGsWORTII, THE DESERVING PooR: A STUDY OF
WELFARE ADMINISTRATION 177 (1971) (analyzing the characteristics of those welfare
recipients in Wisconsin who seem to have significantly greater difficulty in escaping the
need for state aid); see, e.g., AULEITA, supra note 27, at 225 (quoting the findings on a
segment of women in a welfare study, "they are deeply passive and accept welfare as a
stable feature in their lives").
56. Even administrators of the poor relief system in America are said to have "the
same revulsion for the welfare wise as the ordinary citizen." Ken Neal, The Welfare Pris-
on: Society Punishes Rather than Rewards Those Who Find Jobs, TULSA WORLD, June
13, 1993, at DI (describing the sentiments of Jack Quinn, a housing administrator in
Pueblo, Colo., and the President of the National Association of Housing and Redevelop-
ment Officials).
57. Jason de Parle, Counter to Trend, A Welfare Program in California Has One Idea:
Get a Job!, N.Y. TImEs, May 16, 1993, § 1, at 14 (describing a jobs program in River-
side County, Cal., and quoting Lawrence Townsend, Riverside County Welfare Director).
58. Herbert Gans recites the 13 purposes of poverty and the poor. These include a
number which reinforce the status of the better of classes and which result in the ability
of society to discard its cast-offs efficiently. For example, poverty makes possible the
abundance of cheap labor for dirty, demeaning work, and in this manner permits the
wealthier classes to keep a greater part of their wealth. HERBERT J. GANs, PEorLE,
PLANS, AND POLICIES: ESSAYS ON POVERTY, RACISM, AND OTHER NATIONAL URBAN
PROBLEMS 264-68 (1991). See also Ross, supra note 35, at 1510 (commenting on the
poverty literature and the recurrence therein of the theme of the permanence of poverty).
59. The lumpenproletariat are the lowest section of the proletariat They are dispos-
sessed, displaced individuals who have been cut off from the socioeconomic class with
1995]
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ists and macro-economists, the poor exist because the cycles of the
market system produce periodic labor instability-sometimes more
workers are needed, sometimes less. Since workers are not as easy
to create as, say, sofas,'e the economic system requires the pres-
ence of enough workers to meet the labor requirements of peak
periods of demand, even during non-peak periods. During periods
of inactivity, these excess workers are likely to constitute the desti-
tute classes. Stasis rejects the notion of either the existence of or
need for an excess of workers to jobs.6 The static paradigm is
suffused with the notion that the immutable and unchangeable
economic and social system has and will continue to provide suffi-
cient occupations to employ all able-bodied people who actively
seek employment.62
which they would ordinarily be identified. For a discussion of the impact of the concept
of the proletarianized poor in the English-speaking world in the 19th century, see
HIMMELFARB, supra note 52, at 270-87 (discussing especially the impact of Friedrich
Engels' work).
60. Assuming easy procreation, most people require a nine month gestation period and
a number of years to mature sufficiently to be ready to enter the labor market. Note that
with less regulation, the numbers of years between birth and suitability for the labor
market might be far less. See, e.g., WAYNE FLYNT, POOR BuT PRouD: ALABAMA'S POOR
WHrEs 108-11, 126 (1989) (reporting that in the period before World War I, work in the
coal mines began at about age 12, and work in the textile mills could begin as early as
age seven). Such practices continue in many parts of the world.
61. Again, personal choice or choice within the context of a culture of poverty pro-
vides the more satisfactory explanation. See AurLmTA, supra note 27, at 226 (citing a
study which found that some able-bodied welfare recipients became extremely passive and
remained on welfare even when work became available); MEAD, supra note 26, at 73
(arguing that excess labor is a function of people's refusal to work in low-wage jobs
rather than a function of the market); infra text accompanying notes 96-112, 544-47.
62. This is an old notion with roots, at least in modern times, back to the labor poli-
cies of the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers of 1349-1351, which was designed to
provide adequate cheap labor to employers at the time of the labor shortages caused by
the Black Death. Society has tended to view the problem of the able-bodied idle not as a
problem of want or poverty, but as a problem of "seepage from the supply of labor."
KARL DE ScHwrnNrfz, ENGLAND'S ROAD TO SOcIAL SEctJRTY 6 (1943); see also E.
Merrick Dodd, From Maximum Wages to Minimum Wages: Six Centuries of Regulation of
Employment Contracts, 43 COLtUM. L. REV. 643 (1943) (discussing the ancient origins of
labor regulation and its effects on labor supply and freedom of contract in labor situa-
tions); tenBroek, supra note 9, at 276 (pointing out that even in times of labor surplus,
the jobs available might well have to be provided by the state). Correctly, Robert Bums
explains this view as reflecting the notion that American labor market outcomes produce a
just distribution for a substantial number of labor market participants. It would follow that
no adjustments to a just system are necessary; providing relief for labor market partici-
pants would run counter to the belief in the justness of the current labor market system.
Such a result is an unacceptable tampering with the low-wage portion of the labor market.
Robert P. Bums, Rawls and the Principles of Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 184, 229
(1989). But see PIvEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 123-80 (discussing the way in
[V'ol. 44.871
1995] MEDIEVAL POOR LAW 895
As such, our paradigm provides a key assumption: income
inequality is a function of productivity or wealth accumulation, and
even a minimum of productive conduct would be sufficient to
provide an adequate amount of wealth or income to meet one's
needs.' Poverty and destitution follow only those who refuse or
who are unable to be productive. Since no one is prevented from
being productive or from accumulating wealth, destitution is the
product of individual choice (refusal to work or the squandering of
personal wealth), or bad luck (physical injury or disabling condi-
tion, or loss of wealth by reason of forces beyond one's immediate
control)-not a systemic flaw of the American economy.0 In a
large sense, then, poverty is a problem caused by the poor,s not
a deficiency of society in general."
which poor relief can be used to reinforce the mechanics of the labor market).
63. Of course, such jobs might have to be sought out with some effort, and might not
be to the person's liking. However, the social and economic system is indifferent, in this
regard, to the preferences of the able-bodied unemployed. The problem isn't the lack of
work, but the attitude of those able-bodied who have not sought work out. "If you want
to work, the program is there for you. But you've got to want to do it for yourself."
AULErTA, supra note 27, at 226 (quoting Eric Lax, an interviewer for the Manhattan
MDRC program, the subject of the author's study); see also id. at 210-19 (discussing the
case histories, of the participants and noting that several participants dropped out of the
program because they were bored or thought the work was dumb); MEAD, supra note 26,
at 73 ("Turnover rather than lack of jobs largely explains why [the poor] are so often
unemployed. Of course, as in musical chairs, if the turnover stopped there might not be
enough jobs for everyone. Then government job-creation efforts would be more necessary
than they seem now.").
64. This notion has been disputed from a variety of perspectives even within the static
vision. Some argue that the right to be productive and accumulate wealth is a function of
conditions other than the will to produce. Examples of other factors include: gender, Law,
supra note 17, at 1282-1317 (discussing some of the ways in which federal welfare and
labor policy impede women's access to the wage labor market); race, NEwMAN Er AL.,
supra note 17, at 262-64 (describing the birth of the welfare rights reform movement and
the discriminatory. practices in the delivery of welfare to minorities; and ethnicity, TVE
MOUNT PLEASANT REPORT, supra note 17, at 80-90, 141-43 (discussing the effect of
hiring discrimination against Hispanics in government and the private sector in Washing-
ton, D.C.). More fundamentally, these studies form part of the general argument that the
social and economic order is set up so that only the dominant group, Caucasian males,
are freely able to use the system to accumulate wealth.
65. See, e-g., Asa Briggs, The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, 2 EUR. L Soc.
221 (1961); Ross, supra note 35, at 1502-08 (describing the "societal feeling" that poverty
is an avoidable social condition). Contrast this view to the universalist notion of certain
modem scholars who take the position that poverty cannot be understood as an isolated
problem, but that it is merely part of an overall correctable problem of a kind of societal
disfunction or inefficiency. DAvID R. RuiMR, T1m PRIsoNERs OF WELFARE LIBERATNG
AmERCA's POOR FROM UNEMPLOYMENT AND LOW WAGES (1988); see Skocpol, supra
note 28, at 411.
66. Society's only deficiency, perhaps, is not its overgenerosity, but its tolerance and
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In the face of an immutable status quo of income and wealth
inequality founded on productivity, there arises a certain resistance
to the redistribution of wealth as a negation of the "reward" prin-
ciple of income or wealth inequality. Static society might well
allow its indigents to fend entirely for themselves. And indeed, the
thrust of the static notion of individual productivity creates incen-
tives for all people to prepare for the worst by providing for a
financial or physical disaster.' Society, after all, is no more than
the sum of the production of the industrious, each of whom must
plan for the occurrence of a "rainy day." However, even static
society does not absolutely require all people to fend for them-
selves. Accidents or other unforeseeable events occur which can
exceed the ability of even the best planners to cope financially.
And, like the ants in the Disney version of the Grasshopper and
the Ants, society will not permit even the most unproductive of its
members to die from want. Static systems, therefore, tend to recog-
nize that there exists a point of deprivation beyond which a person
will not be permitted to exist (at least in theory).s Alleviation of
financial support of the deviance of economic and social non-conformists. See GILDER,
supra note 37, at 97-98 (arguing that poverty, especially the poverty of the racial and
ethnic ghettos, are a direct result of a "crippling plague of broken families" which fol-
lowed naturally from the abandonment of traditional gender roles and the primacy of the
traditional family). In a sense, Gilder argues that changing social norms have permitted
the emergence of a deviance with significant economic effect. Note, however, that even if
society has created the framework in which this problem can arise, the poor are left hold-
ing the proverbial bag-it is up to the victims to correct the problem that society created.
67. Popular fairy tales provide many clues about the nature of this incentive. Most
telling, perhaps, is the apocryphal story of "The Grasshopper and the Ant," Aesop, The
Ants and the Grasshopper, in THE FABLEs OF AEsOP 26 (Willis L. Parker ed., 1931),
which was made into a very popular cartoon during the American Depression by the Walt
Disney Studios. T1E GRASSHOPPER AND THE ANTs (A Walt Disney Production 1935)
(cartoon short film distributed by RKO Radio Pictures). In the film version of this fable,
the grasshopper spends the summer in song and play (as reflected by the film's popular
song, The World Owes Me a Living) while the industrious ants spend the summer toiling,
gathering food and other materials for the winter. When winter comes, the grasshopper
starves and freezes while the ants enjoy a long comfortable winter respite from work. The
grasshopper is saved when he agrees to work for the ants by serving as their musician.
Scholarly theorists have recast the tale of the grasshopper and the ant into more nuanced
theories of roughly the same content. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAzER, THE LiMITs OF SOCIAL
POLICY 128-39 (1988) (arguing that traditional community and family sources of relief
should be the backbone of welfare efforts); MFAD, supra note 26 (discussing particular
social and political obligations of adults, that, if fulfilled, would encourage the desirable
goal of self-sufficiency).
68. Thus, in its purest form, it follows the exhortation of Gratian, "In hospitality there
is to be no regard for persons, but we ought to welebme indifferently all for whom our
resources suffice:' GRATLAN, DEcRtruM, Dist. 42 post cl, quoted in TIERNEsY, supra note
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deprivation, therefore, becomes the touchstone of the static re-
sponse to the absolute (or relative) need of its members. Allevia-
tion of this type requires a system of poor relief to do little more
than to provide such material things as will increase the standard
of living of the recipients to a level deemed acceptable by the
donor, be it an individual, an entity, or the state. It requires noth-
ing of the recipient other than that the person be in "need"-that
he evidence an economic condition giving rise to some kind of
societal obligation to correct or ameliorate. The trick, of course, is
to give meaningful content to the term "need."
Stasis gives exceedingly precise content to this term based on
its core assumptions. The static concept of need is founded on
accepting the notion that one can provide relief for the need of
another only by taking from other resources which were meant to
provide the former with an economic cushion against his own
potential need. As a result, the concept of need, at least in the
static sense, becomes highly malleable, a function not of the lack
of resources of the recipient, but of the resources which society is
willing to devote to the relief of the poor.69 Since the aggregate
amount of resources available varies, to be acceptable the condi-
tions constituting need will tend to be defined and redefined in a
manner ensuring that only as many needy individuals as can be
supported by available resources fall within the definition. 0 We
feel badly for everyone else. They are truly society's unfortunates,
but we will help them with material things. The manipulation of
this concept of "need" and its restriction based on the paradigmatic
assumptions implicit in stasis, therefore, lie at the heart of notions
of approaches to American poor relief. Control of the definition of
36, at 55. However, blind open-handedness is not the end of the analysis, even in a
system in stasis. The underlying theoretical imperative of universal aid on the basis of
need, irrespective of the cause, is refined by imposing on it the possibility of discrirnina-
tion, both in the hierarchy of needs, and the ordering of the satisfaction thereof. And on
this basis arises the utility of classification. These notions were worked out to a consider-
able degree in the Canon Law. See TERNEY, supra note 36, at 55-60.
69. This limitation of resources is both an absolute and a relative concept. In a world
of finite resources, all resources are, by definition, limited. More importantly, for the static
view, resources are limited in a cultural sense, based on the acknowledgement of a gener-
ally accepted resistance to income and wealth transfers.
70. Kerry Bensinger describes how the California courts struggled to limit the ability
of California counties to set benefit levels almost exclusively by reference to the aggre-
gate amount of the county budget allocated to that purpose. See Bensinger, supra note 9,
at 521-40. Cases spch as Gardner v. County of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271 (Ct.
App. 1995), illustrate how such courts struggle to deal with the legislature's attempts to
curb judicial interference with county relief obligations.
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"need" in this sense becomes a primary weapon of those who seek
welfare "reform." Consider the roughly thirty year debate over the
federal poverty standard.7'
Poor relief manipulates need by imposing queuing requirements
on the destitute?2 Queuing, serving as the means of distributing
limited resources, takes two primary forms: discrimination based on
impermanent eligibility criteria, and shifting definitions of hierar-
chies of need By fine-tuning these forms of queuing, stasis rein-
forces the societal belief that not everyone in need is needy enough
to be supported by other than his or her own efforts. Further,
manipulation serves to enforce the cultural norm (obligation) to
fend for oneself. Adjusting the definition of eligibility and need
can also effectively "punish" deviance from accepted cultural mores
and reinforce the established social order. Because the definition of
need is a moving target, qualifying at one time does not guarantee
continuing qualification! 4 As malleable concepts, stasis does not
imbue need, eligibility, discrimination, or need hierarchies with
71. See, e.g., FURNSs & TILTON, supra note 23 (advocating reform proposals that
center on the definition of need); MuRRAY, supra note 3, at 270 n.2 (describing the de-
bate about the standard for determining need and arguing that the definition of need war-
ranting societal aid approaches a standard of absolute, extreme need); Bensinger, supra
note 9 (chronicling efforts to use the courts to establish minimum criteria for determining
need in California); Fuchs, supra note 3, at 89-94 (arguing that the definition of poverty
should be replaced by one that changes with the growth of the American economy, and
that income transfers to the poor be based on this more generous notion of need); Reich,
supra note 37 (arguing that welfare entitlements ought to be treated as forms of property
rights).
72. Queuing, of course, is not unique to stasis. Queuing is a concomitant of limited
resources and high demand. The development of queuing as a component of relief sys-
tems underlying a static vision are unique. For elementary queuing theory and its applica-
tion to the social sciences and economics, see, e.g., DONALD GROSS & CARL M. HARRIS,
FUNDAMENTALS OF QUEUMIG TEORY (1974); LAJOS TAKACS, INTRODUCtON TO THE
TEoRY OF QUEUES (1962); HARVEY M. WAGNER, PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH:
WrrH ArppcmATmoNs To MANAGERIAL DECSIONS 851-902 (2d ed. 1975).
73. For a discussion of the nature of eligibility discrimination and need hierarchies, see
Backer, supra note 20, at 1017-20. For a discussion of the manner in which eligibility
discrimination and need hierarchies shape American systems of poor relief, see discussion
infra part IMI.
74. The shifting criteria of eligibility under AFDC provides a fascinating example of
this type of manipulation by the state, supported always in the name of some higher goal.
See Fineman, supra note 17 (describing how society has responded to perceived changes
in the manifestation of motherhood in an effort to preserve traditional patriarchal values).
The classic current examples are President Clinton's Work and Responsibility Act of
1994, H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter WARA] and the Personal
Responsibility Act, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) [hereinafter PRA]. For a discus-
sion of WARA and PRA in the context of the static paradigm, see Backer, supra note
42.
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magical qualities; these concepts are not burdened with notions of
absolute rights7 Both eligibility discrimination principles and
need hierarchies are, in this sense, political concepts7 each infi-
nitely manipulable to suit the needs of the providers and recipi-
ents.
Stasis, when applied to the problem of the amelioration of
"need" as a special, political category or condition, has significant
implications for the approach taken with respect to the manner and
extent to which societal resources are diverted to contain (certainly
not solve) the problem. The fundamental and critical assumptions
of the static paradigm provide the basis on which a general theory
of poor relief in the United States can be developed, which ex-
plains the limited palette from which society paints its picture of
poor relief. These specific characteristics and motivational impera-
tives of the system in "ideal" form are easily derived from the
fundamental acceptance of the notion of the permanent existence in
society of a group of people (the composition of which may
change) in constant need of aid, many of whom, but not all of
whom, could or ought to fend for themselves. It is to an under-
standing of these specific characteristics with which American
75. The term "rights" is used here in both its legal and moral senses. See discussion
infra part EIf. The only qualification, of course, is that those in imminent danger of phys-
ical harm (starvation) will always be eligible for whatever assistance is available and, in
that way, will find their way to the top of the need hierarchy.
76. See discussion infra part EI; cf. MENCHER, supra note 14, at 364-71 (arguing that
need and eligibility are defined by economic theories). Let's look at need first. How are
distribution determinations made? The easiest way is to create a hierarchy of the needy.
To some greater or lesser extent, this hierarchy is the product of political choices. While
the political choices may be based on basic political, moral, religious, or other assump-
tions about the ordering of society or the relative utility of its members or their conduct,
they remain political choices at base. What about eligibility discrimination? Again, the
easiest way to discriminate is to create a system based on the relative worthiness of po-
tential recipients. Notions of worthiness are pregnant with political implications, which are
influenced by the underlying ordering of society. In the West, worthiness is based on the
inability to work. See discussion infra part I.
77. Need hierarchies are a political concept at least to the extent that they have power
to influence the process of need determination. See, e.g., Prvmt & CLOWARD, supra note
20, at 177 (arguing that the "structure of American public welfare system meshes with
and enforces the work system, not the least by excluding potential workers from aid!);
STaiNER, supra note 10, at 148 (noting that each of the groups with a stake in the wel-
fare system-administrators, politicians, program advisors, and recipients--"has been less
of an instrument of change than one of retaining the particulars of a program with which
they all acknowledge dissatisfaction); cf. Bruce Bolnick, Toward a Behavioral Theory of
Philanthropic Activity, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 197 (Edmund S.
Phelps ed., 1975) (arguing that an understanding of philanthropic activity requires broaden-
ing economic behavioral models to include social and psychological models).
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systems of poor relief are necessarily imbued, that this Article will
now turn.
m. A GENERAL THEORY OF AMERICAN POOR RELmF
The static paradigm is a powerful tool for understanding con-
temporary American systems of poor relief. Fundamental to the
construction of any program of poor relief is the underlying accep-
tance of the static notion of the permanence of the fundamentals of
the current social and economic order and of income and social in-
equality (and the basis thereof). It is to be expected, in the first
instance, that no matter what its form, no system of poor relief
would either directly or indirectly effect significant changes in the
social order." Accepting this overarching postulate has significant
78. For instance, even so-called "liberal" visions of poor relief, such as the programs
of the 1960s Great Society, have been described as attempting to provide the eligible
poor with the tools to function within the economic system, and not to change the system
itself. See MEAD, supra note 26, at 33. The notion that the poor will have to make their
own way in the economy as presently constituted continues to be unquestioningly accepted
by a number of commentators and those who seek to shape the course of government
policy. See, e.g., Low INcOME OPPORTUNrrY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 26-37
(arguing that dependency is a term used to imply a reluctance to participate in the nation-
al economy); NEw YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 63 ('The Task Force believes
that work should be the cornerstone of the reform of welfare. The effectiveness of work-
based reforms will depend not only on the economic and educational policies described in
the previous chapter, but also on policies concerning the working poor"); Ellickson, supra
note 9; Winter, supra note 21, at 85 (arguing that substantial redistribution of income to
effect greater income equality "can be undertaken only after equality has been chosen as
a transcendent purpose overriding the material well-being of the society').
Of course, this notion has been challenged. So-called universalists and economic
libertarians, for instance, continue to argue that the whole basis on which relief is accord-
ed must be changed. See discussion infra part VI. Significant voices in academia have
argued for years that a national guaranteed income program would eliminate the need both
to maintain the poor and to continue to employ a large bureaucracy of almsgivers. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 192 (arguing for a negative income tax which would
result in payment of a subsidy to those who fall below a certain income level); David
Allen Larson, Long Overdue: The Single Guaranteed Minimum Income Program, 69 U.
DEr. MERcY L. REv. 353, 354 (1992) (advocating a negative income tax). Others have
argued that there ought to exist a constitutionally mandated right to a certain minimum
standard of living, or to housing. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 9; Dworkin, supra note 23,
at 185; Michelman, supra note 37, at 660.
Academic scholars have also begun again exploring the utility of a universalist ap-
proach to poor relief, either as a means of fulfilling the potential of the current economic
and social system, or as a means of overturning it. See PiVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
20 (discussing the universalist approach as a means of overturning it); Rmmm, supra note
65, at 135 (discussing the universalist approach as a means of fulfilling the potential).
See generally Dodd, supra note 62 (tracing the development of the Anglo-American law
of employment contracts from the 14th century to the present and the increasing trend to-
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repercussions for defining the limiting characteristics of viable poor
relief programs.
First, one should expect stasis to repeat the hierarchy of the
established social and economic order in constructing systems of
relief of the needy poor. The social and economic order produce a
hierarchy based on wealth, productivity, and social position-social
and economic inequality is accepted, and wealth redistribution is
resisted. The social and economic ordering of people potentially
eligible for maintenance produces hierarchy and status within the
ranks of the poor which imitate this hierarchy79 This ordering is
accomplished by identifying the economic level below which limit-
ed distribution is tolerated and identifying the individuals living
below that level which society is willing to aid, then manipulating
the order through queuing." It is upon this ordering that the form
and manner of relief is determined. Central, then, to the notion of
need and its manipulation is the concept that poor relief systems
mimic the immutable and accepted social and economic systems.
Among the poor, such ordering takes the form of eligibility
discrimination and need hierarchies. Eligibility discrimination is
simply prioritizing need. Thus, eligibility discrimination serves a
gatekeeper function by determining who may line up for aid. Need
is another way of referring to the means used to determine how
much aid someone ought to receive, and the order in which that
wards regulation of the employment relationship). Most have derided the notion of social
inequality, the fact of which continues to be confirmed in recent empirical works. See,
eg., KAus, supra note 26, at 16-24. The argument over the basis of societal approaches
to its political economy sometimes has had significant political repercussions in recent
years, particularly with respect to the attempt by the Nixon Administration to pass a
minimal form of negative income tax. This approach represented an attempt to fundamen-
tally change the way society treated the problem of poverty. However, the Family Assis-
tance Plan, even in the watered-down version considered by Congress, was defeated. For
a history of the Family Assistance Plan, see DANIEL P. MOYNMAN, TME PoLmcs OF A
GUARANTEED INcoME TRE NIXON ADMINISTRAION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN
(1973).
79. Note that to the extent that social ordering is a function of other things-race,
ethnicity, language proficiency, religion, morals-the ordering of aid will reflect this as
well. This, perhaps, is implicit in the arguments of commentators like Derrick Bell. See
DEmRcK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WLL THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992). Thus, AFDC was acceptable when the archetypal AFDC recipient was a white
widow with small children. It became far less acceptable when the perception (whether or
not accurate) of the AFDC archetypal recipient became a young Aftican-American woman
with an "excess" of children born out of wedlock and to an "excess" of men. See, e.g.,
JAMES T. PATrERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGLE AGAiNSr POVERTY: 1900-85, at 101-03, 173-
74 (1986).
80. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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aid will be distributed. Thus, need determines quantity, and to
some extent, order based on the immediacy of the need.
Static system builders employ eligibility discrimination and
craft need hierarchies to create categories of aid-worthiness. Be-
cause society values productivity so highly, discrimination becomes
a function of a perceived potential to produce. Those who could or
ought to should; those who cannot need not. Not surprising, then,
near the top rung are the disabled-those who are incapable of sat-
isfying their needs through their own labor. Theirs is not so much
the poverty of deviance as it is the poverty of chance or ill-luck.
Traditionally, these have included the old, the blind, widows with
young children, and the developmentally and physically handi-
capped But even among those traditionally considered to be
incapacitated, the societal imperative to work is strong. Thus, for
instance, advocates of the rights of the disabled have recently
urged the disabled to take advantage of federal programs providing
monetary incentives to seek and obtain employment.'
At the bottom rung are the able-bodied poor. Theirs is a pover-
ty born of deviance from the accepted social and economic mores.
81. These categories form the bulk of the federally favored categories, the members of
which traditionally formed the bulk of welfare recipients under federal welfare programs.
See, e.g., Briggs, supra note 65, at 229 (tracing the development of the concept of a
"welfare state" in Britain); Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With
Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE- 457, 470-83, 487-88 (1988) (describing the rise of federal categorical pro-
grams and arguing that there has always existed a disjunction between the rhetoric of
federal programs in aid of poor mothers, the conception that women ought to stay home
and care for their children, and the reality that poor women were expected to either work
or get married). Notions about disability, or an inability to work, have undergone substan-
tial change in recent years. There has been a shift away from the wholesale categorization
of particular conditions as disabling, to a notion that conditions (for example blindness)
might restrict, but not eliminate, the person's ability and therefore obligation to work. See,
e.g., MEAD, supra note 26, at 132-35 (discussing the rise of work requirements for the
disabled); James R. Sheldon, Jr., PASS: SSI's Plan For Achieving Self-Support, 25 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REv. 962, 963-72 (1991) (discussing the benefits and methods of the federal
government's PASS program (Plan For Achieving Self-Support, Pub. L. No. 92-603,
§ 301, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(4)(A)(iii), a(b)(4)(B)(iv),
b(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. H 1990))) permitting the disabled to exclude certain income from
eligibility determinations).
82. See Sheldon, Jr., supra note 81, at 972 (offering that the author "hopes that this
article will stimulate many attorneys and paralegals who work in legal services to consider
work related to the Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS) as a priority"). These pro-
grams are good, because for "individuals with disabilities, the PASS can offer a way out
of the cycle of poverty, allowing them to move from dependence on social security or
SSI [Supplemental Security Income] disability benefits [a bad thing] to a position of fi-
nancial independence [a good thing]" Id. at 963.
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As the most easily able to ameliorate their own economic predica-
ment, and compelled by social and economic rules to do so, there
is no reason to treat them like those with more limited options
(such as the blind or the aged).s If, in fact, society provides
enough employment to occupy all of the able-bodied-for that is
what the static system builder believes-then the unemployed able-
bodied person is a shirker, a person who seeks to satisfy his or her
needs without using his or her own resources (that is, his or her
labor)." In the stylized language of 1960s social science, this was
explained as a product of the inevitable workings of the "free"
market system. "In a competitive market economy, income is deter-
mined primarily by the demand and supply of different types of
labor. The ethical basis for the 'market' solution is that a man's
income should be determined by his contribution to production."'
The exception to this view would include the able-bodied unem-
ployed who are actively seeking work and find themselves tempo-
rarily unemployed.' One would expect all systems of poor relief
to recognize these aid-worthiness categories and to structure relief
83. Irving Kristol makes this point in discussing his conservative approach to reform of
the "welfare state:' The elderly (including the wealthy elderly), the children of the middle
class, and the working, taxpaying poor should be more generously supported. "Welfare
mothers,' defined as "[y]oung girls [who] permit themselves to get pregnant, and to bear
a child, because the prospect of going on welfare does not frighten them," should face a
more unpleasant life, and able-bodied men should have no entitlement to welfare whatso-
ever. Irving Kristol, A Conservative Welfare State, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1993, at A14.
84. See supra text accompanying note 48. This view is expressed repeatedly in popular
press opinion accounts of the "welfare problem:' One example will suffice:
When welfare came to be a substitute for a job, too many Americans adopted
a lifestyle where work was irrelevant to survival and, soon thereafter, contrary
to their values. So we see more welfare, not less; a permanent welfare
underclass instead of families moving across FDR's bridge to better times.
Pete Du Pont, If Even Democrats Want Welfare Reform, Its Coming, STAR TRIB., Sept.
29, 1992, at 15A (opinion of the chairman of the Committee for Republican Leadership
writing for the Scripps Howard News Service). There is more than the whiff of status to
this view of the poor and employment. This is perhaps best expressed in the notion that
the function of the laboring classes is to labor, and the laboring classes include all indi-
viduals who are not members of any of the higher social and economic classes.
85. Fuchs, supra note 3, at 89, 93 (arguing that this ethical basis is weakened by the
fact that not all people join the work force under equal conditions). On the earlier mani-
festations of this status view of labor and social class in the Elizabethan period, see
tenBroek, supra note 9, at 276 n.88. The poor, themselves, have been taught to believe
this as well. See Hobbes, supra note 43, at C1 (presenting one homeless man's argument
that the poor simply lack the will to work).
86. This exception is certainly recognized in the United States and provided for in the
form of unemployment insurance, as opposed to poor relief. This category is one of the
favored categories qualifying for governmental aid. See LEVrrAN, supra note 3, at 43-46.
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programs on the basis of these categories.
Now that we have created our intra-needy distinctions, what
does the static paradigm suggest we do with them? We use them
as principled bases for allocating resources, and perhaps more
importantly, as means of justifying our core assumptions of social
and economic inequality based on productivity and of the need to
minimize income redistribution. On a record level, all of these
notions find expression in the idea that any system of poor relief is
meant to ensure that those who have less do not have so little that
they are unable to live in a minimally acceptable manner. One
should expect our system of poor relief to be crafted as a minimal-
ist system, in the sense of providing minimal assistance to the
smallest number of people belonging to the fewest categories of
"4poor." In that manner, institutional poor relief is useful only as a
system of last resort and not to eradicate, or even ameliorate in-
come inequality. The system is designed merely to sustain, to
varying degrees, those without sufficient resources.
Eligibility discrimination and need hierarchies also punish those
who are viewed as subversive, people who are potentially able or
who disrupt the established social or economic order by their very
being.8' While static society is inclined to maintain those who try
and lose, it is less inclined to support (especially with the produc-
tivity of others) those who do not try. Those who do not try are
perceived as economic criminals. Their existence, in effect, is a
function of their ability to effectively steal resources which could
otherwise be applied to aid those with no alternative but to seek
the help of the state. Indeed, since no person could truly be idle,
those poor whose time was not taken up with work were suspected
of doing far worse with their time--employing themselves in dis-
honest occupations, primarily robbery and theft." In this way, the
87. For a similar conclusion from a different perspective, at least with respect to
American systems of poor relief generally, see HiMmLFARB, supra note 52, at 381-400
(describing the development of the notion of the poor as dangerous and potentially revolu-
tionary, and, therefore, in need of strict social control); BRUNO STEIN, ON RELIEF. THE
ECONOMICS OF POVERTY AND PuBLIC WEn.FARE 5-14 (1971).
88. The notion has been popularized:
[Tihat even the promise of a guaranteed job did not guarantee that every young
person would want to work. Some young people preferred to hustle. Some of
those listed as unemployed were in fact earning a living in the underground
economy. The notion that a job automatically equals less drug use and less
crime is dismissed as naive; the MDRC found, for instance, that a guaranteed
job for a year in supported work did not reduce drug use-though it did re-
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poor further distance themselves from mainstream society. Idleness
is the type of deviance that is thought to lead to significant anti-
social behavior. Such conduct must be suppressed because it
amounts to an illegitimate and arbitrary means of redistributing
wealth. The link between poverty and lawlessness is routinely
assumed by commentators. "While growing more numerous, the
poor have also grown more divorced from middle-class culture,
producing epidemics of violence, drug-abuse, idleness, illegitimacy
and chronic dependency.""8
The need to control criminal activity (and the underlying as-
sumption that the poor resort to crime to meet their needs) sup-
plied the rationale for the criminalization of the state of idleness.
Idleness was considered
[Miother & rote of all vyces, whereby hathe insurged &
spronge & dayly insurgethe & spryngeth contynuall theftes
murders and other haynous offences & great enormytes ...
S[In all places throughe out this Realme... Vacabundes
& Beggers... dayly do increase in greate & excessyve
nombres into great routs and companies... to the high
displeasure of God the inquyetacon & damage of the
Kyng's People & to the marvaylous disturbance of the
Comon Weale of this Realme.
This perceived link between the poor and the "criminal class" thus
duce crime. But crime is caused by more than just unemployment. For the
career criminal, crime becomes a way of life.
AUL=rA, supra note 27, at 275. Idleness, thus, does not mean solely a lack of gainful
activity, perhaps in the popular mind it means illicit and socially threatening activity as
well.
89. Stephen Chapman, Clinton, Bush and Welfare: Beyond the Promises, Cm. TRm.,
Sept. 6, 1992, at C3; see also Christopher Jencks, Is the American Underclass Growing?,
in THa URBAN UNDERCLASS 28, 74-83 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds.,
1991) (discussing the perceived link between lawlessness, poverty, and membership in the
"underelass"). This perceived connection between destitution and petty criminality is re-
flected in stories reported by the popular press. E.g., Robert Tier, The Case Against
Homeless Shelters: We Want Our Streets Safe and Clean, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 8, 1991, at
26 (arguing that adding a shelter would increase street crime, drugs, and ltter, the author
states that "because the police are all but powerless to do anything about it, the homeless
carry out a life of solicitation, begging, verbal assaults, littering, and, all too often, public
elimination").
90. 22 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1530) (Eng.) quoted in tenBroek, supra note 9, at 277; see
also JOHN POUND, POvERTY AND VAGRANCY iN TUDOR ENGLAND (Patrick Richardson ed.,
1971). The link between idleness and criminal behavior was well-established during the
19th century. See HhMEFARB, supra note 52, at 381-87.
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has proven to be a powerful tool of policy in twentieth century
America, supporting policies such as the affirmation of the tradi-
tional patriarchal family as a means of reducing poverty (and crim-
inality) 9' The perceived link between patriarchal families, crime,
and social stability has been amplified in non-homogeneous societ-
ies like that of late twentieth century America, where the poor
disproportionately may be members of non-majority racial and
ethnic groups. "[T]he recurrent patterns of behavior among
marginalized people seem predictable adaptations to the recurrent
patterns of their circumstances - a "survival culture." Everyone
needs respect; and if the usual middle-class avenues to respect
seem closed, other avenues will be pursued."'
91. "IThe likelihood that a young Black man will engage in criminal activities doubles
if he is raised without a father and triples if he lives in a neighborhood with a high
concentration of single parent families." PRA, supra note 74, § 100(3)(0). Senator
Moynihan, with some confidence, asserts that:
Inhere is one unmistakable lesson in American history: a community that
allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated
by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, never
acquiring any set of rational expectations about the future-that community asks
for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest, unrestrained lashing out at the
whole social structure-that is not only to be expected; it is very near to inevi-
table.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17, 26 (1993).
92. Karst, supra note 17, at 18. Thus, poverty and crime are commonly thought of as
a Black or Mexican-American or Puerto Rican problem, and not a problem of White
America. The problem of the lawlessness of the poor who are not part of the dominant
racial or ethnic group in America is characterized as one of individual irresponsibility, for
which the victim is squarely to blame; or genetic deficiency, for which little can be done;
or social maladjustment, for which society is to blame, but for which the poor themselves
must take responsibility to alter. In this view, the blame for the poverty and criminality
of the poor can be laid squarely on the deficiencies of the poor themselves. African-
Americans are poor because they have not been able to reconstruct a basic nurturing
family structure since slavery days, see OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNiNG AND RESEARCH U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965);
or because they are genetically inferior to other races, see Arthur R. Jensen, How Much
Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39 HARv. EDUC. REV. 1, 81 (1969),
discussed in Thomas Sowell, Race and LQ. Reconsidered, in ESSAYS AND DATA ON
AmRICAN EThNIC GROu'pS 203, 205 (Thomas Sowell ed., 1977); or because they are
socially maladjusted, see AULETrA, supra note 27, at 210-35; ELLIOTT LIEBOW, TALLY'S
CORNER (1967).
Mexican-American families are unable to free themselves of the chains of generations
of poverty because they stubbornly cling to the customs and language they brought with
them from Mexico, and have deliberately failed to integrate themselves into mainstream
society. See, e.g., OSCAR LEWIs, LA VEDA: A PTERTo RICAN FAMILY IN THE CuLTuRE
oF POVERTY-SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK (1965); John & Homer, supra note 17, at 140-
52; cf. RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY (1982) (discussing a child of Mexican
and American parents who spoke no English until he went to school, yet who became a
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The relief of the poor threatens society with two types of crim-
inality, then. The receipt of aid by those who could work amounts
to stealing from the productive. The idleness subsidized by poor
relief creates incentives for criminal activity. Poor relief systems
tend to try to control such direct and indirect criminality by pun-
ishment of certain conduct and by manipulating program "incen-
tives." Thus, aid to the potentially employable should neither be
generous nor readily available. Material aid should be limited to re-
lieving immediate need. The bulk of aid to this category of the
poor should be in the form of exhortation, positive and negative
"incentives" to become productive. In this sense, perhaps, Herbert
Gans is correct when he writes:
One of the ways that America and its policy makers avoid
dealing with poverty is to label some of the poor as mor-
ally deficient or undeserving, and therefore not worthy of
help. This line of reasoning presumes that everyone can
rise out of poverty and become middle class (there being
lots of well-paying jobs for them) if only they make the
effort.93
Indeed, during the 1992 presidential campaign, then-candidate Bill
Clinton argued that welfare should be temporary; if able-bodied
recipients were unable to obtain a job within two years, they
would be required to take public-sector jobs.94 "The issue being
scholar), Note, supra note 17, at 1320. See generally Karst, supra note 17, at 24-30 (ar-
guing that the principle of equal citizenship means that America should not forbid the
marginalized poor from participating in the community).
93. Herbert J. Gans, Fighting the Biases Embedded in Social Concepts of the Poor,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 8, 1992, at A56. Of course, the point of stasis is that poli-
cy makers are not avoiding dealing with the poor at all, rather they have solved the
problem of the able-bodied poor by telling them to get a job. Aid, therefore, is reserved
for those who, whether unable or unwilling to get a job, have moved beyond poverty or
relative deprivation to extreme destitution. The tendency is to recharacterize the able-
bodied pauper without children as the "homeless,' that is, one who is utterly destitute.
The less needy destitute, without children, are ignored. See also Chackes, supra note 9, at
157 (describing strategies for obtaining relief for people not eligible for categorical assis-
tance and the progress in that respect in state court); Hopper et al., supra note 9 (de-
scribing the rise of public shelters as an important institutional resource for the poor who
are unable to secure other forms of poor relief); Perlin, supra note 9 (describing the
effect of deinstitutionalization on the problem of and "solution' to homelessness). Thus,
shelters are provided to the homeless and food to the starving-but income maintenance
runs out with the last unemployment compensation check; Fullen, supra note 25 (describ-
ing problems in the provisions of shelter to the homeless). See infra part V.A.
94. Julie Kosterlitz, Reworking Welfare, 24 NAT'L J. 2189 (1992). President Clinton's
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discussed this year is not what we can do to help the poor, but
what the poor. . . [can] do to help themselves."'95 Requiring the
recipient to work or to train for work as the quid pro quo for even
temporary assistance should be the norm.
Since work is "good" and unemployment is "bad," static sys-
tems will also tend to implement programs that make the provision
of aid for unemployed able-bodied recipients as unpleasant as pos-
sible.96 The very basis of the proposals of commentators like
Charles Murray is that if you make the able-bodied poor person
uncomfortable enough, that person will be induced to work for his
or her keep. Aid is always "too generous," and contributes to
proposals for "reshaping" welfare programs were presented to Congress as the Work and
Responsibility Act of 1994, see supra note 43.
95. Stephen Chapman, Clinton, Bush and Welfare: Beyond the Promises, CIL TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 1992, at 3 (describing the poor relief rhetoric of the presidential candidates in the
1992 presidential campaign).
96. In contemporary terms, the procedures devised for the determination of eligibility
can be complex and drawn out. See the discussion of the intake procedures for general
assistance in Los Angeles, California, described in Frst Amended Complaint, supra note
13, fl 6-41. Receiving aid is deliberately meant to be a humiliating experience, where a
substantial amount of privacy is surrendered in return for aid. See PiVEN & CLOWARD,
supra note 20, at 149-61 (describing the burdensome and humiliating procedures used in
the "intake" process through the 1960s). For a description of the views of welfare recipi-
ents of the 196 0s and 1970s, see RICHARD M. ELMAN, TIe PoomousS STATmE T1E
AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE ON PUBLIC AssISTANCE (1966) (providing observations of the
manner in which aid was distributed in a Manhattan welfare agency during the 1960s);
HANDLER & HoLuNGswORTH, supra note 55, at 119-28, 177 (describing the welfare pro-
cess in Wisconsin); SUSAN SHEEHAM, A WELFARE MOTHER 19-24, 60-66 (1976) (describ-
ing the relationship between a recipient and her caseworkers which became hostile when-
ever the client demanded services other than those that the caseworkers were willing to
provide); Scott Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare Sys-
tem, 54 CAL. L. REv. 370, 374-77 (1966).
There has been little change over the past thirty or so years. See, e.g., THE MoUNiT
PLEASANT REPORT, supra note 17, at 91-101 (studying the interaction of a Washington,
D.C. hispanic neighborhood with the local social services agencies); MARE VESELY Er
AL, FAIR PLAY: A REPORT OF A STUDY OF THE ADMINIsTRATIoN OF AID To FAMIEs
WrI DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN SEvERAL MIDWESTERN STATES 41-44 (1982) (studying the
practices of welfare offices in several midwestern states); Handier, supra note 81, at app.
II 529-33 (describing the effort of a lay advocate employed by a public interest law firm
to secure general assistance for a developmentally disabled homeless person in Los Angel-
es County); Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-22 (describing the stultifying effects of the
routinization and bureaucratization of welfare delivery).
97. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-33. This notion of the utility of degradation and
humiliation reflects the views, much more starkly set forth, in connection with the theory
behind the creation of workhouses as the primary means of dispensing aid in England
after the 1830s.
If paupers are made miserable, paupers needs will decline in multitude. It is a
secret known to all rat-catchers; stop up the granary-crevices, afflict with con-
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the breakdown of the work ethic,9 family traditional values,"
and the decay of large cities.I"o Since the societal imperative is to
work, we should also expect static poor relief systems to require
the able-bodied poor to labor for whatever aid is provided."0'
The tendency of stasis is to embrace a reactive methodology;
the manifestation of this tendency is reflected by an implementation
philosophy limited to a readiness to provide the most basic materi-
tinual mewing, alarm, and going-off traps, your "chargeable labourers" disap-
pear, and cease from the establishmenL A still briefer method is that of arsen-
ic; perhaps even a milder, where otherwise permissible.
Thomas Carlyle, Chartism, in ENGLISH AND OTHER CRITICAL ESSAYS 174-75 (Everyman
ed., n.d.).
98. Low INCOME OPPORTuNrrY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 36-37 ("Velfare
recipients may come to have little regard for community standards and local institutions,
because no matter what a community says or does, welfare is guaranteed. The community
gradually loses its power to influence behavior or to enforce the mutual obligations that
make a community livable."); see also MEAD, supra note 26, at 73-82 (advancing theories
as to why welfare mothers and others consistently do not work); MURRAY, supra note 3,
at 69-82 (discussing how unemployment rates for young Black males have increased
disproportionately to other groups); Paul Taylor, Carrots and Sticks of Welfare Reform:
Author of Landmark Federal Bill Hears Why States Are Going Their Own Way, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at A13 (discussing New Jersey's plan to deny additional benefits to
welfare mothers who have children).
99. GILDER, supra note 26, at 64-74, 259-69 (arguing that loss of faith and traditional
values are at the core of the poverty problem); GELDER, supra note 37, at 79-98 (arguing
that family values and traditional gender roles are the bedrock of a stable and independent
working class); GLAZER, supra note 67, at 140-46 (arguing that the strength of traditional
structures-family, church, ethnic group, neighborhood, and voluntary organizations-are
essential and have been replaced by institutionalized forms of relief); George H. Bush,
Address at the Republican Party Convention Accepting the Republican Party Nomination
for President of the United States (Aug. 19, 1988), in FACTS ON Fr WoRLD NEws Di-
GESr, Aug. 19, 1988, at 605 F1 (seeking the replacement of governmental charity by
traditional forms of voluntary efforts). William Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan.
24, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws file (Welfare "undermines family
values, it lets millions of parents get away without paying their child support ... ).
100. George Skelton, Wilson Says Welfare System is Chasing Jobs Out of State; Gov-
emnment: Governor Sees the Issue as a Choice Between a Healthy Business Climate and
an Overly Generous Relief Program that Keeps Forcing Higher Taxes, LA. TIMES, Jan.
14, 1992, at A3 (address by the Governor of California) (arguing that the state will con-
tinue to lose jobs as long as welfare spending remains "out of control").
101. The able-bodied ought to reconsider their decision to forego working and comply
with the societal obligation to labor, or face starvation. For a critical study of modem
welfare to work programs, see GUERON & PAULY, supra note 6, at 79-125 (providing an
analysis based on studies of a number of work inducing or enhancing programs; the data
base is described). For the modem genesis of the language of this imperative, see
IMMELFARE, supra note 52, at 147-76. For the modem rendition of this argument, ex-
plicitly stated, see MURRAY, supra note 3; and for a more subtle exposition of the same
theme, see MEAD, supra note 26. But see MARMOR ET AL, supra note 6, at 1-2 (arguing
that welfare reforms of the 1960s have not resulted in failure).
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al needs only to those who are desperate enough to seek aid from
the state." The concept of "outreach," of an aggressive seeking
for the potentially eligible, is alien to the static world view.
Criminal conduct is thus minimized by keeping the poor from
idleness, through the manipulation of eligibility and need and more
directly through the criminal law." Poor law systems attempt
eligibility and need manipulation by compelling the poor to work,
train for work, or spend their time seeking work, even when there
are no jobs for them to fill.' 4 So-called "workfare" programs of
102. The active parties, then, are those in want. The reactive nature of this view as-
sumes that those in need will be able to determine the severity of their need and to seek
the aid of the state when their condition becomes intolerable.. The state takes the passive
role in the process. Its mandate, and the limitations of its usefulness, is to stand ready
to prevent absolute deprivation-it is not to seek out those who might profit from materi-
al, economic, or other forms of aid. Piven and Cloward describe the passivity of a fed-
erallstate welfare system in which the applicant quite literally had to undertake a quest
akin to an Arthurian legend in order to obtain the "prize"-or form of relief to which the
applicant was probably entitled to in the first place. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note
20, at 149-61. Federal categorical relief programs after the 1960s appeared to become
more passive by becoming more "voluntary" and by separating the income-maintenance
functions from the social services functions of such programs. See HANDLER &
HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 55, at 177 (analyzing data from a 1970s study of AFDC in
Wisconsin); William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1985) (examining the evolution in the social work jurisprudence per-
spective); Simon, supra note 13, at 1215 (discussing the separation of social services from
financial assistance mandated in 1972 and the logic behind this decision). The problem
with a system like this, at least for those who view welfare as a means of transforming
the poor into productive citizens no longer dependent on the largess of the state, is that
those who need and could benefit from the system the most are the least likely to know
about the programs, or their potential benefits. HANDLER & HOLLNGSWORTH, supra note
55, at 177.
103. See PIvEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 147-77 (describing the means by which
welfare rolls are shrunk); Simon, supra note 9, at 632-33 (discussing punishments for
vagrancy); Jodie Levin-Epstein, Changes That Won't Serve the Public Welfare, WASH.
POST, July 12, 1992, at C8 (describing the amendments to Maryland's welfare rules im-
posing monetary sanctions when children of recipients fail to attend school, noting that a
"key state official admitted that the change is 'punitive,' but declared it necessary, be-
cause 'families need more assistance in becoming responsible'"); Mississippi Proposes
Changes in Welfare (National Public Radio, Morning Edition, Apr. 2, 1992) available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File (reporting that the Mississippi legislature is considering
changes to the state welfare system that would condition benefits on the grades children
of recipients receive in school (they must maintain a "C" average), and requiring welfare
mothers with more than four children to use birth control).
104. "Reforms" of the public assistance systems in New Jersey, California, and Michi-
gan, for instance, rely in large part on providing incentives; they tie benefits to seeking
or obtaining or retaining employment. See Backer, supra note 20, at part V.B.I.; cf.
Taylor, supra note 98, at A13. "Furthermore, aspects of some of the state reform projects
appear merely to be attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of experimentation:'
Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare "Re-
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recent vintage, mandatory work requirements that are imposed as a
condition of receiving assistance payments, provide a good example
of the practice." The effort to minimize criminal conduct also
finds expression in the tendency of static systems to keep children
from delinquency by keeping them in school or in the play-
ground."e Thus, for instance, many states have recently proposed
or implemented, at least with respect to federal categorical aid pro-
grams, so-called "learnfare," which requires, as a condition to the
continued receipt of a certain level of benefits, that the children of
the recipient attend school."ar
Because the static view holds that the unemployed able-bodied
poor have made a vicious lifestyle choice, static systems also more
directly punish those able-bodied poor who refuse to work for their
keep, whether work is provided by the state or otherwise. The
criminalization of begging and vagrancy has a long history." It
form," 26 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 741, 745 (1993).
105. See, eg., HANDLER & HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 55 (studying the effects of a
welfare program in certain Wisconsin counties); Weinberg, supra note 27, at 442-47 (argu-
ing that current work requirements disadvantage women in particular, and that California
workfare programs indicate that such programs do little to get the poor into the workforce
or to raise their income); The Family Independence Program: The Perils of Turning Wel-
fare into Workfare, 3 IssuE BRIEF, Apr. 1987, at 1 (The Municipal League Foundation,
Seattle, WA).
106. The welfare "reforms" effected in many states now require recipients' children to
attend school on pain of losing some or all of the benefits otherwise provided to the
recipient. See BACKER, supra note 20, at part V.B. On the benefits of education as a tool
reinforcing the necessity of fending for oneself and the shame of taking charity from
others, see infra notes 138-42.
107. This is the case under the proposed '7Larnfare" programs proposed in several
states. Sea Carolyn Colvin, Maryland's Responsible Welfare Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
1992, at C8 (author was the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Human Resources)
(describing and defending Maryland's experimental behavior modification programs which
would penalize AFDC recipients whose children failed to attend school over a certain
minimum). But see Higher Attendance in Michigan's Schools Act, 1993 Mich. S.B. 140
(lowering AFDC payments to recipients whose children have more than two unexcused
absences from school); Levin-Epstein, supra note 103, at C8 (arguing that the changes are
not helpful). A number of these types of programs are critically examined in GUERON &
PAuLY, supra note 6, at 107-20.
108. Vagrancy laws were imposed as a means of ensuring labor stability, and later
retained and revitalized as a means of coercing proper conduct from the idle, the idea
being that the idle might be forced to work if they were punished for failing to work.
See, e.g., FERNAND BRAUDEL, 2 THE MEDnERRANEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD
IN THE AGE OF Mw 11 739-43 (Sian Reynolds trans., 2d rev. ed. 1973) (1966); E.M.
LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF 11-21 (1900); POUND, supra
note 90, at 58-68; Margaret K. Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 511 (1966); tenBroek, supra note 9, at 265-79; Note, The Vagrancy Concept
Reconsidered: Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 102, 103-07
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retains its vitality today in somewhat watered down form in many
states.'" Thus, while it may today be constitutionally impermissi-
ble to criminalize the status of beggar, it may well be constitution-
ally permissible to criminalize the act of begging at certain times
and in certain places."' Additionally, generally applicable crimi-
nal laws, such as those proscribing trespassing or stealing, are
especially useful when targeted at controlling the most marginal of
the poor, the homeless able-bodied male. Thus, for instance, resort
by the poor to squatting in abandoned buildings is handled by
(1962); discussion infra part V.A.
Traditional vagrancy statutes usually punished a condition or status. Thus, the statute
at issue in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), provided for con-
viction of the misdemeanor of vagrancy all "[r]ogues and vagabonds or dissolute persons
who go about begging . . . persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object. . . persons able to work but habitually living upon
the earnings of their wives or minor children . . .. " Id. at 156 n.1 (citing Jacksonville,
Ma., Code §§ 26-57 (1965)). Such statutes have been declared void principally on vague-
ness grounds. Id. at 162; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Squire v.
Pace, 516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975).
109. See supra note 103. Currently, vagrancy laws include broad provisions banning
particular types of disorderly conduct such as lodging in public buildings without permis-
sion. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 647(1) (1988) (a person who "lodges in any building,
structure, vehicle, or place, whether public or private, without the permission of the owner
or person entitled to the possession or in control thereof" is guilty of disorderly conduct).
Other types of vagrancy legislation proscribe more narrowly defined conduct, such as
sleeping in parks after closing time. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 418-19 & nn.7-8
(describing various statutes of this kind). Vagrancy laws have been used recently as a
potent tool against the homeless. See id. at 417-25. Such efforts have met with some
success in the courts. See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,
164 (2d Cir.) (holding that the New York City ban on begging and panhandling in the
subway was constitutional), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990). Courts, however, are not
always receptive to such restrictions. See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp.
1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (declaring unconstitutional Miami's practice of arresting homeless
individuals and seizing their property). The right of a state to proscribe conduct such as
begging continues to come under attack, usually on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Bak-
er, supra note 9, at 435-48 (discussing how legislation that punishes the homeless for
involuntary manifestations of their homeless status violates the Eighth Amendment); Scott
D. Sitner, Note, Beggar's Banquet: The First Amendment Right to Beg, 1991 DET. CL.
REV. 795 (1991). Alternatively, others have argued that vagrancy statutes are anachronis-
tic status crimes that are inconsistent with modem criminal theory. See Note, supra note
108.
110. Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d at 164; see also Grace L. Zur,
Note, Young v. New York City Transit Authority: Silencing the Beggars in the Subways,
12 PACE L. REV. 359, 383-93 (1992) (stating that banning begging does not violate the
First Amendment). But see Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.
1993) (striking down on First Amendment grounds a New York statute that criminalized
loitering in a public place). On recent attempts by municipalities to curb begging, see
Heather MacDonald, The Homeless Rights Counterrevolution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1994,
at A20.
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enforcement of anti-trespassing laws."' This, of course, makes it
easier to formalize, bureaucratize, and proletarianize any system de-
livering aid."' Since expectations are low, there is little need for
the kind of professional guidance that would be necessary if the
accepted underlying notion of the purpose of the poor relief system
were a transformative one."'
The sole rehabilitative goal of static systems is to force the
able-bodied to fulfill the Biblical imperative to work."4 If the
poor actually grow to like the work they are forced to accept, all
the better, but it is not to be expected. Under a static system, then,
the notion of rehabilitation means compulsion. Static system build-
ers are comfortable with the notion that programs of poor relief
must be designed to press solid middle-class behavior on the poor,
they do not consider that rehabilitation might or ought to involve
rehabilitating the social or economic system from which the poor
arose.
115
There exists no corresponding incentive to punish the incapaci-
tated-or to motivate them to fend for themselves. Relief to them
should be more open-handed. The incapacitated did not make a
111. See, &g., Hirsch & Wood, supra note 9, at 611-16 (discussing organizing the
homeless to squat in abandoned buildings in New York).
112. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-21. On the necessity for formalism in the
administration of American poor relief, see DAVIS, supra note 24; Handler, supra note 24;
Smith, supra note 9, at 655 (discussing how general welfare could be administered more
effectively and fairly if state-wide standards existed).
113. See Simon, supra note 102 (contrasting welfare jurisprudence developed by social
workers with lawyers' welfare jurisprudence).
114. Genesis 3:17-19. Recall that the discrimination is based primarily on the refusal,
when able, to work. Thus, while the poor include all who are in need, different classes
of the poor, primarily the able-bodied, are singled out for different treatment. The basic
notion is that people need aid either because they have become unable or are unwilling to
support themselves. For those unable to support themselves, there is nothing to be done
but care for them. Those unwilling to support themselves, on the other hand, are little
better than thieves. While provision must be made for them, lest they starve, there is an
underlying assumption that all an able-bodied person needs to do to support him or her-
self is to go out and work. If only the able-bodied would seek gainful work, they would
find it: the jobs are waiting for them.
115. See DAVID WARD, PoVERTY, ETHNicrry, AND THE AMERcAN Crry, 1840-1925:
CHANriNG CONCEMONS OF THE SLUM AND TIM GHETTO xi (1989):
[Whenever they seem to be unresponsive to environmental improvements, they
are judged to be part of a deviant subculture or the result of personal deviance.
Assumptions about high levels of personal deviance among the poor and within
the inner city have, therefore, encouraged a strong emphasis on clinical and
therapeutic approaches at the individual or familial level.
Id. See also Backer, supra note 20, at part V; Taylor, supra note 98, at A13 (quoting
the New Jersey legislator responsible for the passage of welfare reforms in that state).
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deliberate choice to become unproductive, and are therefore more
deserving of aid. Why? Perhaps because redistributing income in
the form of aid to the incapacitated does not significantly disturb
the social and economic system. Poor relief programs are meant to
serve as long-term income maintenance programs only for those
who lack any other means of meeting their material needs; for all
others, aid is meant to be temporary (until another job can be
secured) and to relieve only the most extreme want."6
As should be expected, the political definitions of eligibility are
also suffused with race, gender, and ethnic considerations. In this,
of course, the political determination of worthiness and need mir-
rors the general struggle in America for power as between a Cau-
casian, European Protestant majority, and the host of other groups,
increasingly self-conscious about their group identity and anxious
to translate this self-awareness into tangible power.' Power, in
this sense, is power to control the means of productivity, and
therefore the means of acquiring wealth (and political power) in the
United States."' The struggle is evidenced by the manner in
116. See, for example, the study of the Wisconsin welfare system conducted by Joel
Handler and Ellen Hollingsworth in the early 1970s. On the basis of that study, the au-
thors concluded that for all of the potential transformative usefulness contained in the
"idea" of AFDC as set forth in statute rules and the hortatory statements of people in
command, "AFDC is basically a low-level income maintenance programs, and very little
else; much more routine than flexible.' HANDLER & HOLUNGSWORTH, supra note 55, at
203.
117. While it is important to understand the particular effects on non-majority peoples,
and the powerless generally, such a study lies beyond the scope of this article. For a
sampling of the writings of those who see these issues as paramount in the welfare "de-
bate," see, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 28 (discussing the dominant traditions poverty law de-
rives from and how this alienates poor minorities); Mary Jo Bane, Politics and Policies of
the Feminization of Poverty, in THE PoLrICS OF SOCIAL PoLicY IN THE UNrIED STATES
381 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) (exploring the issue of the feminization of poverty
resulting from the increasing number of women below the poverty line); Cloward &
Piven, supra note 23, at 510 (advocating empowering the poor by informing them of their
rights so they generate a "crisis" the federal government cannot ignore); Grey, supra note
22 (discussing and comparing liberation and equalitarian theories on social welfare to each
other's and to Rawl's position); Handler, supra note 81, at 459 (arguing that the current
social services consensus represents "a deep hostility to the female-headed household in
poverty'); Karst, supra note 17 (reviewing the history of bias against minority groups and
recent trends to change such bias); Kilson, supra note 27 (discussing the need for black,
white, and blue-collar workers to help support conclusionary policies so that those in
poverty may rise to stable employment positions); Law, supra note 17 (exploring how
federal aid programs and law systematically disfavors women); Monaco, supra note 27
(tracing the history of poverty for minorities and immigrants and their rise to wealth
through increased political participation); Note, supra note 17 (discussing the effects of the
dependent care tax credit, especially on latinos).
118. The nature of this power struggle has long been recognized. King, supra note 28,
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which questions of approaches to modifications of poor relief are
framed. But it does not imply that empowerment is progress, it
may merely affect outcomes as one system of equitable ordering
and social valuation is replaced by another.' 9
The static paradigm, as it must, trivializes these concerns.
Struggles for empowerment, and the recognition thereof are the
province of those looking to empower themselves. Stasis recognizes
at 555 ('Tne problem of transforming the ghetto, therefore, is a problem of pow-
er-confrontation of the forces of power demanding change and the forces of power dedi-
cated to the preserving of the status quo:); see also id. at 600-04 (discussing how Afri-
can Americans can use their employee status and their role as consumers to effect change
in the status quo). Fairly representative of (liberal) government's perception of the prob-
lem is the view of the New York State Task Force on Poverty and Welfare, one of
whose members, Donna E. Shalala, is currently the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services. "Race- and gender-based discrimination are important causes of the
low wages and the weak labor market position of women and minorities." NEW YORK
TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 44. Empowerment is seen by some as the means of re-
ducing destitution. See, e.g., Woodson, supra note 17, at 1030-35, 1044-46 (advocating
empowerment of African-American communities so they may deal with their own prob-
lems and the creation of "business development districts" to spur entrepreneurial growth).
Conservative commentators tend to see no problem.
119. See ROBEiTo M. UNGER, THm CRmCAL LEGAL STVimES MovEMeirr 115-17 (1983)
(characterizing society, in the aggregate, as a vast array of overlapping yet discrete sets of
prerogatives establishing a system of social stations, each station being defined by its
relation to all others and by the degree and character of its access to the favors of gov-
ernmental power, politics, in this sense, and lawmaking as well, can be understood as a
struggle among these groups for greater access to governmental favors). A current exam-
ple: Should the amount of welfare payments made to single parents depend on the num-
ber of children in the household? This question could encompass issues of race; see, e.g.,
Morley D. Glicken, Transgenerational Welfare Dependency, 32 L CONTEMP. STUD. 31
(1981) (discussing the poverty cycle becoming more evident; children of welfare parents
are more likely to receive welfare); gender, see Handler, supra note 81 (examining the
trials and tribulations of female heads of household attempting to get aid); Hirsch, supra
note 17 (explaining that labeling funds received under the AFDC as income will make
poor women poorer); Kilson, supra note 27, at 60-63 (examining the plight of Black fe-
male heads of households compared to male-headed homes and two-parent homes); Law,
supra note 17 (discussing how women are systematically prejudiced by federal law);
Carole A. Corns, Note, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent
Women: A Proposal to Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion Funding Provi-
sions, 24 U. Mcn. J.L. REF. 371 (1991) (discussing court decisions and legislation limit-
ing the use of public money for abortions by indigent women); Patti E. Phillips, Com-
ment, Adding Insult to Injury: The Lack of Medically Appropriate Housing for the Home-
less HPV-ill, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 567 (1991); disability, see Lance Liebman, The Defini-
tion of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the
Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARv. L. Rev. 833 (1976) (discussing that the ad
hoc nature of social legislation has led to inconsistent and inequitable decisions regarding
the disabled and their benefits); and ethnicity, see Note, supra note 17 (examining compli-
cations that arise among Latinos applying for aid due to Latin cultural attributes). The
debate describes the groups attempting to attain, retain, or deny governmental favors of a
socilly favorable character.
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no such struggle; it paints them over with words and phrases such
as "welfare values," "single-mother families," "illegitimacy."'"
Productivity is the key; racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, and
heterosexism are merely impediments to full productivity-they do
not affect a person's ability to be at least minimally productive.
Stasis sees at best a secondary connection between these impedi-
ments and the relief of the poor. What is of concern, then, is that
the needy be maintained, not that people have the right to maxi-
mum productivity. Those who are able to work, but do not because
they feel the work is beneath them, or is too difficult, or does not
pay enough, are not needy-they are indulging a pickiness not
permitted by the social and economic imperatives of current soci-
ety.121
120. Robert Bonner, Kicking the Poor While They're Down, CIE. TR1B., May 13, 1992,
at C18 (commenting on a letter written in support of an Illinois state proposal to deny
welfare benefits to women who bear children while receiving welfare):
I don't know whether the Tribune realizes it, but the gist of Sobieski's resort
to the bundle of stereotypes he used ("lifestyle," "habit," "legacy," "welfare
values," "single-mother families," "stigma," and "illegitimacy") came within
about half-an-inch of saying, outright, that the real problem with welfare is a
racial one--a problem with the minority races, that is, particularly with blacks.
In short Sobieski's message was a racist one, wearing the mask of welfare
reform.
See also Rosemary L. Bray, So How Did I Get'Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 35
("Welfare has become a code word now, one that enables white Americans to mask their
sometimes malignant, sometimes benign racism behind false concerns about the suffering
ghetto poor and their negative impact on the rest of us.").
121. This is articulated in the work of so-called conservative writers such as Murray
and Mead. See MEAD, supra note 26, at 76-82 (explaining different theories regarding
why some people will not work); MURRAY, supra note 3, at 156-64, 227-33 (examining a
hypothetical case comparing 1960 to 1970 welfare and then suggesting the elimination of
all welfare programs to force individuals to work). But see AU.ETrA, supra note 27, at
272 (arguing that "if them were an adequate number of jobs, members of the underclass
would readily take them" based on the stories of 26 people participating in a jobs train-
ing program in Manhattan in 1979-80); RmBM , supra note 65, at 34 (arguing that "the
poor who are unemployed-together with their non-poor competitors-face a massive job
shortage"). For the same reason, the fact that the only work available was exploitative, or
perpetuated racial, gender, or ethnic discrimination patterns, is largely irrelevant. The im-
portant consideration is self-sufficiency. Those with the talent, drive and good fortune will
quickly improve their financial circumstances. All other considerations were either irrele-
vant or of secondary importance.
In addition, the static paradigm makes the critical assumption that there always also
exists sufficient means by which the poor could improve themselves, that is, make them-
selves marketable. Thus, schools are available for the young, vocational and language
classes are available for adults. Where the private sector does not provide these, the state
will make these available. See, e.g., GLDER, supra note 26; GILDER, supra note 37;
MEAD, supra note 26; MURRAY, supra note 3. But see FURNIss & TILTON, supra note
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As such, the assumptions comprising our core social orderings
are not merely a legalism, or a transient political compromise or an
imposition from some outside force. It is us. A static system does
not depend on the underlying legal or constitutional basis of the
aid provided. In this sense, "rights," such as the right to relief,
either as a constitutional or moral or "natural" right is largely a
marginal concern. Such rights exist, in the static world view, only
as a code, an afterthought dependent on societal conceptions of
rights to property and the personal obligation to labor or amass
wealth, and not the other way around.'" Thus, in the context of
static systems, the hotly debated question of whether relief to be
afforded the poor is a right or a privilege-whether the state has
the right to determine if benefits will be made available at
all----is largely irrelevant; that is, it is relevant at best principal-
ly in connection with the (secondary) debate about how minimum
benefit levels are determined.' 2
4
23 (comparing the social states of Sweden and Great Britain to the United States and
advocating that the United States move closer to these two countries in its social welfare
policy); MARMoR Er AL., supra note 6 (discussing the general misunderstanding of wel-
fare in the United States and its consequences); RIEMER, supra note 65 (discussing how
government should not expand its role to wipe out poverty). For earlier versions of this
view, which has been a part of the culture of ideas in Britain and the United States for
centuries, see HimmELFARB, supra note 52, at 42-304 (discussing Adam Smith and "politi-
cal economy" through the industrial revolution).
122. Physical maintenance, therefore, does not stand as an independent concept-worthy,
somehow, of special consideration. It is a derivative concept in the sense that the right to
aid is conceived as flowing from the obligation to work. This connectedness is most
clearly evidenced in the work of self-styled conservative writers. See, e.g., GILDER, supra
note 37; MEAD, supra note 26, at I (asserting that part of the welfare problem is that the
government has not required employable recipients to work); MURRAY, supra note 3 (as-
serting that working age poor who refuse to work should not receive aid). It is sometimes
more masked in the work of others. See, &g., NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23
(outlining a plan based on mutual responsibilities of the State and individuals to help the
poor avoid dependence on welfare); MARMOR Er AL., supra note 6. That is not to say
that this state of affairs is either good or bad in an absolute or relative sense. Certainly,
the current state of affairs has many supporters as well as detractors. This debate mirrors
the general debate in American society as groups holding different views vie for pow-
er-that is, the power to control the legislative machinery, or the debate, or the very
conception of the problem.
123. See supra note 21 (discussing whether the right to benefits is a constitutional right
or not).
124. For a discussion of the merits of a constitutional right to relief, see, e.g.,
Braveman, supra note 21 (examining state constitutions to determine if more authority
arises there for a constitutional right to relief than in the U.S. Constitution); Michelman,
supra note 37 (responding to critics of the constitutional right to relief). But see
Ellickson, supra note 9 (explaining that a right to shelter or to income discourages work
while our Constitution encourages work); Winter, supra note 21 (discussing Supreme
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The manner in which aid is dispensed is also a secondary
consideration; it is a point relating to the relative conveniences of
different bureaucratic approaches and not a matter of fundamental
concern to the static system builder. A static system is as well
served by a system of professional case workers as it is by a
proletarianized workforce shorn of all discretionary authority whose
only function is to apply the rules relating to the provision of aid
to applicants."z Both are driven by the core assumption that the
poor need fixing.
Given the system's indifference, we would expect that the
manner in which relief is styled (as a privilege or as a right) and
services are dispensed will be dictated by expediency; the form of
relief will be driven by costs"r and the impositions of higher au-
Court decisions regarding economic equality as alarming and in need of constraint). For a
discussion of the entitlement to relief as a matter of state law, see, e.g., Bensinger, supra
note 9 (discussing that California courts should announce that there is a statutory right to
relief); Bums, supra note 62 (arguing that identification of need does not impose a legal
obligation upon state legislatures or agencies to give this need priority over other equally
valid social welfare goals); Chackes, supra note 9 (discussing the judicial enforceability of
the governmental duties owed to assisting the poor). For a general discussion of the na-
ture of modem fundamental rights analysis, see Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Con-
troversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE
LJ. 1063 (1981).
125. Recall that the fundamental goal of such systems is relieving physical want at
some minimal level. This is a very modest goal. To the extent that people are provided
with whatever minimum society deems adequate, and this minimum tends to be quite
small, all else is extra. Perhaps for this reason, federal categorical grant programs quickly
abandoned even the attempt to institute a grant delivery mechanism allowing the profes-
sional caseworker some discretion to make determinations of need on a case-by-case basis.
See Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-21 (discussing that, over the past two decades, rules
have been substituted for standards for social worker decision-making). For an application
of these notions in the context of a particular state welfare program, see Smith, supra
note 9, at 642-55 (exploring several Indiana cases where the judiciary limited discretion of
the trustee). For a discussion of the benefits of limited the discretion welfare delivery
systems, see, e.g., Handler, supra note 24, at 500-10 (explaining that this limited discre-
tion begins with the federal government's permissive legislation). For a discussion of
social work jurisprudence, see Simon, supra note 102, at 14-23. Poor relief systems with
transformative or redistributive goals might well have other imperatives. As I attempt to
demonstrate, however, despite statements to the contrary, American systems of poor relief
are neither fundamentally transformative nor redistributive (except, perhaps, in the most
marginal sense).
126. Costs, not more abstract matters, tend to shape the characteristics of modem relief.
Jacobus tenBroek has examined the manner in which cost minimization helped shape the
Elizabethan Poor Law. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 267 (discussing how poor law
developed when the Tudors encouraged charity as both an alternative to public expendi-
ture and a cost-cutting measure). The importance of cost minimization follows from the
contingent nature of society's view of its obligation to relieve the poor. Since there exists
no independent relief imperative, the notions affecting its implementation are derivative as
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thority-in the United States today that normally means by the
federal government. Indeed, states now generally structure their
relief programs to meet the requirements of federal law, although it
is applicable, as a technical matter, only to programs receiving
federal funds. As a result, as William Simon has demonstrated, the
rules applicable to the needy under such systems tend to resemble
the proverbial Pharisaic codex interpreted not by learned priests but
by a proletarianized workforce devoid of both substantial discretion,
and the desire or the ability to work on a case-by-case basis."
Static system builders are relatively indifferent (except for potential
cost savings in a particular case) to how benefits are dispensed.
Static systems can as easily dispense aid in the form of cash or in-
kind benefits, or both; aid can be provided on an institutional
(indoor) or non-institutional (outdoor) basis. Static systems will
provide for both.s
A static system isolates those of its destitute on the dole."z I
have explained how our core social realities dictate that the provi-
sion of relief be passive, oriented to providing aid to those who
turn to it, those who have exhausted all other avenues of relief; it
will, thus, be designed and implemented as a residual system, the
well.
127. See Simon, supra note 13 (discussing the demoralization of social workers and
advocating that they be given greater discretion); Simon, supra note 102 (explaining the
need for responsible states that allow public workers to function "responsibly and effec-
tively"); see also DAVIS, supra note 24 (exploring all aspects of discretionary law as
opposed to rule-based law); Wyers, supra note 24 (discussing erosion in the skills of
social workers and advocating increased discretion for the income-maintenance line work-
er); Smith, supra note 9, at 632-33 (outining the criteria trustees must use to determine
if aid should be given).
128. Thus, for instance, California's general assistance provisions permit both indoor and
outdoor relief at the discretion of the county. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000,
17002 (West 1991) (stating that first is outdoor relief, then comes indoor relief through
almshouses and county farms to care for the poor). But see Robbins v. Super. Ct., 695
P.2d 695 (Cal. 1985) (issuing writ of mandamus to prevent the county from refusing
welfare benefits based on the "strong likelihood" that the policy violates the statute).
129. Anecdotal accounts of this isolating tendency of statically oriented systems abound
in the popular press. The isolating effect is acknowledged even when criticized by gov-
emmental officials charged with administering the system. Thus, Jack Quinn, a public
housing administrator and President of the National Association of Housing and Redevel-
opment Officials (NCHRO), stated in an address given at a meeting of the Southwest
Regional Council of NCHRO, "We've set up a protected class of people. We punish
them when they make a move to get off welfare. It's almost like a penal system. We
ought to be rewarding them instead of punishing them." Neal, supra note 56, at DI.
The marginalization of the poor can also be augmented by considerations of race and
ethnicity. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 17, at 3-7 (explaining that while whites typically
move in and out of poverty, racial and ethnic minorities seem to remain poor).
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system of last resort. 3 Reactive sensibilities reinforce the ten-
dency to compartmentalize poverty and to treat the poor (those in
need of aid) as a separate, inferior component of the popula-
tion."' This compartmentalization of poverty is evidenced by the
way in which poverty is defined, by reference to a poverty line,
for instance-an income wall separating one kind of person (a
person in need), from the rest of us. It is also evidenced by our
sense (anecdotal for the most part) that the poor remain poor and
pass their poverty on to their children-the apocryphal "cycle of
poverty.'
32
130. See supra note 102 (describing the American general assistance systems). The very
recipients of aid also have traditionally shared this view. See, e.g., Briar, supra note 96,
at 374-77 ("Thus the stance these recipients adopt toward the welfare agency is not that
of a rights-bearing citizen claiming benefits to which he is entitled by law but that of a
suppliant seeking ... .'a little help to tide us over until we can get back on our feet
again.,').
131. See HIMmELARB, supra note 52, at 288-304, 371-400 (discussing the development
of this notion of separateness and inferiority in 19th century Britain); PIVEa & CLOWARD,
supra note 20, at 165-75 (arguing that degrading the non-productive able-bodied person
serves as an effective means of reinforcing the work ethic); Alfieri, supra note 28, at
683-89 (examining also the tendency of advocates of the poor to treat the poor as sub-
status individuals and give short shrift to their concerns); Karst, supra note 17, at 3-7
(describing how the modem welfare system separates the poor from the rest of society
and treats them as inferior); Ross, supra note 35, at 1509-10 (reciting the common notion
that there have always and will always be poor people).
132. For a fairly nonideological discussion, see Peter Gottschalk et al., The Dynamics
and Intergenerational Transmission of Poverty and Welfare Participation, in CONFRONTING
POVERTY: PRESCRnONS FOR CHANGE 85 (Sheldon Domziger et al. eds., 1994). Com-
mentators in the popular press continuously provide anecdotal evidence of the existence of
this constancy of poverty.
Citizens raised with a strong work ethic--working parents and all
that implies-probably do have that kind of desire for self-sufficiency. But what
if you were raised by a welfare mother who was raised by a welfare mother?
That's not uncommon. Quinn has the same revulsion for the welfare
wise as the ordinary citizen. He told of another case in which a 32-year-old
mother and her two daughters, age 16 and 14, showed up for their annual
review.
Both of the girls had been born in welfare and both were pregnant
themselves.
Neal, supra note 56, at DI (Jack Quinn is a public housing administrator and president of
the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials) (commenting in an
address given at a meeting of the Southwest Regional Council of NCHRO); see also
Georgie A. Geyer, Why Won't U.S. Poor Take Jobs Illegals Take?, TuLSA WORLD, Jan.
31, 1993, at DI; cf. Gertrude Himmelfarb, A De-Moralized Society, FORBES, Sept. 14,
1992, at 120 (explaining the consequences of moral neutrality as realizing that problems
of poverty are unseverable from morality). A number of studies, however, suggest that the
cycle of poverty is more apparent than real-more an effect at the margin than the com-
mon fate of the destitute. See, e.g., Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping Into
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It follows from this that static systems tend to be self-contained
and focused on directly manipulating the target population. We
tend to speak of different systems-for instance, employment sys-
tems, insurance systems, welfare systems, and property systems,
each only loosely related to the others.'33 And static poor law
systems tend to respect these boundaries.3 ' An identifying charac-
teristic of such systems should be the lack of formal or informal
connection between the state's poor relief program and other state
policies or agendas, including a state's labor and commercial poli-
cGy.
135
and Out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM. RESoURCES 1 (1986) (explaining
that a large portion of those falling into poverty stay for a short time while a small
portion stay poor for extended periods); Jencks, supra note 89, at 36 (explaining that
consolidation of the poor in cities reinforces misconceptions regarding a cycle of poverty).
133. See, e.g., BARTH Er AL., supra note 14, at 9-14 (discussing relations between
different systems that affect the welfare of the poor); NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra
note 23, at 30-44 (recognizing that some type of coordination is necessary between labor
policy and welfare policy to minimize the size of the welfare-eligible population).
134. See, eg., FURNISS & TILTON, supra note 23, at 164-66 (noting that while the
notion of full employment has been embraced as an ideal, the government has taken a
minimalist attitude to its achievement, relying on the private sector to achieve the goal).
Even the New York Task Force on Poverty and Welfare, in recommending a more inter-
ventionist approach to labor policy, remained fairly conservative in its suggestions, concen-
trating on a call for more responsive fiscal and monetary policy and making America
more competitive in foreign trade. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 43.
Again, both the separateness of these areas and the correctness of keeping approaches to
policy in these areas separate have come under increasing criticism. Cf. BARRY
BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 99"M CONG., 20
SESS., THE GREAT AMERICAN JOB MACHINE: THE PROLIFERAMON OF Low WAGE EM-
PLOYMENT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986) (discussing wage trends in the United States);
FOLKE DOVRiNG, INEQUALrY: THE PoimcAL ECONOMY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 146-48
(1991) (arguing that the United States should take a more active role in achieving full
employment through public works projects, using the unemployed for infrastructure repair
and environmental clean-up); RIEMER, supra note 65 (discussing the relationship of job
shortages to poverty); Larson, supra note 78 (criticizing the United States system for in-
come maintenance because of its lack of coordination); Skocpol, supra note 28 (advocat-
ing the creation of good systems to implement welfare programs to avoid political in-
fighting between different agencies).
135. Recall that since the static paradigm assumes that poverty is the fault of the poor,
the cure ought to address the conduct or skills of the poor. However, there is a certain
futility in job training and education programs if there is no demand for the workers and
poverty programs in the United States have failed to address the demand side of the
unemployment problem. See, eg., MARMOR Er AL., supra note 6, at 121-23 (arguing that
unemployment causes poverty and that state training programs will not solve the problem
until jobs are available); REME, supra note 65, at 28-34 (asserting that most organiza-
tions, the federal government included, overlook the role of job shortages on poverty).
But note that while there may be a lack of cohesive planning, there might well be
some attempt at tying the efforts. Thus, for instance, many states currently are attempting
to link the receipt of federal categorical aid to the attendance of recipients' children in
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Educational policy is different. In one of its guises-indoctri-
nation--education policy provides the key means for inculcating
each generation with the proper order of things. This is a concept
that dictators of the twentieth century-Adolph Hitler, Josef Stalin,
Fidel Castro-understood quite well when they boasted of their
educational policies. 36 It is also a concept that might well have
been learned from the English example of the early nineteenth
century, a time when Protestant religious education was used to
teach the children of the poor to accept the notion that a life of
hard work and poverty was their due.37 Even after the advent of
school. This leamfare is the subject of intense debate in several states. In addition, many
state programs require recipients to actively look for work, or make themselves available
on some kind of state employment availability roster. See infra part V.A. However, the
push here is distinctly one-sided. The relation of the poor to labor policy is one requir-
ing them to work harder to get a job. . Of course this is not to say that the labor policy
itself must create and maintain jobs sufficient to employ all the potentially employable.
See, e.g., RIMR, supra note 65, at 4-10 (advocating a new poor relief system that fo-
cuses on jobs for those unemployed, but able to work). Likewise, the push to keep
children in school might also be an effort to indoctrinate the goodness of work and self-
discipline, and of the acceptance of a life of hard work and poverty. This notion under-
lies Charles Murray's suggestion that America abolish its governmental welfare programs.
See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-28.
136. On the experience in Germany after 1933, see, e.g., GEORGE L. Moss, NAZI CtL-
TtiRE: INTELLECTuAL, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LimE IN TH THRa REICH 263-318 (1966)
(discussing Nazi educational techniques and containing many excerpts of original class-
room materials from the Nazi period); WLLIM L. StaER, TarE RIsE AND FALL OF TIm
Taw REICH: A HisToRY OF NAZI GmANY 249 (1960) ("The German schools, from
the first grade through the universities, were quickly Nazified. Textbooks were hastily
rewritten, curricula were changed, Mein Kampf was made... 'our infallible pedagogical
guiding star' and teachers who failed to see the new light were cast out.").
On the creation of the machinery for the education of the party and the masses in
the former Soviet Union, see JOSEF V. STALIN, Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the
C.P.S.U.(B.) on the Work of the Central Committee (Mar. 10, 1939), in JOsEF STALIN:
PROBLEMS OF LENINISM 746, 788 (State Publishing House of Political Literature ed.,
1953) ('The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres,
is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist
science of the laws of social development.:).
On the experience in Cuba after 1959, see Gerald H. Read, Tfte Cuban Revolution-
ary Offensive in Education, 14 COMP. EDUC. REV. 131, 134 (1970) ("In June, 1965, the
Minister of Education, Armando Hart Dhvalos, proclaimed the start of a new phase in
educational development which would be marked by an aggressive effort to secure an
ideological transformation in the moral and social consciousness of every citizen").
137. Indoctrination to the habits of work and the acceptance of a life of poverty was
central to the Sunday-school education of 19th century English poor (substantially the only
education provided to children of the poor during the first part of the century). This is
luridly described in connection with the effect of 19th century Methodism in E.P. THOMP-
SON, TaE MAKING OF Tm ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 375-78 (1963). The modem view
tends to treat the education of the children of the poor as the way to create self-sufficient
adults. See Aletha C. Huston, Children in Poverty: Developmental and Policy Issues, in
[Vol. 44:87
1995] MEDIEVAL POOR LAW 923
compulsory education in Britain in 1880, the primary purpose of
education was to discipline future workers and prepare them for a
life of low-wage factory work.' In this sense, education is cen-
tral to the dominance of any culture, paradigm, or system of social
ordering. For us, it is essential to teach the young to accept with-
out question the central tenets of the paradigm, and especially that
each individual must learn to fend for himself.'39 This is good
CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHILD DEVELOPMENT' AND PUBLIC POLICY 1, 9-10 (Aletha C.
Huston ed., 1991) (explaining that the children of poorly educated, unwed, teenage moth-
ers are at the highest risk for long-term poverty); Craig T. Ramey & Frances A. Camp-
bell, Poverty, Early Childhood Education, and Academic Competence: The Abecedarian
Experiment, in CHILDREN IN POVERTY: CHIL DEVELOPMENT AND PUnC POLICY 190
(Aletha C. Huston ed., 1991) ("%ow resource children are at increased risk for retention
in grade, for special education placement, and for failure to complete high school. Drop-
ping out of school is linked, in turn, to increased rates of juvenile delinquency, increased
likelihood of teenage pregnancy, and intergenerational economic dependency.") (citations
omitted); cf. Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes: Rights to Education and to Family
Stability, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 337, 348-58 (1991) (discussing problems faced by home-
less children attempting to enroll in school).
138. See DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMEMIEUS: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 341-
45 (1968) (asserting that most of the wealthy viewed education according to one's lot in
life; if you were working class, you received an education suitable to what you would
need for factory work). This, of course, was not a purely British preoccupation. Cf.
FLYNT, supra note 60, at 109 (describing the efforts of a female Alabama mill stockhold-
er to justify child labor in the early part of the 20th century. "When you know more of
these people, you'll see that they're just like animals. In the mill they have some chance
of getting civilized. If we make laws restricting labor we should frighten away capitalists
and wreck our very surest chances of progress and prosperity."). Certainly, Karl Marx
was well aware of the place of lower-class education in traditional society, and of the
gulf between its stated purposes and real effect. See KARL MARX, Education for the
Workers, in THE KARL MARX LIBRARY (ON EDUCATION, WOMEN, AND CHILDRIEN) 25
(1975) (arguing that the education of workers "altogether depends on life conditions" and
that the bourgeois understand the moral education of the workers to be "the drumming
into the head of [workers] bourgeois principles, and that ... the bourgeois class has
neither the means nor, assuming it had them, (even the desire to) apply them so as to
offer the people a real education"). Of course, the essential contradictions of education
are not specific to traditional European or American society. It appears in many other
systems as well, liberal and conservative. See infra text accompanying note 139.
139. Low INCOmE OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 53 (describing one
of the goals of the Reagan administration welfare programs: the creation of "opportunities
for self-reliance through education and enterprise. For those who can work, public assis-
tance should be a temporary means of support and skill improvement, until employment
can be obtained."); NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 9-10, 41-42 (arguing that
society should expect people to be self-sufficient and must "help citizens take advantage
of employment opportunities by creating an education system that prepares citizens to be
productive members of a first-class work force"); THE MOUNT PLEASANT REPORT, supra
note 17, at 122-38, 150-52 (arguing for greater outreach to Hispanic students in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Report argues that: "Access to equal opportunity in the United
States depends to a large degree on the ability to attain an education.); WHITE HOUSE
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irrespective of ideological perspective. Thus, "the 'public' education
of the State is rather the rational and public existence of the State.
Only the State trains its members in that it makes them into politi-
cal members; in that it transforms individual aims into public aims,
raw drives into ethical tendency, natural independence into spiritual
freedom.""
A system of isolation, itself resembling the poor, who are also
said to be unconnected with the mores of mainstream America,
141
the physical manifestation of the system should be its bureaucra-
cy-physical spaces which the needy must seek out filled with
waiting processors who the needy must appease as a prerequisite
for relief. Its other physical manifestation should be the means
used to discover who among the population of seekers is actually
worthy of aid in accordance with then-current criteria. And because
we are dealing with people that society does not favor, the incen-
tive of stasis is to make the discovering process itself a test of the
desperation of the applicants. The waiting processors are equipped
with a variety of complex tests and trials-unpleasant, difficult,
stigmatizing-to be overcome by the applicant (much like the
twelve labors of Hercules) before aid is made available. This
WORKING GROUP ON ThE AMILY, supra note 20, at 41-42 ("Education has caused waves
of American immigrants to rise out of poverty, and it remains the most effective vehicle
today for breaking the cycle of dependency.").
140. MARX, supra note 138, at 17.
141. Anecdotal characterizations of this kind are common. An example: "To repeat, the
goal of welfare programs should be to help needy people help themselves. Instead, Con-
gress has devised a system that traps society's weakest members in a cycle of misery.
Worse, it permeates the rest of society, contributing to class hatred, crime and political
unrest." Neal, supra note 56, at Dl; Hobbes, supra note 43, at C1 (describing the
author's experiences as a resident of homeless shelters in New York and Minneapolis).
142. The extremes this static tendency takes are perhaps best exemplified by the poor
relief bureaucracy and the process to which the poor must submit in order to obtain relief
in Los Angeles County, Cal. See Handler, supra note 81, at 524-33 (describing byzantine
intake and screening procedures). Applying for federal categorical relief is little better.
The application for Food Stamps was recently simplified, from 18 pages to 12 pages. And
yet, the Secretary of Agriculture (a lawyer), on attempting to complete the form, still
found it difficult to understand. Local welfare offices had to hire personnel specifically
to help applicants fill in the forms. See Food Stamp Applications Confusing, Official Says,
TULSA WORLD, June 15, 1993, at A20. The humiliating and difficult process of securing
relief has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Low INCOmE OPPORTUNrTY WORKING
GROUP, supra note 3, at 19 ("Wiorkers complain about the hundreds of rules that are
difficult to interpret and require mountains of documentation .... Recipients say the
rules and reporting demands strip them of dignity and stigmatize them as lazy and dis-
honest."); Simon, supra note 13, at 1205-06 (explaining that Massachusetts requires AFDC
applicants to produce up to 30 different documents in order to successfully complete the
AFDC application).
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passivity, this incentive to require the poor to prove their worthi-
ness for relief, serves not only to isolate the neediest poor, but also
increases the likelihood that fewer than all of the potentially eligi-
ble will take advantage of the system, reducing the overall cost of
aid to those who provide it.'43 In a system which favors any pro-
ductive alternative to institutional relief, this set up is both natural
and good.
The need to provide a means of giving these tests of "eligibili-
ty," the need for physical manifestation, for interacting with a
separable and identifiable class of people not like the rest of us,
creates incentives for localized administration. Local administration,
it is believed, tends to simplify the process of discriminating be-
tween classes of the needy, eliminating effectively all who do not
qualify for aid.'" Local administration also has some cost con-
143. For instance, in Massachusetts, failure to meet the smallest technical requirements
can result in the rejection of the application, forcing the applicant to begin the process
again.
For example a letter verifying a child's enrollment at school may be rejected if
not signed by the right official or not dated within the appropriate number of
days. The workers are encouraged, through training and supervision, to insist
on strict compliance with the documentation rules, and they are discouraged
from relying on the claimant's undocumented statements even when the rules
do not expressly require documentation.
Simon, supra note 13, at 1205-06. This habit of welfare workers has been documented in
other states as well. See, e.g., VESELY Er AL., supra note 96, at 44 (describing how in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a recipient received an appointment letter two days before a sched-
uled hearing and was away at the time; when she called in to explain, the welfare worker
refused to reschedule, her case was closed and she was required to reapply for assis-
tance); THE MoUNt PLEASANT REPORT, supra note 17, at 93 (documenting instances
where the caseworkers attended employee parties rather than attend to registered appli-
cants, and where an applicant who had an appointment with a caseworker who was on
vacation was not informed that her caseworker was out until a large part of her day was
spent waiting).
144. See Low INcomE OPPoRTUNITY WORKNG GROUP, supra note 3, at 51 (holding
that the cornerstone of a new national strategy for public assistance must be rooted in
"long term experimentation through demonstrations that are both community-based and
state-sponsored.... Throughout American history, the state governments have played a
unique role in serving as laboratories for policies that can blend national goals with this
community energy and support"); NEw YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 93:
State and local governments tend to be closer and more responsive to commu-
nities and individuals than the federal government. They are able to provide a
variety of diverse approaches to problems that respond to local needs. The
costs of programs that invest in the poor, however, are appropriately borne at
least partly at the federal level.
Local administration makes it easier for the providers of relief (taxpayers) to politicize the
granting of aid. See Bensinger, supra note 9, at 506 (discussing how political pressure
from tax-paying citizens affects elected officials in their budgetary decisions regarding
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tainment potential. The theory is that local administration is more
efficient than administration from afar, since local administrators
are closer to local problems, and that local taxpayers are more
likely to keep close watch on the munificence of local administra-
tors. 45 Local administration may also reduce the administrative
costs of welfare provision by eliminating the need for a large state
administrative apparatus."
Questions of cost, and of the transfer and allocation of resourc-
es, have run through the proceeding discussion as a sort of under-
tone. Let us examine the effect of cost under the static world view
more closely. Stasis, when applied to the problem of poverty, has
implications for the approach taken with respect to the allocation
of societal resources. Since the expenditure of public funds has a
necessarily redistributive effect which runs counter to the notion of
the rewards of individual productivity, institutional programs of
poor relief under a static view will tend to be crafted in a manner
that minimizes the cost of providing poor relief to the extent possi-
ble.'47 Understand, of course, that the lack of resources, though
several relief programs). This notion has very old roots. See LEONARD, supra note 108, at
133 (arguing the nature of the administrative system set up under the Elizabethan Poor
Law is representative of the unthinking "thinking" in this respect, where the notion is
uncritically accepted that "the relief of the poor is a matter which can only be efficiently
administered by men who have a great knowledge of detail. The action of the Privy
Council would have had very little effect unless there had been an efficient system of
local government.:); cf. tenBroek, supra note 9, at 257-91 (discussing why administration
of relief was kept local in the Elizabethan age).
145. See STaiN supra note 87, at 45 (arguing that local responsibility for relief funding
and administration leads to more efficient allocation); Kravit, supra note 9, at 140-41
(stating that local officials have "every incentive" to reduce town spending); tenBroek,
supra note 9, at 262-65 (discussing the Elizabethan system of each locality taking charge
of relief for its residents).
146. See infra notes 367-89.
147. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 262-65 (discussing measures taken by the
Elizabethans to minimize cost of aid to the poor). This notion is by no means confined
to late medieval England. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol & John Ikenberry, The Political For-
mation of the American Welfare State In Historical and Comparative Perspective, 6 COM.
Soc. REs. 87, 124 (1983) (chronicling the development of welfare policy in the United
States since the late 19th century and arguing that one of the principal reasons that uni-
versal welfare state programs were never institutionalized has been the fear that such pro-
grams "might result in politically uncontrollable, easily expandable handouts from the
public treasury to masses of individual citizens"); Wayne Green, Board Kicks Off New
Philosophy of Welfare, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 1, 1992, at Al ("The state Commission for
Human Services.. . started a new era of lean budgets, program reviews and new think-
ing about welfare that puts taxpayers' concerns at the forefront."); cf. James 1. O'Hern,
Note, Aid to Families With Dependent Children and Emergency Assistance: New Jersey's
Aid to Homeless Families, 13 SEroN HALL LEGIS. L 181 (1990) (arguing that having too
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quite real, is perhaps more a function of the political limitations
society has placed on public expenditure than on the actual inabili-
ty of any government to raise taxes sufficiently to provide the
services. Thus, there may well be no governmental resources be-
cause of a political determination that to increase tax burdens
would result in (politically) unacceptable distributive effects, and
alter the social and economic order of the system. This type of
unacceptable action, with its dynamic repercussions, is precisely
incomprehensible as a viable alternative for a society subscribing to
the static ideal. Thus understood, the driving force of aid distribu-
tion is the scarcity of resources-not the needs of the indigents.'1
Eligibility is not the stuff of lofty, principled determinations.
Rather, it is largely a function of the manner in which society
chooses to recognize poverty from among the infinitely nuanced
conditions of poverty."9 And that is driven, in part, by cost, by
the need to minimize the redistributive effects of poor relief. Gov-
ernmental systems of poor relief concern themselves primarily with
limiting the pool of eligible recipients. Determining eligibility will
also likely be defined as narrowly as possible, thereby restricting
many agencies administering aid is not effective and that one agency should be given
control). The notion of cost containment affects all areas of relief to the poor. It has
become especially acute in the area of medical assistance to the indigent. See, e.g.,
Randall R. Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent:
Public and Private Options, 19 IND. L. REv. 857, 896-905 (1986) (comparing the costs
and benefits of hospital and insurance-based options for extending care to the medically
indigent).
148. This is most clearly illustrated in the contemporary example of states' attempts to
ration the availability of health care among the pool of the eligible poor, all of whom are
considered deserving. For instance, Florida has attempted to divide its poor into seven
ranked categories, each based on status (i.e., the elderly, pregnant women, and infants),
and provide health care based on the rankings. See Florida Plan Would Ration Health
Care, TULSA WORLD, OCt. 17, 1992, at A8. Oregon has enacted a similar plan. The need
to establish need hierarchies, such as those in Florida and Oregon, ae based primarily on
the perceived scarcity of resources. Thus, Dr. Leslie Beitsch, the head of Florida's family
health services division, stated that "[t]his is not pretty. It's reprehensible and we don't
like it. But to ignore it is to do what government has been doing for too long-ignore
hard choices." Id. A change in administration at the federal level permitted Oregon to
proceed with its plan, previously rejected, subject to oversight and direction from the
federal government. On March 19, 1993, the federal government granted the state a waiv-
er, allowing Oregon to ration Medicaid services in accordance with the plan which had
been rejected by the prior administration in August, 1992. See Clinton Allows Oregon to
Implement Medicaid Health-Care Experiment, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 19, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP file.
149. See, ag., STON, supra note 87, at 5-14 (discussing definitions of poverty and
different standards that are used to determine poverty); STEINER, supra note 10, at 108-31
(discussing the politics of eligibility in the context of federal categorical aid programs).
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aid to the able-bodied, if it is made available at all.' Other po-
tentially eligible recipients might be disqualified by requiring each
to count the income of family or friends with whom they live or
co-habit."' And, as should be expected, eligibility criteria might
tend to focus on concerns which may be race, gender, and ethnici-
ty sensitive.'
Cost reduction incentives thus tend to focus on minimizing
aid-providing the least amount necessary for maintenance to the
smallest number of people. From the perspective of stasis, resourc-
es devoted in excess of those necessary to keep the poor from
destitution are poorly spent. The goal of poor relief is not to
achieve a more elual distribution of wealth to all members of
society; embracing such a goal would violate a significant taboo of
static paradigm poor relief system building. Finely crafted defini-
tions of income units charged with the obligation of mutual
maintenance, usually family units however broadly defined, and the
attempt to directly link the indigent and those taxed to support
them (i.e., local administration) provide common bases for effecting
the cost reductive imperatives of the static view.5 3
Manipulation can thus occur only at the boundaries of the
categories created. It involves drawing and redrawing definitional
queues. It is as simple as defining eligibility to exclude for aid all
persons who are potentially employable, '54 or excluding certain
child care support given to families with children.55 In this man-
ner static systems manifest the tendency to eschew an absolutist
definition of need in favor of a political definition.'56 It is politi-
150. See infra part V.A.
151. See Bensinger, supra note 9, at 514-18 (arguing that several California cases taken
together allow courts to determine relief needs independent of personal needs.); see infra
part V.A.
152. Redistribution is power. Those empowered through redistributive programs, when
disproportionality of a group seeking greater power, may tend to make reductions in
redistributions as attempts to reduce their power. Sadly, the rhetoric of the debate is
rarely framed as stardy. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
153. For the application of this principle in state general assistance programs, see infra
part V.A.3.
154. For the practical application of this approach, see infra part V.A.2.
155. See, e.g., Proposed California Law:. The Governmental Accountability and Taxpayer
Protection Act of 1992, §§ 6, 7 (rejected Nov. 2, 1992) (prohibiting grant increases to
grant recipients who bear children while receiving aid); see also Backer, supra note 20, at
part V.B (analyzing California's system in the larger context of analyzing the limits of the
static system).
156. See STmEm, supra note 10, at 108-75 (explaining the political reasons behind aid
programs and contending the current stability in these programs are due more to lack of
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cal in the sense that the amount of resources society can extract
from the productive determines the broadness (or narrowness) of
the definitions of disability (worthy of long-term, open-handed aid)
and others (those who really do not need substantial or long-term
state aid and with whom we can be brusque). The underlying work
imperative of the static view also manifests itself in political terms
in an acceptance of the concept that "better" systems err on the
side of finding that the potential recipient is able to work. Thus, a
person unable to walk might still be fit for work as a typist."'
We should expect the static poor relief system to create a broader
definition of capacity for work.' Obviously enough, the broader
the definition of incapacity, the larger the aggregate obligation of
the state to the members thereof.' Since the federal categorical
innovations resulting from lack of access to political groups than to general approval of
the programs); Liebman, supra note 119, at 855-67 (discussing the reasoning behind cur-
rent Social Security Income definitions of "disabled" and "on welfare"); cf. supra text
accompanying notes 87-91 (discussing how idleness implies criminality, so 20th century
politics chose the family to reduce both).
157. "Persons with physical disabilities hold down jobs of almost every description, and
many more could if more were done to remove barriers to participation." NEw YORK
TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 85. The federal government has attempted to create pro-
grams to induce the partially disabled to work. See Plan for Achieving Self-Support
(PASS), Pub. L. No. 92-603, Title Ill, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382a(b), 1382a, 1382b(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)); Supplemental Securi-
ty Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SS), 20 C.F.R. § 416.1180 (1992) (ex-
plaining that one objective of SSI is to induce disabled persons to be self-supporting);
SSA Program Circular No. 05-90-OSSI (Sept. 28, 1990). PASS permits a person to ex-
clude certain income and resources otherwise counted in determining Supplemental Securi-
ty Income Program eligibility, but only to the extent such income or resources are used
to achieve vocational goals. For a practical discussion of how the PASS program works,
see Sheldon, supra note 81.
158. Thus, for example, when examining the problem of work and the disabled, the
New York State Task Force on Poverty and Welfare expressed its belief that having a
disability is different from not being able to work. It recommended that eligibility for
disability payments be more finely tuned to take into account the degree of disability of
the recipient. "In other words, if people are too disabled to continue in their present
occupation but could perform another with training and assistance; then support should be
provided that enables such persons to make the transition." NEw YORK TASK FORCE,
supra note 23, at 86.
159. The Reagan administration understood this concept quite well. As a result, that
administration fought a long battle to narrow the definition of incapacity in connection
with federally administered categorical aid programs in support of the incapacitated dis-
abled population through the Supplemental Security Income Program. Thus, in order to be
eligible for SSI disability payments, a person must be so disabled that he or she cannot
do any job that exists in the economy, even if the job is not available in the area or the
person would have to be completely retrained to do it. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (discussing qualifications and requirements for individuals to be
eligible for aid). But see NEw YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 85-86 (advocating
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aid programs cover certain classes of the incapacitated, we might
also expect states seeking to minimize expenditures to conform
their definitions of incapacity to the federal definition, and in that
way pass along a substantial cost of state poor relief programs.
Cost minimization has several other consequences. First, volun-
tary charitable programs conducted by private institutions or other
alternative sources of private aid are encouraged. Private charity
thus becomes an integral part of any static program of poor relief,
whether administered under conservative" or more liberal re-
gimes." At the heart of the static system's integration of charity
are a number of statutes and programs designed to facilitate the
giving of charity. In the United States, the most potent of these
include a favorable tax policy, primarily the charitable deduc-
expanded coverage to the temporarily disabled including those retraining for other jobs).
In addition, the Reagan administration attempted to shrink the size of the eligible popula-
tion administratively by narrowly interpreting the eligibility criteria for SSI and vigorously
prosecuting all cases brought for review. The result was an attempt to cut the aid of
about 485,000 claimants. And 30,000 lawsuits were brought by claimants for wrongful
denial of benefits. In the ensuing political storm, the Reagan administration abandoned this
approach. This chapter in the administration of SSI is described in MEAD, supra note 26,
at 134; see also Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 147 (discussing why there was a rise in
the number of uninsured people during Reagan's term as President); Liebman, supra note
119 (examining the history of SSI and criticizing the current status of the law); Perlin,
supra note 9 (discussing homelessness and its causes); Michael Diehl, Comment, Screen-
ing Out Worthy Social Security Disability Claimants and Its Effects on Homelessness, 45
U. MIAMI L. REv. 617 (1991) (explaining that beginning in 1978 the Department of
Health and Human Services instituted a more restrictive set of criteria, thus denying bene-
fits to many who would have received aid under old tests).
160. For example, former President Bush, in accepting the Republican Party nomination
for President in 1988, characterized community-based private charitable efforts as the
backbone of the nation's poor relief efforts. "[A] brilliant diversity spread like stars, like
a thousand points of light in a broad and peaceful sky. Does government have a place?
Yes. Government is part of the nation of communities - not the whole, just a part."
Bush, supra note 99, at 605 Fl.
The Reagan Administration had earlier worked hard to popularize private charitable
giving as a significant means of fighting poverty. See, e.g., Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY
WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 43-47 (demonstrating the manner in which private
charitable and volunteer efforts have been more effective than institutional relief). Modem
scholars have not ignored the political urgings for a return to a system of poor relief
based on private charitable efforts. Thus, for instance, Nathan Glazer, has advocated refo-
cusing welfare to concentrate more on traditional sources of help such as community
charitable organizations and the like. GLAzER, supra note 67, at 128-39.
161. Thus, even for the builders of the programs leading to the Great Society, private
charity was welcomed as an important component of the welfare state. See SARAH C.
CARY, COMM'N PRIVATE PHILANT ROPY PuB. NEEDs, U.S. TREASURY DEP., Philanthropy
and the Powerless, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS 657-92 (1977) [hereinafter COMM'N PRIVATE
PMLANTRoPY PuB. NEEDS].
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tion," and the exclusion from income of rhuch of the monies
received by charitable organizations." Other methods are also
available, including Good Samaritan provisions."' These provi-
sions have afforded substantial benefits to the donor class."es Such
types of governmental subsidies are not unique to the twentieth
century in this country. In creating the Tudor system of poor relief
in sixteenth century England, the government was quite concerned
about the need to promote and facilitate the operation of private
charitable foundations.t"s Private giving has none of the coercive
redistributive effects of governmental programs, and complements
the notion that the social and economic system is unchange-
able. 67 Private giving is least likely to threaten the social order
162. IMRC. § 170 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
163. I.R.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
164. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-7 (West 1993) (exempting charitable organiza-
tions from damages for negligence to its beneficiaries); Charitable Immunity and Liability
Act of 1987, Tim Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84 (West Supp. 1995).
165. For instance, it was recently estimated that the charitable deduction results in a
loss of about $3 billion in foregone tax revenues. Christopher Edley, Jr, Season's
Seethings: I am Not a Point of Light, LEGAL TMS, Dec. 18, 1989, at 26.
166. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 259-60 (discussing the encouragement of charitable
foundations and the oversight by the court to ensure proper use of these funds).
167. This notion has generated some support, and even greater interest, among econo-
mists. Mainstream economic theory hypothesizes that governmental transfers, in the form
of institutional poor relief, has two effects: a "substitution effect," and an "income effect."
With respect to the former, the hypothesis holds that, assuming the combination of private
and public transfers in the aggregate optimally meet the aggregate social need for poor
relief, increasing governmental transfers lowers the social need for additional contributions,
everything else being equal, thereby encouraging the substitution of public goods for pri-
vate charitable transfers. The "income effect' is fairly intuitive; the more the government
takes from a person in the form of taxes, the lower that person's disposable income and
the less able the person will be to contribute to charity. Thus as taxes are raised to meet
public poor relief obligations, the level of private giving should decrease. See Burton A.
Abrams & Mark D. Schitz, The "Crowding-Out" Effect of Governmental Transfers on
Private Charitable Contributions, 33 PuB. CHOIcE 29, 30-31 (1978) (explaining that in-
creases in government welfare spending will lead private sector to substitute goods for
charitable donations).
As a result, it would seem that the lower governmental expenditures on poor relief,
the larger the amount of voluntary private charitable transfers available for distribution to
the poor. This general notion has been formalized as three alternative models: (i) the
Ultrarational Model (arguing that there exists a perfect correlation between governmental
transfers and private giving-for every additional dollar of public aid, private aid should
decrease by a dollar, see Paul A. David & John L Scadding, Private Savings;
Ultrarationalty, Aggregation, and "Denison's Law," 82 3. POL ECON. 225 (1974)
(occurring under full employment)); (ii) the Interdependent Utility Functions Model (argu-
ing that the value of contribution is based on the perceived well-being of the recipients,
to the extent that increased governmental transfers increase the well-being of the recipi-
ents, the utility of private contributions decrease and an actual decrease in contributions
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or to empower.the poor---"He who gives, dominates. The theory of
the donor works not only at the level of individuals and societies,
but also of civilizations.' 6  Indeed, private charity is viewed
from some theoretical perspectives as conforming poor relief to the
requirements of the economic status quo.'69
The encouragement of private charitable efforts might be indi-
rect-for example, requiring by statute or regulation that the appli-
cant be referred to local non-governmental charitable institu-
tions, 7 ' or referring in statutes, such as that of Texas, to the role
should result, see Abrams & Schitz, supra, at 31-32); and (iii) the "Better-to-Give-Than-
To-Receive" Model (arguing that the rate of governmental contributions or the well-being
of the targeted recipients are irrelevant to the determination of the desire to give; satisfac-
tion is derived from the act itself or some other motive, so that, governmental transfers
have little crowding out effect on the level of private giving). Abrams and Schitz have
argued, on the basis of their study, that private charitable giving has some positive effect
on the level of private giving, but that the effect is less than one for one. Id.
168. BRAuD, supra note 108, at 826. On charity and disempowerment. see, e.g.,
Alfieri, supra note 28 (arguing that private giving does not empower the poor). But see
COMM'N PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY PuB. NEmES, supra note 161, at 1109 (explaining the
manner in which private philanthropic activity might well provide a vehicle for empower-
ing minority groups, the poor, the institutionalized, and other groups considered powerless
in American society).
Some have argued, though, that private charity is, in a democratic society, profound-
ly anti-democratic. To the extent that the wealthy control a significant portion of the
funds used to alleviate the plight of the poor, the funds will be used only as that portion
of the population directs. Thus, voluntary charity substitutes decision making and the
preferences of the donor class, usually small and wealthy, for the collective preferences of
the nation, at least as represented in the nation's legislative bodies. GANS, supra note 58,
at 264-68 (discussing the functions the poor serve in society); see also Edley, supra note
165, at 28 (discussing how individual giving influences public allotment of aid).
169. Thus, the value of private non-profit entities has been explored from the perspec-
tive of its utility for providing the best value for the money to the recipients. See Henry
B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YAlE U. 835 (1980) (discussing
advantages and disadvantages of nonprofit organizations as compared to their for-profit
counterparts). But see Ira M. Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MtCH.
L. REV. 999 (1982) (arguing that Hansmann's theory is flawed because it fails to distin-
guish between different types of non-profit organizations while proposing a framework to
correct the theory). Such theories neatly tie private charity into the overall economic or-
dering of things, and confirm the more primitively felt Tudor notion that cost efficiencies
could be maximized by resorting to private charities taking on some of the burdens of
institutional relief. On definitions of a charitable organization, see, e.g., Burton A.
Weisbrod, Private Goods, Collective Goods: The Role of the Non-Profit Sector, in THE
ECONOMICS OF NONPROPRIETARY ORGANIZATIONS 139 (Kenneth W. Clarkson et a. eds.,
1980); Laura B. Chisholm & Dennis R. Young., Introduction, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
653 (1988) (discussing authors' notion of the nature of charity).
170. Thus, for example, Michael Espy, a Secretary of Agriculture during the Clinton
Administration, discovered when he sought to apply for Food Stamps in West Virginia on
June 14, 1993, that, depending on his employment status, it would take from three days
to one month to "process" his Food Stamp application. In the meantime, the local poor
[Vol. 44.871
1995] MEDIEVAL POOR LAW 933
of state government (and its funds) as the backup of private and
local governmental efforts, to be relied on only in extreme condi-
tions.' More likely, the approach will be direct. Maintenance of
the poor will be privatized, for example, by shifting the respon-
sibility for job training and creation to the private sector."l More
financially strapped jurisdictions might well privatize the entire
burden of relieving certain portions of the population in the belief
that the reduction in governmental expenditures will be made up
by private voluntary contributions."7
Encouraging charity at the end of the twentieth century is
exceedingly easy. It takes advantage of millennia-old religious
teachings and social habits respecting the obligation of those with
income or wealth in excess of their needs to make at least a por-
tion of this excess available for poor relief." At least in Western
Europe, the notion of private charity has deep roots, grounded in
the religious teachings of Christianity."Ts And yet, private charity
is not necessarily an indispensable component of poor relief. That
it remains so attests to the strength of our adherence to the "rules"
relief office was authorized to provide him with a "food voucher at a local charity to
help tide him over." Food Stamp Applications Confusing, Official Says, TULSA WORLD,
June 15, 1993, at A20.
171. See 7TEX HuM. RES. CODE ANN. § 3401 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
172. Former President Bush's program for the revitalization of the federal welfare pro-
grams-the so-called "thousand points of light' campaign-is a good example of the trend
in this respect. Alan Houseman argues that a significant trend that developed during the
1980s was the increased role of the private sector through privatization of governmental
services and through the creation of a number of public-private joint ventures. Alan W.
Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the 1990s, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 831, 839 (1990). Nathan Glazer has suggested that the best means to
deal with social problems, such as poverty, is to "think of ways to meet needs with a
lesser degree of dependence on public action:' GLAZm, supra note 67, at 139. This need
is driven in large part by the perceived necessity of cost containment and has given rise
to interest in privatization of social services, and reliance on private philanthropic efforts.
Id. at 125-26, 139; see also Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 147, at 892-93 (discussing the
limitations of privatizing health care to the medical indigent); Weinberg, supra note 27, at
431-32 (arguing that the workfare requirements imposed under the Family Support Act of
1988 effectively privatizes the responsibility to assist the indigent).
173. See, e.g., Abrams & Schitz, supra note 167, at 36 (arguing that increased govern-
mental expenditures crowd out, at least to some extent, private charitable giving).
174. See, e.g., infra part IV.
175. TERNEY, supra note 36, at 44-67; TRATrNER, supra note 6, at 3-6; see also infra
part IV.A. It is not surprising, then, that, as a recent Gallop Organization study revealed,
membership in religious organizations seems to be related to the tendency to donate to
charity or volunteer in charitable endeavors. Thus, 78% of members of religious organiza-
tions reported donations to charity, 58% stated they volunteered, and 40% reported that
they gave both to religious institutions and other charities. Anita Manning, Charitable
Spirit Survives Hard Times, USA ToDAY, Oct. 16, 1992, at Dl.
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and assumptions of the static paradigm which describe the inclina-
tion of static-oriented governmental institutions to respond to the
needs of the poor in this manner."
The poor, themselves, may contribute to cost minimization. A
characteristic of the static approach is to impose work requirements
on the recipients of aid-not as a means of reforming the recipi-
ents or dealing with general commercial or labor policy, but purely
as a means of reducing costs." This dovetails nicely with the
static notion of the need to work for one's keep. A significant cost
reduction can also be effected by requiring family members to be
responsible for the maintenance of each other-principally parents
and children, including illegitimate children.' What makes this
176. Indeed, where one hypothesizes a non-static system, one might well argue that
private charity becomes inefficient and, ultimately, superfluous. See, e.g., Abrams &
Schitz, supra note 167, at 37 (discussing how the crowding out effect of private charita-
ble contributions increased government welfare spending); Edley, supra note 165, at 28
(discussing ramifications of private giving on organizations receiving the donations). But
see COMM'N PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY PuB. NEEDS, supra note 161, at 662-75 (explaining
the increasing proportion of public funding of social welfare services and the necessity for
private social agencies to have a variety of funding sources to avoid dependency on fed-
eral funding and federal oversight); GLAZER, supra note 67, at 118-39 (arguing that the
best way to deal with poverty and other social ills is to strengthen traditional charitable
and voluntary endeavors). Cf. GANs, supra note 58, at 267 (arguing that among the many
important functions of poverty in American society is that of helping "to keep philanthro-
py busy, thus justifying its continued existence .... [lndeed, some sectors of the upper
class depend on the poor to demonstrate their superiority over other elites who devote
themselves solely to making money.").
177. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 276-77 (reviewing history of labor policies under
the Tudors and how these policies related to the welfare recipients).
178. Currently, state law almost uniformly imposes a duty on parents to support their
minor children. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.04 (West 1993) (requiring parents to
support their children and/or each other or face prosecution); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C24-5
(West 1993) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 10, § 4 (West 1991) ("The parent entitled to
the custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstanc-
es."); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (same).
For a discussion of the development of the general support obligation, at least as
between parent and child, and its relationship to the development of the support obliga-
tions imposed under poor relief statutes, see tenBroek, supra note 9, at 287-91, 298-317
(tracing familial relationships and the resulting economic consequences in both feudal
England and early New York common law and statutes). For a general discussion of the
history of the derivation of legal obligations and expected roles between family members,
see Minow, supra note 17, at 827-85. For discussion of issues relating to support obliga-
tions, see, e.g., Braveman, supra note 21, at 579-85 (describing the nature of poverty
among children and arguing that state governments ought to have an obligation to make
available minimally adequate assistance to poor children); Judith G. McMullen, Family
Support of the Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to Support Disabled
Family Members, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 439 (1990) (arguing that current eligibility stan-
dards provide a disincentive to pay partial support to families who cannot afford to pay
19951 MEDIEVALPOOR LAW 935
concept quite effective is the power of the state to define, for the
purpose of family responsibility, the term "family." It likely in-
cludes parents and children, but might also include grandparents
and grandchildren, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews, by blood
or marriage, and cousins.'" Indeed, the obligations of certain
family members to support each other has been legally recognized
in the poor law of twenty-two states."' The obligations extend
not only to current support, but also to reimbursing the state for
prior support.'
The importance of cost minimization in the static scheme of
things also permits a separation of the determination of minimal
needs from any actual funding decision. The focus of the static
system is on the ability or willingness of the state to pay rather
than on meeting the perceived needs of the eligible population.
Thus, for instance, while the state may determine that a certain
amount of money is necessary to maintain a family of four in a
certain place, it may choose to provide only some percentage of
that amount through its assistance programs." AFDC is notorious
the full cost of support). On the origins of the obligation to support minor children, par-
ticularly fathers' support of bastards, see tenBroek, supra note 9, at 284-86 (discussing
liability of both parents for financial support of bastard children). For modem commentary
on the necessity for such obligation and the efficacy of its enforcement, see Donald M.
Payne, The Abandoned Infants Assistance Act: Improvements to Help "Boarder Babies"
and Their Families, 16 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 455 (1992) (discussing New Jersey's enact-
ment of legislation to help reunite "Border Babies" with their families); Charles D.
Creech, Note, Legislating Responsibility: North Carolina's New Child Support Enforcement
Acts, 65 N.C. L. REy. 1354 (1987) (outlining the problems of enforcing parental obliga-
tions to children and North Carolina's new approach to the problem).
Jacobus tenBroek argues that the notion of primary family responsibility to maintain
destitute relatives was part of the state's effort to minimize the public burden for support
of the poor, especially the impotent poor who could not be put to work. tenBroek, supra
note 9, at 285-86. Stefan Riesenfeld notes that the rules concerning primary family re-
sponsibility were first created after the powers of ecclesiastical law and the jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical courts in these matters were superseded by those of the monarchy.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CAL. L.
REv. 175, 199 (1955). There is much in the observations of both. Certainly, the Canon
Law incorporated a rudimentary form of family responsibility drawn from the categories
of deserving poor first developed by Ambrose and adopted by Canon Lawyers. See
ThaNY, supra note 36, at 56-57. This problem remains one for state and federal systems
of poor relief. See, e.g., Leslie J. Harris et a., Making and Breaking Connections Between
Parents' Duty to Support And Right To Control Their Children, 69 OR. L REv. 689
(1990) (discussing child support duties, control rights, and parental autonomy); Hirsch,
supra note 17 (discussing the aid to families with dependent children program rules and
its imposition of more extensive family obligations on the poor).
179. See infra part V.A.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. This occurs even when the program is designed to take into account the varying
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for recognizing the poverty line as a measure of poverty and yet
for permitting the states to establish maximum grants that fail to
raise eligible families to this minimum level." Making up the
difference between the amounts funded and the amounts necessary
to meet the anticipated need would fall to the private sector. Per-
haps the poor will find some other way to make ends meet, adver-
sity being the mother of invention;" 4 in any case, that is not a
concern of static system builders.
This article has talked about what a static system is and what
it is supposed to look like when implemented. To augment this
description it should also say a few words about what it is not.a
At the core of what a static system is not, predictably enough, is
the notion of change, which is fundamentally a dynamic concept.
The distinguishing feature of a dynamic approach is its acceptance
of the notion that as a result of intervention, the problem of pover-
ty, destitution and the like can be eradicated.'
cost of living in different parts of the state. Thus, for instance, when California attempted
to reform the manner in which federal categorical aid is distributed in that state to ac-
count for the fact that it is more expensive to live in the urban areas of the state, benefit
levels were still set well below the actual cost of living in certain areas. Thus, while
average fair market rent in Orange County was $764.00 per month, total monthly benefits
available in Orange County was set at $633.00. While the poor obviously would rent at
the lower end of the market, it is hard to believe that the average aid recipient will not
spend more than 50% of his allotted benefit solely for housing, especially as the number
of children in the family increases. See Virginia Ellis, Senate OKs Regional Rates For
Welfare, L.A. Trmas, Aug. 30, 1992, at Al; cf HANDLER & HOLUNGSWORTH, supra note
55, at 89-102 (surveying aid levels and whether recipients feel these are adequate
amounts).
183. Daan Braveman highlighted, in 1987, the difference between the poverty line and
the maximum grants set by the various states. Braveman, supra note 21, at 595-614.
184. This, one might argue, is at a fundamental level the ultimate position that people
like Charles Murray would take. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-28 (advocating elimi-
nation of all welfare programs and outlining the possible effects of this action). Whether
or not adversity is the best means of reducing the incidence of poverty is another ques-
tion. For directly contrary views, of which there are many proponents taking a variety of
positions and offering a variety of solutions to currently perceived problems of welfare
state implementation, compare, FURNSs & TILTON, supra note 23, at 183-99 (suggesting
"negative tax rate" or "incremental reform" as a means to provide incentive for the poor
to escape poverty while at the same time ensuring them at least a minimum income) with
MARMOR Er AL., supra note 6, at 114-27 (supporting the Family Support Act of 1988 as
moving in the right direction).
185. For a fuller treatment, see Backer, supra note 20, at part V.A.
186. Commentators have, over the years, urged or argued for the adoption of this type
of approach to solve the problem of American poverty. See, e.g., HAVEMAN, supra note
26, at 44-50 (describing how the equality-with-efficiency view of reform will move toward
abolishing poverty); LAmPmAN, supra note 37, at 135-45 (describing three strategies to
eliminate poverty).
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A dynamic approach need not necessarily affect all potential
recipients of aid-its concern is principally with unemployed, able-
bodied people who are capable of becoming self-sustaining; those
who are incapable of employment are relegated to mere mainte-
nance under more traditional models, or not thought of much at
all.1
8 7
At its core, the dynamic approach clearly distinguishes itself
from traditional approaches by embracing the need for fundamental
social change. The fundamental goal of the dynamic approach is to
make the poor disappear, which necessarily requires the poor not to
be poor. The easiest way to achieve this is to require the better-off
to support their less-well-off brethren through one or more forms
of income redistribution. Thus, negative income tax proposals,'
increasing income transfers or entitlements based on income levels
and related proposals'89 are all fundamentally dynamic.
But dynamic proposals are not necessarily limited to the prob-
lems of relative poverty, which can be corrected by income redis-
tribution. Such programs also tend to be universalist-tied to vari-
ous programs calling for the restructuring of society, including the
187. Them is, after all, little that society can require of people incapable of retaining
any kind of employment. Under a dynamic approach, the notion of need based on condi-
tion-lack of a job, disability, age, and the like-becomes the foundation for the creation
of programs which have the effect of eliminating the possibility for the condition. Thus,
for instance, rather than provide maintenance for the respectable poor--old age, physical
disability, school enrollment, and steady work that does not pay enough to cover one's
needs-a family security program could be developed, providing benefits for all members
of the family in a way that reinforces "fundamental values such as rewards for work,
opportunities for individual betterment, and family and community responsibility for the
care of children and other vulnerable people." Skocpol, supra note 28, at 429.
188. Proposals for programs of income redistribution were first seriously considered in
the 1960s with the introduction of proposals for a negative income tax, which basically
were meant to provide income supplements unrestricted as to use. See, e.g., Sheldon S.
Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 678-
98 (1969); Larson, supra note 78, at 356 (describing the major conceptual problems of
the early negative income tax proposals). More current proposals stress the creation of
guaranteed minimum income programs as part of a general strategy for the elimination of
poverty. Thus, for instance, Robert Haveman's program includes the creation of a guaran-
teed minimum income program, a national child support program, employment subsidies,
and capital accounts for youth to be used for education or training. HAvEm , supra note
26, at 149-87; see also Larson, supra note 78, at 359-61 (discussing Haveman's proposal).
189. See, e.g., DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT POVERTY IN TiE AMERICAN FAMI-
LY 231-43 (1988) (offering suggestions for improving poor relief systems); WILSON, supra
note 42 (advocating the integration of a comprehensive labor policy for all classes and the
melding of social and economic classes); Piven & Cloward, supra note 26, at 99-100
(advocating the creation of a comprehensive national system of social provision for the
poor).
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redistribution of political and economic power."° Such a restruc-
turing is needed because poverty is the inevitable and ineradicable
by-product of our society as currently organized.19'
Thus, the fundamental assumptions and world-view of the static
paradigm give rise to a complex system of rules for crafting and
implementing any system of poor relief. The system severely con-
strains the options for devising such programs of poor relief. Our
cultural and societal preconceptions unconsciously dictate the form
of our approache's to our relief of the poor. Within the acceptable
modes of system construction, however, the theory permits a sub-
stantial amount of discretion. The discretion, however, is one of
detail, not of fundamentals. We can spend an eternity arguing
about the most effective manner for "ending the dependency" of
the destitute. There is, however, virtually no serious discussion of
the assumption that people must work. The complex picture of
theoretical poor relief derived from the static paradigm does not
necessarily translate into a complex and ever-mutating system of
poor relief. Quite the contrary, examining the most significant
features of Anglo-American poor relief methodologies from the
Norman Conquest in 1066 through the present reveals that the
fundamentals of contemporary American poor relief systems are
only highly sophisticated versions of ancient European poor relief.
IV. THE GENERAL THEORY AND ARCHETYPAL ANGLO-AMERICAN
POOR RELIEF SYSTEMS
In this part, I test the explanatory and predictive potential of
the theory developed in part nM by analyzing Anglo-American poor
relief systems. This analysis will focus on the development of
Anglo-American systems from their origins in the medieval system
of ecclesiastical relief to their modem manifestation as state general
assistance systems, which are the only catch-all governmental sys-
190. See, e.g., PiVa.N & CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 345-46 (advocating reforms in
economic policy that would "lead[] to full employment at decent wages"); see also
Alfieri, supra note 28, at 695-711 (advocating dialogues between poverty lawyers and the
poor so that poverty can be abolished); Woodson, supra note 17 (discussing how Blacks
viewed the war on poverty as an extension of the civil rights movement). But see FRAN-
cES F. PIVEN & RIcHARD A. CLOWARD, THE NEW CLASS WAR (1982) (taking the posi-
tion that the welfare state is here to stay and, with it, the transformation of the American
political economy; this is in effect the less desirable alternative they recognized in PIvEN
& CLOWARD, supra note 20, at 345-48).
191. See, e.g., PtVaEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20; Piven & Cloward, supra note 26, at
45-108.
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tems available in America.'"
American general assistance programs evidence the current
iteration of traditional, and perhaps archetypal, Western European
systems of poor relief. The Western European systems were adopt-
ed essentially unchanged in purpose, from the Elizabethan Poor
Laws." The Elizabethan Poor Laws, in turn, arose in substantial
part, from the ecclesiastical system of poor relief operating in Brit-
ain until the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation. The histori-
cal antecedents of American general assistance provisions are first
briefly described, and each then is examined in light of the model
set forth in part III.
A. Ecclesiastical Poor Relief
The theoretical structure of medieval poor relief"' under Can-
on Law 95 has been the subject of a number of studies. An under-
192. Actually, private voluntary charity is the most ancient of the systems of poor relief
surviving in the United States today. Its origins can be traced back to the rules and con-
cepts codified in the Canon Law. Voluntary charity is shaped, to a large extent, by the
need to provide a measure of satisfaction to the donor. This, however, is not one of the
primary articulated reasons for private voluntary charity. Instead such reasons include:
fostering innovation in the creation and implementation of poor relief programs; providing
recipients with a choice between private and public assistance; encouraging competition,
efficiency and cost control; providing a means to meet emergency needs in a more flexi-
ble manner than that available from public sources of relief; and promoting increased
responsiveness to the problems of the poor. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 657-62 (describ-
ing the purposes of private charity). At least since the 17th century, private voluntary
charity has also been shaped by government efforts to foster private giving as a means of
reducing the cost of poor relief. Regulation, to the extent it has existed, is aimed at as-
suring that charitable aid is not misapplied. See Richard Steinberg, Economic Perspectives
on Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 775-79 (1989)
(discussing the need to regulate against fraudulent solicitations for charitable endeavors).
Regulation also seeks to assure that private and public charitable works are interrelated
administratively and financially (public matching funds for "demonstration projects" com-
plying with governmentally established guidelines in the area of job training, education,
and social services for the poor). See Winston, supra note 4, at 687-93 (discussing the
benefits and detriments of the financial entanglement of private and public charitable ef-
forts). Finally, regulation seeks to assure that private charitable activities are encouraged in
areas covered by public responsibility, such as poor relief. Thus, for example, tax rules
provide detailed regulation respecting the types of charitable foundations which are to be
tax advantaged and the type of giving which is to be encouraged.
193. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.). See infra part
IV.B.
194. Tierney's work, TmRNEY, supra note 36, remains the most useful treatment of
medieval poor relief. F-M. Leonard's now nearly century old study of English poor relief,
LEONARD, supra note 108, also remains timely. This Article draws extensively from both
for the factual material which follows.
195. The Roman Catholic Church in the period after the fall of the Western Roman
Empire, and at least until the 16th century, asserted jurisdiction over the care and protec-
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standing of the structure of medieval European poor relief is essen-
tial for appreciating both the age and strength of the static para-
digm and the major features of modem poor relief which devolve
from that paradigm. It is in the crafting of poor relief during this
period that the static paradigm first found its modem expression
was created.
Unsophisticated by contemporary standards, especially with
respect to implementation, ecclesiastical poor relief does encompass
a complete system not dissimilar to our own. Canon Law accepted,
as a fundamental part of the divinely ordained system, the existing
structure of property and social relationships. This system was
based on the ownership of property and was hierarchical in nature.
Every person was thought to have a well-defined place in society,
a place which was defined in terms of income, social status, and
other expectations. Different styles of living were appropriate for
people holding different ranks within society, and, as such, people
occupying different rungs of the hierarchy were expected to make
do with different amounts. 9 ' There was, though, little social or
economic mobility in medieval society. Rather, one held one's
place within the hierarchy with little hope of upward mobility."9
The notion of poverty, therefore, was not restricted to a concern
with absolute need, but also encompassed notions of unacceptable
relative deprivation as well.'98 Canon Law accepted unquestion-
tion of the poor. Such matters were to be administered by the ecclesiastical govern-
ment-parish priests, bishops, and the hierarchy of the church ultimately leading to the
Pope in Rome-and regulated by ecclesiastical law. Poor law, as such, prior to the Refor-
mation, was a matter of church law. Church law, in turn, was contained in the Corpus
luris Canonici, which are made up of GRATtAN'S DEcREruM (c. 1140) and subsequent
works containing church law appearing after 1140 through roughly the end of the 14th
century. This was the law of the church, which imposed obligations on the faithful, and
was applicable to the resolution of disputes governed thereby and over which the church
claimed jurisdiction. For a short history of the Canon Law, see R.C. MORTMR, WEST-
ERN CANON LAW 40-55 (1953); TMRNEY, supra note 36, at 6-9.
196. See THOMAs AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS II-
m, at 546 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1941) (revised Daniel J.
Sullivan, 1952) ("Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one's own in order to
give to others to such an extent that the remainder would be insufficient for one to live
in keeping with one's station and the ordinary occurrences of life; for no man ought to
live unbecomingly.").
197. Of course, movement between the social classes was not completely frozen, though
it may appear so from the perspective of late 20th century America. Generally, such
social mobility was initiated from above, by act of king or noble. See Karl Bosl, On
Social Mobility in Medieval Society: Service, Freedom, and Freedom of Movement as a
Means of Social Ascent, in EARLY MEmoevAL SociEEY 87, 88 (Sylvia L. Trupp ed. &
trans., 1967) (1964).
198. Thomas Aquinas defined need in a manner anticipating modem notions of relative
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ingly Ambrose's notion that poverty was not an absolute concept,
but was determined, in part on the social and economic station of
the person in need of aid.' Each person was expected to live in
a style in accordance with his or her rank and status in life. There-
fore, it was inconceivable that a Bishop would be required to live
in the style of a parish priest, or that a noble be reduced to the
living standard of a serf. Thus, quoting Ambrose, Thomas Aquinas
suggests that: "[W]hen you give an alms to a man, you should
take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes
the shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps
he has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his
own."
200
The benefits of status and property, however, carried with them
a spiritual and quasi-legal duty of charity Canon Law estab-
lished not only a duty to give charity, but also regulated the man-
ner in which charity was to be given. While a person was not
bound to deprive himself of his own necessities in order to help
another in need, or even periodically determine and donate for
charitable purposes whatever "superfluities" they possessed, in a
deprivation. Thus:
[A] thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it live in keeping
with the condition or state either of his own person or the persons of whom
he has charge. The 'necessary' considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for
one might add much more to a man's property, and yet not go beyond what
he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he would still
have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position.
AQuINAS, supra note 196, at 545.
199. See TIERN , supra note 36, at 56-57 (discussing the relative deprivation of the
old and sick and those who fell from riches to want).
200. AQuiNAS, supra note 196, at 550 (quoting AisaRosF, DE OFmcus, reprinted in 16
PATROLOGIAE CURSUS CoMPLETuS; AMRoSE OPERA 74 (Series Latina, J.P. Migne ed.,
Paris 1844-55)).
201. TIRNEY, supra note 36, at 33-35; see also AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 544-45
(arguing that giving alms from out of surplus is a precept; however, the failure to give
alms is a mortal sin when (i) the recipient is in evident need and is unlikely to be re-
lieved otherwise, and (h) the giver knowingly refuses to give of his superfluities).
202. See Jean-Louis Roch, Le jeu de I'aumfne au Mdyen Age, in 44 ANNALS:
ECONOMIES, SOCIrES, CIVHImsAT1ONS 505, 506-11 (1989) (stating that charity was to be
offered without insulting or disparaging the recipient, with humility and without mockery,
and in a timely manner).
203. Superfluities or surplus were, in the Canon Law, a relative term, generally referring
to wealth in excess of that necessary for a person to maintain his social status and social
and economic obligations to his superiors. AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 544 ("On the part
of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus:); TIERNEY, supra note
36, at 34-35 (emphasizing that men could retain superfluities provided others were not in
want).
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time of necessity all persons were expected to share their superflu-
ous wealth with those in need&' What constituted superfluities,
and the determination of when conditions gave rise to a state of
need were matters largely left to the conscience of the donors.
In addition to the timing and extent of the duty of charity,
Canon Law enumerated different kinds of permitted charity through
a crude system of eligibility discrimination: "Mo feed the hungry,
to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbour the
harbourless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury the
dead.ass There was no unitary system of eligibility determination.
Rather eligibility under this system was determined in the context
of relative deprivation as between social classes since, among other
things, the very mark of differences between social classes included
different standards of living. Permitting a noble or high cleric to
live like a peasant was the only kind of relative deprivation with
which the system was concerned; it was thought a good thing that
peasants did not live like kings. Conversely, even impecunious
aristocrats without any means of support could not be permitted to
live like peasants, at least as long as they continued to provide the
necessary service (usually military) to their superiors. Determining
eligibility under this criteria was left to the parish priest and the
donor. Each exercised the kind of discretionary informed decision
making which several hundred years later was thought more appro-
priate for a professionalized cadre of social workers.
The Canon Law further refined eligibility criteria by creating a
fairly sophisticated need hierarchy system, based on an interpreta-
tion of the writing of the early church fathers-John Chrysostum,
Ambrose, and Augustine.t Canon Law limited discretion only to
204. AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 544 ("Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our
surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme; otherwise ansgiving, like
any other greater good, is a matter of counsel."); rlERNEY, supra note 36, at 34-35 (stat-
ing that in times of want superfluous wealth was to be treated as common property).
205. AQUINAs, supra note 196, at 541.
206. On the importance of poverty linked to status, see supra notes 198-200. On mod-
em social work theory, see BISNO, supra note 24, at 1 (providing a working definition of
social work); see also TOWLE, supra note 24, at 235 (describing the purpose of social
work); Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-19 (describing the transformation of public assis-
tance); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1437 (1986) (discussing the role of social workers during and after the New
Deal).
207. TIERNaY, supra note 36, at 54-61 (describing the need policies of Chrysostum,
Ambrose, and Augustine). On the manner in which charity was to be dispensed by do-
nors, see Roch, supra note 202, at 511-15.
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the extent of requiring the distribution of aid to be amounts "due
and customary,"" with local churches providing more details for
meeting local needs. If there were sufficient resources to meet
the perceived need in the locality, all who sought aid would re-
ceive it.0 If there was a shortage of resources, a system of pref-
erences was devised by Ambrose to meet the needs of the poor in
fifth century Milan?" The Ambrosian system of preferences
adopted by the Canon Law stressed the obligation, in the first in-
stance, of a person to support, by distribution of superfluities, his
or her own parents and children, then members of the extended
family, then other members of the household,"2 and, finally
strangers.2 3 Irrespective of the sufficiency of local resources, aid
208. E.g., TmRNEY, supra note 36, at 78.
209. Tierney, for instance, describes the efforts to regulate the details of poor relief in
England in the 13th and 14th centuries. Id. at 89-109.
210. Id. at 60.
211. Thomas Aquinas cites to both Ambrose and Augustine in relating the principle of
charity that favors those most closely united to the giver than to strangers. He also de-
scribes the exceptions of that rule:
For we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want,
and to one who is more useful to the common good, rather than to one who
is more closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very closely united,
and has no special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very
urgent need.
AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 549; see also TERNFY, supra note 36, at 60 (noting that
Ambrose's De Officiis forms the backbone of the Canon Law pronouncements on poor
relief).
212. Presumably, this would apply with more practical force to the local elite who
would be responsible for the welfare of serfs, workers, and other retainers under their
control. See, eg., AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 549 (stating that, according to Ambrose,
"'ilt is with commendable liberality that you should forget not your kindred, if you know
them to be in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family, who
would be ashamed to beg help from others").
213. Having satisfied family obligations, the Ambrosian hierarchy of charitable discrimi-
nation favored faithful Christians. Among those, the traditional deserving poor (the aged or
sick) were to be given first place in line. Due regard was also to be paid to the relative
destitution of people of good birth who fall on hard times. See TIERNEY, supra note 36,
at 56-57. This hierarchy of need satisfaction was not meant to be a shield. Aquinas notes
that the essence of charity required a constant weighing of relative need, only one of the
weights being the relationship between the donor and the donee. He states:
Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion, according to the various
degrees of connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one
who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the
common good, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially
if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care
then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.
AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 549.
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to the poor, including the able-bodied idle, was to be limited to a
sufficient amount to prevent starvation or utter destitution.214
Again, the parish priest served as a ready source of guidance to
those who wished to give, but were not sure in what order to do
SO.
The obligation to provide charity did not include an obligation
to seek out the poor. The charitable person was permitted a strictly
passive role that only required meeting the needs of those who
sought aid. Once sought out however, a person under an obligation
who refused to give an appropriate amount of charity could be
compelled to do so through the Canon Law procedure of
denunciatio evangelica.215 Although it was the rare indigent who
could resort to this procedure, the procedure was not entirely dead
letter, since any person had "standing" to bring the complaint,
including parish priests and fellow parishioners 16 In England,
after 1552, the Bishop's power under the denunciatio evangelica
procedure was supplemented by secular law.21 7 After 1563, the
214. Thus, Aquinas argued that an indigent was entitled to aid sufficient to meet his
immediate needs; aid in excess of this amount was to be discouraged, it being "better to
give to several that are in need. . .. 'Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms,
and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many."' AQ INAS, supra
note 196, at 549 (quoting GLOSSA LOMBARD1, reprinted in 191 PATROLOGIAE CURSUS
COrML~ErUS 1660 (Series Latina, J.P. Mige ed., Paris 1844-1855)).
215. TmiEY, supra note 36, at 38-39. Under the process of denunciatio evangelica,
any person could renounce a recalcitrant parishioner to the Bishop. That parishioner was
one who refused to contribute his superfluous wealth to the relief of the poor. See supra
note 203 (explaining the notion of superfluous wealth). Originally, the denunciatio process
only gave the Bishop power to exhort a contribution from the recalcitrant donor, he could
not compel a contribution, except perhaps indirectly by threatening excommunication. By
the 15th century, the general opinion of the Canonists had reversed itself. By the begin-
ning of the 16th century, the commonly accepted Canon Law position was that a recalci-
trant parishioner could be compelled to fulfill his charitable obligations. See TERNEY,
supra, at 127.
216. TIERNsY, supra note 36, at 125. Understand that uneducated village parish priests
were wholly beholden to the local aristocracy and would hardly be in a position to pub-
liely denounce their benefactors to the Bishop. However, members of the same social
class, and independent clerics, might be in a better position to do so. While there exist
recorded instances of Bishops ordering changes to the manner in which relief is dispersed
in parishes during this period, see LEONARD, supra note 108, at 6 n.1, such action was
probably extraordinary. Thus the process held more promise in theory than in practice.
217. An Acte for the Provision and Releife of the Poore, 1551-1552, 5 & 6 Edw. 6,
ch. 2 (Eng.); see TMRNEY, supra note 36, at 127 (providing that alms for the poor were
to be collected in each parish church and that those who refused to give were to be
reported, most likely by the parish priest, to the Bishop, who could then call the recalci-
trant parishioner to induce and persuade him to make the proper contribution); see also
LEONARD, supra note 108, at 58 & n.3 ("The part taken by the bishops must have been
of very considerable importance, . . . and it often happened that the bishops took a con-
19951 MEDIEVAL, POOR LAW 945
English secular law provided that if the exhortations of the Bishop
were unsuccessful in extracting a contribution, a compulsory contri-
bution could be assessed and collectedY8
Because the poor were obligated to seek out those dispensing
charity, charitable efforts tended to be local affairs. This comple-
mented the locally based administration of formal ecclesiastical
poor relief, the other major means of succoring the poor in the
medieval period. It also complemented the organization of social
and religious institutions, and perhaps also reflected the techno-
logical impediments to centralization of that day. It is to the insti-
tutional (official) means of poor relief that I briefly turn to next.
The institutional delivery of aid to the poor was the responsibility
of the Church. The three sources of institutional poor relief under
Canon Law were the parish, the monastery, and the charitable
hospital.219 Under Canon Law, each Bishop was responsible, in
the first instance, for supervising the care of the poor of the dio-
cese, and specifically for allocating a portion of the diocese's total
revenue for the care of such diocese poor."
siderable share in the general organization of relief.").
218. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1562-1563, 5 Eliz., ch. 3 (Eng.); LEONARD,
supra note 108, at 57-59; TIeRNEY, supra note 36, at 131.
219. See LEONARD, supra note 108, at 3, 6-10, 17-20 (indicating the three sources of
poor relief under Canon Law). This article will concentrate solely on parish relief. The
reader should understand, however, that both monasteries and charitable hospitals were
significant sources of charity in the medieval period. Monasteries were not required to
give aid except to the extent that they appropriated the revenues of parishes, a relatively
common practice during the period. In case of appropriation, the monastery had the obli-
gation to use a portion of the appropriated revenues to aid the parish poor, either by
directly providing the aid, or by appointing a perpetual vicar, endowed with sufficient
revenue, to provide such relief. See TIERNEY, supra note 36, at 83-85.
Charitable hospitals were both hospitals for the sick and almshouses for the destitute.
They included leper colonies, orphanages, rest homes for aged, and other similar institu-
tions. Hospitals were founded by grant of wealthy individuals and administered under the
rules of its charter. While largely unregulated, by the 14th century Canon Law gave the
Bishop the power to investigate and correct abuses in hospital administration. The charita-
ble hospitals were the forerunners of the almshouses and workhouses that emerged after
the Reformation and persist into the present See LEONARD, supra, at 19-20; TIERNEY,
supra, at 85-87; TRATrNR, supra note 6, at 5. It is, thus, the first effort to implement a
program of "indoor" relief, in contradistinction to relief accorded to the destitute in their
own homes, referred to as "outdoor" relief. Debates about the relative benefits of indoor
or outdoor relief have raged in modem form for well over a century. For an example of
a modem discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695
(Cal. 1985) (discussing the propriety of providing only in-house relief).
220. TnmNEY, supra note 36, at 69-70. The revenues of the church included all income
and wealth of the particular diocese. This would include income and revenue from the
operation of church lands, bequests, and, increasingly more important, revenues from
tithes. Tithes were a form of compulsory ecclesiastical taxation, corresponding roughly to
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Relatively early in Church history, each diocese was divided
into several parishes, local units of administration presided over by
a priest, each of which was a separate economic unit. The parish
priest was responsible for the administration of the revenues de-
rived from Church assets in the parish and the tithings of parishio-
ners. In practice, in addition to providing for the poor, the parish
priest was expected to allocate a portion of the revenues for the
priest's own maintenance and to the maintenance of certain local
church property. In this respect, it was expected that the amount
necessary for personal maintenance would depend on the social
status of each cleric. Thus, a younger son of a noble with universi-
ty training would not be expected to live the same way as the
parish priest drawn from the local peasantry.= '
Another part of parish revenues were to go to the Bishop, who
oversaw all of the parishes in the diocese. This money was project-
ed for the Bishop's personal maintenance, the maintenance of his
household, and the upkeep of diocene property. This revenue was
extracted in the form of various taxes. After allocation of funds for
the maintenance of the church's personnel and property, all of the
remaining revenues, to the extent necessary, were to be allocated
for the relief of the poor. The Bishop was responsible for ensuring
that sufficient revenues were available for the relief of the poor.
Upon complaint, the Bishop had the authority to rectify any per-
ceived abuses."
As such, the essence of institutional aid was local administra-
tion. The primary responsibility for the relief of the poor resided in
the parish priest, who was expected to keep close watch over the
parishioners, and know the extent and "reality" of their needs.
Local administration, therefore, served as a means of minimizing
potential abuses of poor relief by those not entitled to aid, and of
efficiently administering the proper expenditure of church revenue.
Local administration also resulted in the vesting of a substantial
amount of discretion to the parish priest to determine the needs of
particular parishioners and the manner in which relief was to be
10% of the produce of each parishioner. Id. at 70.
221. Where the revenues of the parish were assigned to an absentee, such as a monas-
tery or other institution, the absentee holder of the benefice was required to appoint, in
addition to an employee priest, a perpetual vicar, removable only by judicial process, to
whom a suitable income was to be assigned and used, among other things, for the relief
of the poor. Id. at 83-84.
222. Id. at 79.
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given. Recall that aid was to be given to all in need and up to the
extent of such need. Accordingly, a local administrator might most
cost-effectively determine the extent of real need and the availabili-
ty of local resources, including private charitable resources. As
previously discussed, Canon Law limited discretion only to the
extent of requiring the distribution of aid to be amounts "due and
customary," with local churches providing more details on local
needs.m
Thus, the assumptions of stasis appear full blown at a germinal
stage of the development of our culture. The distinguishing feature
of the medieval system of poor relief was its acceptance of the
notion that the social and political order was both good and immu-
table. This social and economic ordering also necessarily resulted
in a social, political, religious, and economic hierarchy. Along with
hierarchy came acceptance of the notion that hierarchy demanded
inequality between people occupying different social stations. Thus,
Canon Law both internalized and sought to rationalize and explain
the necessity of wealth inequality, and its purpose in the divinely
ordained world order. "If you acknowledge them, namely, your
temporal goods, as coming from God, is He unjust because He
apportions them unequally? Why are you rich while another is
poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of good steward-
ship, and he the reward of patience?"'
An accepted consequence of hierarchy and its attendant social
and economic inequality was an acceptance of the notion that at
the bottom rungs of this society necessarily existed a group of
people in a constant potential state of need, through famine, per-
sonal misfortune, or a refusal to work. Who were these people?
Generally, they consisted of people who could not provide for
themselves in a manner deemed sufficient in accordance with the
norms of the time. These people included young orphans, the old,
the sick, and the handicapped.' But the poor, eligible for aid
223. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (noting the local control of distri-
butions to the needy).
224. AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 545 (quoting Basil, Hom super Luc. 12.18, reprinted
in 31 PATROLOGiAE CuRsus COMPLErUS (SERIES GRAECA) 275 (J.P. Migne ed., 1857-
1866)). For the modem Catholic view, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL- PASTORAL LEITER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND
THE U.S. ECONOMY 26-29 (1986) (discussing the modem Catholic views on poverty,
riches, and the challenge of discipleship).
225. By "handicapped." I refer to a condition that is at least severe enough to render
the person incapable of work. Understand that one epoch's disabled person is another
94719951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
also included able-bodied males and females, who for whatever
reason, did not have the resources to provide for themselves. The
divisions between rich and poor, productive and idle, worthy and
unworthy, were not merely honored metaphysically. Society ensured
that every person understood the limits of luxuries to which they
might be entitled in a variety of ways. The most artificial, perhaps,
.was the sumptuary laws.' In this manner, society was starkly
able to segregate its poor from the rest of society. Twentieth centu-
ry America, of course, has adopted more subtle means to the same
end.2 7 Thus, true to its static nature, the Canonical system of
poor relief tended to isolate and regulate identifiable economic and
social groups.
Ecclesiastical poor relief reflected the general patterns of the
social and economic order in creating hierarchies of need and in
limiting society's obligation to satisfy needs to some, but not all
of, the need categories created. Just as the general society was
rigidly hierarchical, so too were hierarchies of need fashioned to
mimic those of society in general. At the top of the hierarchy were
those who were incapable of earning a living because of age, ill-
ness, or physical or mental condition.ss At the bottom of the hi-
epoch's ordinary (although challenged) person. Good examples of the transition in percep-
tion of the disutility of handicap include the blind, once treated as totally disabled, and
the hearing impaired, whose rehabilitation has proceeded substantially in this century. See
MEAD, supra note 26, at 132-35 (describing the work requirements creeping into aid for
the disabled historically thought of as incapable of work); Liebman, supra note 119, at
842-47 (discussing the requirement of a medical disability for disability income benefits
purposes); Sheldon, supra note 81, at 963-72 (describing the means under which disability
recipients might take advantage of federal programs to encourage work); Diehl, supra note
159, at 628-34 (discussing the Social Security Administration's requirement that disabilities
no longer be slight);.
226. The regulation of the dress of the various social classes as a means of identifica-
tion in this period is reviewed in F.E. BALDWIN, SUMPTUARY LEGISLATION AND PERSON-
AL REGULATION IN ENGLAND (1926).
227. See discussion infra part V.A.3.
228. In addition, people of the higher social stations who fell on hard times were ac-
corded a place high in the hierarchy of need. That these people did not perform manual
labor or pursue other types of labor made no difference. In a society where class distinc-
tions were rigid and the occupations of each firmly established, it was no more acceptable
for an impoverished noble to hire out his labor than it was for a peasant to live like a
noble. See, e.g., PIERRE GOUBERT, THE ANCIEN PGIME FRENCH SocaT, 1600-1750, at
163 (Steve Cox, trans., 1973) (stating that as late as the time of the French Revolution,
there existed a "specifically noble life-style ... [which] above all [meant] never working
with one's hands at profitable, base and 'mechanical' occupations (to do so is to
'derogate')"; potentially, to do so is also to lose noble status); LANDES, supra note 138,
at 129 (discussing the effects of social regulation in business enterprises). This aversion of
the nobility to pecuniary occupations was less troublesome in England by the time of the
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erarchy was, as we would expect, all people who were deemed
capable of fending for themselves. 9 And, as the model would
predict, such need hierarchies are used as a means of allocating the
available aid. In this case, as in contemporary America, need hier-
archies necessarily resulted in discrimination against the able-bodied
poor.?0 For those unable to support themselves, there was noth-
ing to be done but bare for them. Those unwilling to support them-
selves were provided for, lest they starve, but there was an under-
lying assumption that all an able-bodied person needed to do to
support themself was to go out and find work t
Industrial Revolution. See id. at 70-71 (describing the reduction of social regulation in the
business context).
229. Recall from the earlier discussion that a societal determination of what conditions
are sufficient to fit within this definition was, to a large extent, political. See discussion
supra part ll. A gross example might suffice to bring home this point. A blind, deaf
quadriplegic might be considered incapable of performing any known jobs, and on that
basis be characterized as totally and permanently disabled. On the other hand, such a
person could be deemed employable as, for example, a doorstop, and on that basis be
treated as an able-bodied out-of-work person for purposes of determining the level of re-
sponse to his maintenance. The modem version of this essentially political story was
dramatized during the early years of the Reagan Presidency when an effort was made to
reduce costs by aggressively scrutinizing claims of disability. MEAD, supra note 26, at
134. On the problem generally, see ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., SOCIAL SECUR'TY DISABILITY
AND MASS JusTiC A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADUDCATnON (1973) (discussing the prob-
lems in the years prior to the Reagan Administration's attempts to reduce caseloads).
230. Of course, this is a different way of saying that, in a world of limited resources,
society has determined that the marginal utility of helping the incapacitated is greater than
that of aiding the capable. Why? Because, as earlier noted, the static world view accepts
the notion that there is a job for every person. All he or she need do is look. In the
medieval period, the notion was accepted that a laborer was supposed to labor, a mer-
chant to sell, and a craftsman to make crafts. Such labor was available and readily ob-
tainable. The failure to secure work was thus, to use modem terminology, a "lifestyle
choice" for which the state or other aid-giving institution would not provide additional
incentive. The modem counterpart to this notion is the idea of social obligation: the obli-
gation to provide for oneself (by legal means). This idea has been the object of lively
debate in recent years. Compare MEAD, supra note 26, at 194-200 (espousing a conser-
vative perspective) with JEN cKs, supra note 27, at 87-91 (articulating a more liberal per-
spective) and MARMOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 1-2 (taking a liberal perspective and
commenting on the success of American social welfare policies). Perhaps the only real
difference in the modem period with respect to this notion is that it is usually unstated.
Sometimes, however, especially in the writings of self-styled conservative writers, this
notion is made explicit. See, eg., GI.dER, supra note 26, at 65.
231. This notion is not merely a historical curiosity; it remains central to the debate
over the eradication of poverty in our own day. For instance, it forms the core of
Murray's argument for dismantling the entire welfare system for the able-bodied. MURRAY,
supra note 3, at 195-237. Indeed, the belief that all the able-bodied poor needed was
information and training in order to successfully obtain the jobs waiting for them was one
of the fundamental forces driving the Kennedy-Johnson War on Poverty. See, e.g., id. at
18-23. For a discussion of the genesis of this notion in the old feudal, agrarian economy,
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As expected, then, the primary purpose of ecclesiastical poor
relief was to prevent destitution. The notion that a system of poor
relief could actually end the dependency of the poor was neither
part of the consciousness nor even the vocabulary of the creators
of that system. Rather, the creators of ecclesiastical poor relief
assumed a general population of industrious laborers who, in peri-
ods of adversity, might require the aid of those in the locality with
more resources. As such, the concept of rehabilitation was alien to
the universe of the Canon lawyers. The basic notion was that peo-
ple were to be given aid, whether the need arose as a result of an
inability or an unwillingness to support themselves. There was
little risk in this kind of open-handedness under ecclesiastical law.
In a society where religious commandments carried more weight
than perhaps even the civil law, the unambiguous Biblical com-
mandment, that the able-bodied members of the laboring class were
required by their Creator to labor for their sustenance,.'a provided
a strong incentive to provide for one's own needs. Failing that, the
limited aid available to the able-bodied would ensure that resources
were spent on needier folk.W4 Accordingly, the notion of the un-
see POUND, supra note 90, at 79-85 (describing the nature of the old feudal rights en-
joyed by the peasantry, which made survival in hard times easier than for their urban
neighbors); TIERNEY, supra note 36, at 110-13. For a discussion of the work available to
the able-bodied in colonial America, see generally Julius Goebel, Jr., King's Law and
Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931);
Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at 201-35; Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the
Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 346 (1989); tenBroek, supra note 9, at
291-317.
232. The amount of aid might vary, and the circumstances triggering the obligation to
give aid might differ, but ultimately the fundamental assumption was that no person was
to be allowed to starve to death if by the provision of aid, a death could be prevented,
and each person was to be aided in accordance with his social station.
Alms may be considered abundant in relation to either the giver, or
to the recipient; in relation to the giver, when that which a man gives is great
as compared with his means. To give thus is praiseworthy. . . . Nevertheless
those conditions must be observed which were laid down when we spoke of
giving alms out of one's necessary goods [art. 6].
On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant. . . by re-
lieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would
be better to give to several that are in need.... . 'Thus we are warned to be
careful in giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may
profit many.'
AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 549.
233. See Genesis 3:19 (setting forth God's commandment to Adam that he work for his
keep).
234. While the able-bodied might be required to work, such work would be repayment
for the expense of their maintenance and not the provision of permanent employment.
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employed able-bodied person as a social deviant was strongly rein-
forced by a theology which taught that the voluntarily unemployed
were also religious deviants, sinning by failing to fulfill the divine
work commandment.
As such, institutional charity, consisting of the aid available
through the parish priest, the charitable hospital, and the monastery
was conceived as a residual system, the system of last resort. It
had to be, for God had commanded that all people work for their
sustenance. To take from one person the sums derived from that
person's labor in order to sustain another person who did not labor
for his keep was to go against the will of God as explicitly set
forth in Genesis. Therefore, any system of maintenance had to be
implemented in a manner that minimized the amount taken from
others, and did not reward those who could labor for their suste-
nance, but did not. Ecclesiastical poor relief was not driven by the
imperative to meet all of the needs of the poor. Poor relief is
quintessentially a matter of superfluities, of excess, of the residen-
tial, of that which remains after provision is made for donor, be it
individual, church or state. From whatever is left will the poor be
succored.
In the language of the static paradigm, such a system was
fundamentally geared to create systems of poor relief based on
maximizing cost savings, and reinforcing the social order. The
Canonical system of poor relief minimized the collective institu-
tional costs of relief in a number of ways. The most important of
these was the encouragement of private voluntary charity, which
was supposed to provide a substantial amount of the resources
necessary to aid in the local relief of the destitute. Charitable work
conducted by private institutions, or other alternative sources of
private aid, were central to the administration of relief and assumed
theological importance. It was backed by the authority of religious
command. This, in a sense, complemented the theological and
practical command that the poor work. Like the indigent who re-
fused to work, the rich person who refused to give alms was
deemed a social and religious deviant who could be compelled to
comply with their obligations by applying to the rudimentary en-
forcement provision of the denunciado evangelica. Additional en-
couragement was provided by constructing charitable need hierar-
chies in a manner which imposed the obligation of mutual mainte-
nance on relatives.
And what of the villain who scoffed at the word of God and
refused to eat by the sweat of his brow? Canon Law offered as
19951
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punishment only a reduced obligation of sustenance, no obligation
to aid except to the extent necessary to prevent actual starvation.
But these people mocked the law of humankind as well as that of
God. At least in England, the state imposed a secular obligation to
work, on pain of imprisonment a As such, reinforcement of the
social order through the poor relief system found expression, as the
model would predict, in the tendency of medieval poor law sys-
tems to criminalize vagrancy as a violation of compulsory work
laws, to reduce the incentives of an unemployed adult populace to
engage in anti-social activities (robbery, public drunkenness, prosti-
tution, etc.), and to train the children of the destitute in an "hon-
est" trade. Thus, the ecclesiastical poor law system tended to rely
on secular criminal law to penalize the able-bodied, who were sup-
posed to be working for their bread instead of begging for it, for
the sin of nonproductivity 5
Since the primary purpose of aid was to do little more than
tide able-bodied persons over during short periods of destitution,
and do so as cheaply as possible, the ecclesiastical system was
indifferent to the manner in which relief was provided. According-
ly, maintenance only required the provision of food, shelter, cloth-
ing, or the money with which to purchase such necessities. This
aid could be provided on an institutional (indoor) basis through the
charitable hospitals, or a non-institutional (outdoor) basis through
private charitable efforts or parish poor relief.
It is in the context of this fully developed ecclesiastical system
that the English poor law system arose. As a secularized form of
ecclesiastical poor relief, it shared with the old religious system its
internalization of the basic cultural postulates which taken together
comprise the paradigm in which we now operate.s The Elizabe-
235. Ordinance and Statute of Labourers, 1350-1351, 25 Edw. 3, st. 2 (Eng.) (repealed
1863) (calling for both compelled employment and punishment for failure to work). In
other emerging Protestant jurisdictions, work might not be required, but failure to work
might limit the pauper to the right to receive only the barest aid essential to physical
survival. See discussion infra notes 281-88 (discussing early Puritan beliefs regarding
poverty).
236. See Rosenheim, supra note 108, at 512-13 (providing an historical account of
English vagrancy crimes); tenBroek, supra note 9, at 270-79 (discussing the rise of civil
penal approaches to the control of vagabonds).
237. And, indeed, the secularization might only be skin deep. Many of the first attempts
at creating "secular" poor relief borrowed heavily from the religious teaching and percep-
tions of the dominant group in the community. These views were heavily infused with the
dictates of religiously derived "right conduct" See, e.g., the poor law ordinances of Mar-
tin Luther and Ulrich Zwingli, discussed infra note 280, and reproduced in SOME EARLY
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than Poor Law represents, in effect, the culmination of the English
Crown's efforts to absorb the entire system of ecclesiastical poor
relief. These longstanding efforts began in earnest during the reign
of Henry VIII, when the functions of the Roman Catholic Church
were absorbed by the state. s The Elizabethan Poor Law has
been properly characterized as the attempt to fuse the ecclesiastical
system of poor relief with the civil statutes that the English monar-
chy enacted to supplement the ecclesiastical system ra9 Thus,
while the major characteristics of the system of poor relief did not
change much, the administrative mechanism for the implementation
of the programs substantially changed.2
B. Elizabethan Poor Law
American general assistance is essentially a modem version of
the secular institutional poor relief system which was implemented
in England during the reign of Elizabeth .24 A brief description
of the significant features of traditional English governmental poor
relief from the late Tudor period will add an additional level of
understanding concerning the utility of the general theory, and the
links between the historicism of contemporary American general
assistance and the governing framework that supplies the details of
poor relief programs.
The major characteristics of the Elizabethan system of poor
relief included primary family responsibility for the maintennce of
its members, public responsibility for the relief of the poor at the
local level, encouragement of private charity, and relief tied to
TRACTS ON POOR RELIEF 92-93 (F.R. Salter ed., 1926). There are several excellent studies
of the English poor law system from the time of Elizabeth L See generally, e.g., LEON-
ARD, supra note 108; MENCHER, supra note 14; SIDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH
LOCAL GOVERNMENT. ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART 1, THE OLD POOR LAW
(1927); tenflroek, supra note 9.
238. See TIERNEY, supra note 36, at 131 (detailing Elizabethan Poor Law); tenBroek,
supra note 9, at 258 (same).
239. See, eg., LEONARD, supra note 108, at 10 (discussing the development of Elizabe-
than poor law).
240. TIERNEY, supra note 36, at 109-31. Tierney, however, argues that a substantial
distinction between ecclesiastical poor relief and secular (Elizabethan) poor relief was the
latter's concern with the suppression of vagrancy and begging. The latter, though, was
linked to the problem of a rising crime rate, and increasingly absorbed the energies of the
English monarchy after the 15th century. Id.; see POUND, supra note 90, at 53-57 (stating
that the Elizabethan poor laws changed the methods, not the underlying characteristics);
Rosenlelim, supra note 108, at 512-17 (describing the changes in England's poor relief
system from 1349 to 1937).
241. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.).
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residency. The core of the Elizabethan system of poor relief
was the concept that impotent poor were to receive direct relief
from funds collected from taxation.243 This represented a signifi-
cant change from the old ecclesiastical system, and was the most
visible manifestation of the secularization of poor relief. Rather
than providing for the poor from the money levied by the Church
through its system of tithings, the state relied on its power to tax
the citizenry.
The administrators of this system of poor relief were to be the
"Churchwardens of everie Parish, and fower... substancial
Householders there ... [who] shall be called Overseers of the
Poore of the same Parishe."" These administrators, with the con-
sent of the Justices of the Peace,24 were to determine, on a case-
by-case basis, the amounts necessary to maintain the poor and the
manner of this relief. They were responsible for "settinge to worke
all such [poor persons], maried or unmaried havinge no meanes to
maintaine them," as well as for providing "the necessarie Releife
of the lame impotente olde blinde and suche otherse among them,
beinge poore and not able to work." Thus, while legislation
creating a non-ecclesiastical system of poor relief was national in
scope, the administration of the system and the obligation to raise
sufficient revenues was strictly local 47 Indeed, to the extent that
the administration and funding of poor relief was centered at the
parish level, the Elizabethan system continued the ecclesiastical
system's method of administration.2 However, there was a vari-
242. Jacobus tenBroek provides the best short description of the salient features of the
seminal English civil Poor Law system. See tenlroek, supra note 9, at 262 & n.27.
Much of the description of the Elizabethan Poor Law system which follows is derived
from his work.
243. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 1 (Eng.); An Acte
for the Releife of the Poore, 1597-1598, 39 Eliz., ch. 3, § I (Eng.); An Acte for the
Punishment of Vacabondes and for Releife of the Poor & Impotent, 1572, 14 Eliz., ch. 5,
§ 16.
244. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.).
245. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 262 & n.27 (stating that "the Malors, Balifs, or
other Head Officers of everie Towne and Place Corporate and Citie within this Realme"'
were normally appointed Justices of the Peace by royal commission (quoting An Acte for
the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 § 7 (Eng.))).
246. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.).
247. See LEONARD, supra note 108, at 133; Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at 178-81 (dis-
cussing the manner in which Elizabethan Poor Law was received in the American colo-
nies).
248. See LEONARD, supra note 108, at 48 (showing how local people were responsible
for assisting church wardens and constables and no payment was given for their services);
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ety of substantive differences between the two systems.
In addition to permitting the local administrators to provide
outdoor relief, "places of habitaftion]" were to be erected for the
poor on the wastes and commons within the parish.249 County
hospitals and almshouses were to be tax-supported in amounts
determined by the Justices of the Peace in quarter sessions.
In general, begging was forbidden.' All of the able-bodied
males and unmarried females were required to labor for at least
twelve hours per day in order to provide for their needs' Un-
less they came within certain categories, all males were required to
become agricultural laborers, all others were to serve in specified
occupations. They were required to serve an apprenticeship for a
number of years, and then make themselves available to work for
whomever required their services." Employable poor were also
put to work in manufacturing projects organized by overseers of
the poor 4 The able-bodied who refused to work were to be sent
to houses of correction. Rogues, vagabonds, and vagrants were
to be punishedV 6  Poor children were put to work or
apprenticedV7 Relatives were made responsible for the mainte-
TIERN , supra note 36, at 109-33 (discussing why ecclesiastical poor law became inef-
fective from the middle of the 14th century on).
249. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 4 (Eng.).
250. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 12 (Eng.); An Acte
for the Relelfe of the Poore, 1597-1598, 39 Eliz., ch. 3, § 13 (Eng.). See LEONARD,
supra note 108, at 207-15 (discussing the kinds of aid distributed to Elizabethan poor.).
251. See, ag., An Acte for the Punishment of Vacabondes and for Releife of the Poore
& Impotent, 1572, 14 Eliz., ch. 5 (Eng.); An Acte for the due execution of diverse
Lawes and Statutes heretofore made against Rogues Vacabondes and Sturdye Beggars and
other lewd and idle parsons, 1609, 7 Jac., ch. 4 (Fr.); see also LEONARD, supra note 108,
at 25-26 (observing that the methods of punishing beggars included whippings, beatings,
and being held in stocks).
252. tenBroek, supra note 9, at 272-73.
253. POUND, supra note 90, at 45-46.
254. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1597, 39 Eliza., ch. 3, § 1 (Eng.); see also
LEONARD, supra note 108, at 76-78 (discussing the significance of these statutes).
255. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 2 (Eng.); An Acte
towchyng the punysshement of Vacabondes and other Idle Parsons, 1549-1550, 3 & 4
Edw. 6, ch. 16, § 6 (Eng.); An Acte for the punysshement of sturdye vacabondes and
beggars, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25, §§ 6, 10 (Eng.). See also LEONARD, supra note 108, at
3-5 (discussing the rise in vagrancy during the latter part of the 16th century).
256. An Acte for the Punishment of Vacabondes and for Releife of the Poore & Impo-
tent, 1572, 14 Eliz., ch. 5 (Eng.); An Acte for punysshement of sturdye vacabondes and
beggars, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25 (Eng.).
257. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, §§ 1, 3 (Eng.); An
Acte for punysshement of sturdye vacabondes and beggars, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25,
§ 6 (Eng.).
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nance of their destitute kinsmen, including parents, grandparents,
and children of paupers.s The legal liability incurred by relatives
of paupers was subject to the discretion of the local poor relief
administrators.s 9
Every English subject had a settlement roughly corresponding
to a person's place of residence. Only those who had a settlement
in a community were entitled to its aid. The elements of this
settlement and the methods of its acquisition were carefully circum-
scribed. Paupers who remained in a community in which they were
not settled were to be excluded or expelled from the community
and returned to the community of settlement. "An adequate sum of
money to be paid by every county and parish" was to be fixed by
the Justices of the Peace in quarter sessions for the support of the
poor prisoners of the King's bench and marshalsea; a minimum of
twenty shillings per year was sent from each county for prison
use.s In addition, special provisions were made for destitute, ill,
and maimed soldiers and mariners.0z
Local provision of institutional relief was to be significantly
supplemented by private charitable efforts. s In order to facilitate
charitable donations, or at least their effectiveness, the law on
charitable uses was refined and expanded to provide a mechanism
to better ensure that charitable foundations allocated their resources
in accordance with the wishes of the founder.2" The distribution
258. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2, § 6 (Eng.).
259. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 282-85.
260. An Act for the better Releife of the Poore of this Kingdom, 1662, 13 & 14 Car.
2, ch. 12 (Eng.) (repealed 1927) (providing that any two Justices of the Peace may re-
move any poor person from a settled parish); An Acte for punysshement of sturdye
vacabondes and beggars, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 25 (Eng.) (repealed 1863) (enumer-
ating numerous levels of punishment for beggars, including forced labor); An Acte agaynst
vacabondes and beggars, 1495, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 2 (Eng.) (repealed 1623-1624) (vagabonds
were to be set in flocks for three days and three nights); see also Riesenfeld, supra note
178, at 178-81 (discussing the Elizabethan Poor Law conception of settlement).
261. 43 Eliza., ch. 2, §§ 1, 14 (1601) (Eng.) (repealed 1967); see also 39 Eliz., ch. 3
(1597) (Eng.) (repealed 1863) (stating the general provision for overseers of the poor).
262. 43 Eliz., ch. 3, §§ 1, 15 (1601) (Eng.) (repealed 1863) (establishing a special relief
program and its administration for soldiers and mariners).
263. See LEONARD, supra note 108, at 210-15 (noting that the years 1550 to 1650 saw
an enormous increase in new almshouses); MFCttFR, supra note 14, at 37 (noting that
public authorities often supported private charities, which helped lessen the public tax bur-
den); POUND, supra note 90, at 69-76 (noting that private charity might have, in the
aggregate, even exceeded total state expenditures on relief); tenBroek, supra note 9, at
259-60 (considering the encouragement of private charity and the creation of charitable
corporations).
264. Thus, charitable corporations could create an endowment in perpetuity, and a corpo-
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of private charitable giving tended to mirror that of institutional re-
lief.
Thus summarized, Tudor poor relief was built on the same
paradigmatic foundations as the system it displaced. Underlying the
system was the fundamental notion that the socio-economic status
quo was to be accepted as a given. Indeed, there is no notion of
empowerment of the poor, maintaining the poor remained a respon-
sibility of community members most interested in preserving the
status quo, specifically the people of substance and the local politi-
cal leadership. The system was to be driven by the imperatives of
cost minimization, the toleration of localities for income redistribu-
tion, and the goal of driving the able-bodied to employment.m
The mentality was the same as that of the fourteenth century Stat-
ute of Labourers-poverty could be alleviated if people were com-
pelled to work, because employment was available for those who
sought it?'
ration could be empowered to receive property for the purpose of dispensing it according
to the wishes of the founder. To ensure that the founder's will was followed, the Chan-
cellor was empowered to appoint commissions "to enquire ... of all... fuch gifts...
and of the abufes... [and] .. . defrauding" of the original intent An Acte for the
Releife of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.) (repealed 1888). See also 39 Eliz., ch. 5
& 6 (1597) (Eng.) (repealed 1960) (providing similar rules for the organization of charita-
ble hospitals); 14 Eliz., ch. 14 (1572) (Eng.) (repealed 1960) (same); cf. tenBroek, supra
note 9, at 259 (noting that many hospitals and almshouses received public rather than
private support in the form of tax revenues). However, the ability of the state to regulate
private charities was important during the 16th century, largely due to the significant
amount of money placed in private charitable institutions as a result of the abolition of
both the monasteries and the Pope's authority in Rome. Id. at 266-67.
265. See POUND, supra note 90, at 69-76 (describing the uses to which charitable con-
tributions were put, and noting in particular that contributions were used primarily for
direct household relief to prevent paid destitution, though funds for social rehabilitation
were also made available to temporarily unemployed tradespeople). Important aspects of
this notion carried over in many respects to colonial America, thus providing the founda-
tion for the current approach to private American philanthropy. See Bremner, supra note
4, at 103-11 (citing several examples of instances where private and public welfare efforts
coincided and blended together). Bremner notes that "throughout the greater part of
American history, governmental and voluntary forces have cooperated and collaborated in
meeting public needs:' Id. at 103.
266. Jacobus tenBroek has persuasively demonstrated the manner in which the Elizabe-
than Poor Law was shaped by cost considerations. See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 262-87
(discussing various means employed to curtail public costs and to place more liability on
private entities).
267. This explains the striking similarity between the Elizabethan Artificers Act, 1562, 5
Eliz., ch. 4 (Eng.) (repealed 1875), and the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers, 1350-
1351, 25 Edw. 3, st. 2 (Eng.) (repealed 1863) (calling both for compelled employment
and punishment for failure to perform these duties). See tenBroek, supra note 9, at 270.
74 (arguing that the administration of poverty law did not change greatly between the
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In essence, the Elizabethan system was merely an adoption of
the medieval ecclesiastical system of relief to which a series of
substitutions were made. Its impetus was as much practical-the
government needed to fill the vacuum it created when it eliminated
church governance of poor relief-as theoretical. Indeed, the very
structure of the "new" system of poor relief demonstrates more a
desire to appropriate past practices than to "transform" them.
Institutional relief was still intended to be delivered locally, and
the funds for such local relief were still to be provided by the
obligated locality. Such funds were to be obtained from local tax-
ation and from the charitable endeavors of the local citizenry, the
latter being further supported by the power of the state." These
ideas of private charity and local institutional obligations to fund
relief efforts were already embedded in English custom in the form
of the tithe and the procedure for denunciatio evangelica under
Canon Law. 9
Institutional poor relief was not only meant to be supplemented
by local charitable activity, it further relied on the ancient
Ambrosian need hierarchy system to impose mutual support obliga-
tions on members of the traditional family" The difference un-
der the English secular statutes is that the normally hortatory obli-
gations inherent in the Canon Law were, under the Elizabethan
scheme, made obligatory and enforceable through the power of the
state. In this sense, at least, Elizabethan Poor Law represents more
of an installation of an aggressive administrator in place of a pas-
14th century and the Elizabethan era). Moreover, there is also little difference between the
spirit behind those acts and that of conservatives, such as Irving Kristol, today; both urge
that all forms of welfare to the able-bodied should be abandoned on the theory that there
is employment for all who seek it. Kristol, supra note 83, at A14 (arguing that able-bod-
ied and mentally healthy men should have no entitlement whatsoever to welfare).
268. In this manner, the state appropriated one of the two significant portions of the
Canonic system, with the institutional system of parish poor relief providing the remainder
of the formal aid apparatus. The other portion of ecclesiastical poor relief, private charita-
ble efforts, was left to the continued ministrations of religious organizations, now emanat-
ing from the Church of England, and not the Roman Catholic Church. See LEONARD,
supra note 108, at 210-20 (detailing the efforts of almshouses and parish efforts to edu-
cate and provide for children); MENCHR, supra note 14, at 25-26, 95-96 (noting the
tension between private charity and public control, and the fear that an overexpansion of
private charity would lead to dependency and sloth).
269. See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to donate
one's superfluous wealth).
270. This notion of family responsibility for the maintenance of its members is still




sive one, and not a change in the underlying goals and assump-
tions of the system.
Although Elizabethan Poor Law did not impose a new method
of distinguishing between the poor and the vagrants, it did signifi-
cantly refine the approach to dealing with the able-bodied who did
not work. Similar to the pre-Tudor ecclesiastical system of relief,
the underlying assumption was that all people should work, and
that failure to do so was evidence of a social deviance significant
enough to merit the attention of the civil and criminal law. Only
those who society deemed incapable of working were excepted
from this scheme. Of the others, those who were temporarily un-
employed were deemed most deserving of maintenance and sup-
port. The archetypal situation was that of the farmer who had no
means of feeding his family before harvest, or the artisan experi-
encing temporary financial difficulties2 7 All others who failed to
work were shirkers. These people were to be maintained to the ex-
tent necessary to prevent starvation, but, unless they found work on
their own, were likely to be incarcerated and reformed. Their main-
tenance was to be determined solely from the value of their own
labor during the period of their destitution and incarceration m
Alternatively, the obligation to work might be temporarily met by
forcing recipients of aid to work for the locality as payment for
their maintenance until they could return to their old jobs or pro-
fessions (or perhaps until it was time to work the fields again).m
Thus, it is in connection with the able-bodied poor that the
Elizabethan Poor Law, as the first significant generalized state-
sponsored system of poor relief, made the most significant modifi-
cation of past practices. Vagrants, beggars, and the idle in general,
were characterized as social deviants, and as such were to be sup-
pressed by the imposition of criminal penalties unprecedented in
271. See POUND, supra note 90, at 74 (noting that many contributions went for immedi-
ate relief and for the temporarily unemployed). As would be expected, however, the aid
was meant primarily to be temporary; recipients were expected to find some honest way
of supplementing their income at the earliest opportunity. Id.
272. See 7 Jac., ch. 4, § 4 (1609) (Fr.) (providing for the incarceration of the idle in
houses of correction where they might be reformed by punishment, starvation, and hard
work, receiving as an allowance for their maintenance only what they were able to "earn"
by their own labor); see generally tenBroek, supra note 9, at 277-78 (discussing various
forms of punishment and compelled labor of vagrants).
273. For a description of the economics of the laboring classes and the poor law in
Tudor England, see HIMMEuARB, supra note 52, at 24-28 (describing the rise of mercan-
tilism and the ethics of productivity); LEONARD, supra note 108, at 22-46 (detailing the
administration of government efforts to find and create work for the unemployed).
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number and variety.274 In a society intent on preserving the status
quo, where the obligation of every able-bodied person was to
work, and where it was believed that work was available to all
who sought it, idleness among the able-bodied could justifiably be
considered the result of personal choice and not economic condi-
tion.
Moreover, because the obligation to work was both secular and
religious, and necessarily rejected the notion that unemployment is
caused by a lack of employment opportunities, the able-bodied who
did not work engaged in criminal conduct2 '5 And like criminals
274. This conceptualization of the poor, and the corresponding obligation of "good"
citizens to work, had existed in one form or another for several centuries. It was the
natural result of accepting the view that work was to be had by all who sought labor,
and that refusal to work was a personal choice, freely made and easily rectifiable by
command of the law. The Elizabethans took the implications of this conceptualization
further than their predecessors. See generally terBroek, supra note 9, at 270-79 (noting
that the Elizabethan system evolved into a paternalist system with no freedom of labor).
This belief resulted in two types of ordinances. The first mandated that all able-
bodied people were to work. This type of command was not thought of as extraordinary,
since it was clear to all that any person who wanted to work could find it and thereby
prevent dependence on the state for his or her maintenance. See The Ordinance and Stat-
ute of Labourers, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, st. 2 (Eng), preceded by the Statute of Labourers,
1349, 23 Edw. 3, ehs. 5-7 (Eng.) (requiring all people below a certain age to labor for
whomever would hire them at a wage set forth in the statute). The second type of ordi-
nance prohibited begging.
Early in her reign, Elizabeth I adopted a comprehensive ordinance compelling labor
from all able-bodied people. 5 Eliz., oh. 4 (1562) (Eng.) ("containing divers orders for
artificers, labourers, fervants of hufbandry and apprentices"). The purpose of this statute
was to eliminate "idleness" through compulsory labor. All men between the ages of 12
and 60 and all unmarried women between the ages of 12 and 40 were required to work.
In addition, all youths under the age of 21 were obligated to apprentice themselves. To
the extent that a person was unable to obtain work, the state stood ready to supply the
work. For further examples of this theme, see 14 Eliz., ch. 5 (1572) (Eng.); 3 & 4 Edw.
6, ch. 16 (1549) (Eng.); 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (Eng.); 27 Hen. 8, cl. 25 (1535) (Eng.).
These statutes commanded all able-bodied poor people to be provided with work of one
kind or another by local officials so that they might earn their keep and reduce the bur-
den of their maintenance.
Since labor was compulsory, it followed that idleness, vagrancy, and begging could
be suppressed as a means of enforcing the general command to labor in honest work.
Suppression generally took the form of criminal penalties for the failure or refusal to
work. See, e.g., 39 Eliz., ch. 4 (1597) (Eng.); 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (Eng.); 22 Hen. 8,
oh. 12 (1530) (Eng.). Idleness was punished by public humiliation and physical punish-
ment including stocks and whippings, 22 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1530) (Eng.), followed by en-
forcement of the compulsory labor ordinances. By the time of the late Elizabethan period,
the punishment for idleness included mutilation, 1 Edw. 6, oh. 3 (1547) (Eng.) (including
branding with a hot iron on the breast), slavery, and death. 39 Eliz., oh. 4 (1597) (Eng.).
275. See Rosenheim, supra note 108, at 512-13 (noting that criminal statutes were en-
acted to maintain a steady labor force and prevent vagrants from wandering between
jobs); tenBroek, supra note 9, at 270-79 (describing early efforts to control the supply of
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who are convicted of non-capital criminal offenses and sentenced
to a period of incarceration, this group was to be punished, and
compelled to correct their conduct while being physically main-
tained at the barest level possible 6 To question the soundness
of the socio-economic system that might have produced the vagrant
was unthinkable or seditious at best. Indeed, the better opinion was
that there was nothing wrong with the system, rather, there was
something wrong with the character of the poor that needed correc-
tion. And for that, the compulsion of the law was thought to suf-
fice. The purpose of the poor law, as contemporaries saw it, was
to provide "work for those that will Labour, Punishment for those
that will not, and Bread for those who cannot." 7 Furthermore,
this goal was to be undertaken with as little interference to the
productivity of the working population as possible, thus minimizing
the income redistributive effects of the program to levels that
would not be perceived as a threat to the socio-economic order.278
This article characterizes the Tudor efforts at poor relief as
substantially civil. Indeed, a distinguishing characteristic of Anglo-
American poor relief from the seventeenth century onward is the
assumption by the civil government of primary responsibility for
relief. However, by civil, I do not mean to convey the impression
that this new civil administration was in any way secular, nor that
religion and relief had parted company. They had not. For the
labor through enforced labor and harsh criminal punishment).
276. This practice, as will be demonstrated in part V.A, infra, remains a significant part
of our system of poor relief. Modem forms of punishment include coercion by imposing
conditions on the receipt of aid, or the complete denial of aid. See POUND, supra note
90, at 47-48 (describing 16th century coercion as including incarceration, whipping, and
boring through the ear); STEIN, supra note 87, at 5-14 (noting that policies geared toward
poor relief have changed little; they use mostly repressive and coercive tactics);
Rosenheim, supra note 108, at 518-23, 530-41 (detailing the various means of modem
punishment and their goal of encouraging employment).
277. JoYCE OLDHAm APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEvENTEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND 131 (1978) (quoting RICHARD DUNNING, A PLAIN AND EASIE METH-
OD SHEWING HOW THE OFFICE OF OVERSEER OF T)HE POOR MAY BE MANAGED, PREF-
ACE (1686)).
278. According to Jacobus tenBroek:
Once the public agreed to pay the bill, it acquired a pressing concern about the
size of the bill and an active interest in finding methods for reducing it. The
impulse to invent and apply devices which did so was implicit in the poor law
principle itself, and the devices invented and adapted for this purpose, originally
and from time to time thereafter, were as characteristic of the poor law as the
public acceptance of the basic responsibility.
tenBroek, supra note 9, at 286.
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static assumption that the poor are responsible for their own condi-
tion, 9 implicit in the Elizabethan Poor Law, merges impercepti-
bly with the Anglo-American Protestant vision of poverty and
work. From the formative period in the sixteenth century to the
present, Protestant theologians assert that hard work and frugality
are close to divine commandments. Early European Protestant
thinkers constructed their welfare systems on this foundation, ad-
vanced notions of poverty and the obligation to aid the destitute
that were based on the moral worthiness of the recipients and that
equated moral worthiness with productivitya In the absence of
compelling circumstances beyond the control of the recipient, the
able-bodied who refused to work were to be treated like those who
failed to attend sermons, blasphemers, and those who indulged "in
any other kind of wantonness and frivolity."'" These notions car-
ried over to the American colonies, where they provided a basis
279. See Backer, supra note 20, at part DI.A.; supra part II. Thus, social reformers of
the late 19th century lectured the destitute about thrift and frugality, without regard to the
cause of their destitution. At least in the minds of poor law administrators, the causes of
poverty were the bad habits of the poor themselves. See HIMMmELARB, supra note 52, at
147-90, 323-32 (detailing the risk of paternalism within the framework of a moral econo-
my). But see id. at 191-287 (noting the rise of oppositional voices, chartism, Marxism,
and "radical Toryism!); MENCHER, supra note 14, at 269-73 (stressing the difficulty of
reconciling the existence of poverty with beliefs that anyone willing to work could earn a
living); TMPRNE, supra note 36 (examining the early history of English poor law, and the
influence of the church on the law); Goebel, supra note 231 (portraying these attitudes as
they evolved within early New England settlements).
280. See Backer, supra note 20 (discussing the attempts at poor relief in Europe during
the early years of the Protestant Reformation); see also MENCHER, supra note 14, at 23-
37 (illustrating early efforts at poor relief, from work programs to emigration to the
American colonies). Religion stressed the notion that the right to aid was based on the
moral character of the applicant--and the refusal to work for one's keep constituted a
great immorality. Thus, minimal relief was to be accorded "any persons, whether men or
women, of whom it is known that they have spent and wasted all their days in luxury
and idleness, and will not work, but frequent public-houses, drinking-places and haunts of
ill-repute:' Ulrich Zwingli, Ordinance and Articles Touching Almsgiving, in SOME EARLY
TRACTS ON POOR RELmEF, supra note 237, at 100-01. Such unworthy folk were to be
given aid only when they arrived "at the last stage of destitution, and even then reference
must be made to the Mayor and City Council before settling what is to be done for
them:' Id. at 101. Martin Luther notes that:
Those folk in our parish who have become poor through no fault of their own
and who have been left without help from their friends (if they had any), and
also those who cannot work because of sickness or old age and who are dis-
tressingly poor, shall be sustained and provided for.
Martin Luther, Ordinance for a Common Chest, in SomE EARLY TRAcTS ON POOR RE-
LIEF, supra note 237, at 92.
281. Zwingli, supra note 280, at 101.
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for ascertaining the extent of the societal obligation to aid the
poor.W For American Puritans, "[p]overty, like wealth, demon-
strated God's hand, and while riches were proof of goodness and
selection, insufficiency was proof of evil and rejection." Ameri-
can attitudes towards poor relief were and have remained consonant
with this immutable, divinely ordained notion.
It was not only early Protestant religious theory that served to
cement the view of the stasis respecting the nature of society, the
economic order, and the poor. Nineteenth century Methodism pro-
vides an extreme example of the congruence of religious teaching
and the static paradigm. Methodists were taught that they could
remain graced through service to the church, cultivation of one's
own soul, and in keeping a methodical discipline in every aspect
of life. This last method of maintaining grace was best met
through labor. "Moreover, God's curse over Adam, when expelled
from the Garden of Eden, provided irrefutable doctrinal support as
to the blessedness of hard labour, poverty, and sorrow 'all the days
of thy life."''' s4 The Protestantism of England and America might
well serve as the ultimate workplace disciplinary theory. Pover-
ty is the godly person's lot in life, to be borne with patience in the
expectation of an eternal reward. Destitution, on the other hand, is
the outward mark of inward sin. The means by which the able-
bodied destitute were relieved might, therefore, serve an important
instructive purpose. It could provide the idle with a taste of the
282. For a discussion of charitable theories in the colonies, see Bremner, supra note 4,
at 89-94 (ranging from Cotton Mather to Alexis de Tocqueville). The blending of early
Protestant theology with the poor law of the American colonial period is explored in
Goebel, supra note 231, at 427 n.19 (discussing the notions of fundamental law and cove-
nant in Puritan thought); Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at 201-14 (specifying the experiences
of the New England colonies); see also MiNcmet, supra note 14, at 43-44 (noting the
predominance of Puritan thought in colonial poor law). Cotton Mather, the early New
England Divine, was noted for stating that the best charity for the idle was work, and for
maintaining that "for those who Indulge themselves in Idleness . . . the Express command
of God unto us, is, That we should let them Starve." Id at 44.
283. MENCHE, supra note 14, at 43. This concept was adopted by other groups as
well. In addition, many modem economic approaches to alleviating poverty are grounded,
to a significant extent, on these notions. Thus, Galbraith quotes the Calvinist precept,
"[t]he only sound way to solve the problem of poverty is to help people help them-
selves." GALBRAITH, supra note 44, at 251.
284. THOMpSON, supra note 137, at 365. For a discussion of the interrelationship be-
tween Methodism and the early Industrial Revolution in England, see id. at 350-400.
285. See iUL at 379 ("As a dogma Methodism appears as a pitiless ideology of work:).
However, the dogma was softened by the "needs, values and patterns of social relation-
ship of the community within which it was placed" Id.
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eternal damnation which awaited them, absent repentance by be-
coming productive, and as a result becoming "merely" poor.
The system of English poor relief instituted by the Elizabethan
Poor Law of 16011 6 remained one of the formal bases of British
public assistance until the adoption of the National Assistance Act
in 1948' although there were countless amendments, reforms,
and a substantial recodification of the Elizabethan Poor Law with
significant substantive revisions in 1927. These systems were
primarily static in their underlying assumptions. They adopted the
limitations of stasis in determining the proper scope and purpose of
poor relief, especially for the able-bodied poor. These included
prevention of disturbances of the peace, general malcontent, and
famine.
More importantly, the Elizabethan Poor Law system and Eng-
lish local practice subsequently provided the institutional foundation
for the construction of poor relief systems in the United States.. 9
All of the original colonies, whether originally settled by the Brit-
ish or not, ultimately embraced most of the inherent notions of the
paradigm as expressed in the institutions of the Elizabethan Poor
Law." Subsequently transmitted through the law of the original
286. An Acte for the Releife of the Poore, 1601, 43 Eliz., ch. 2 (Eng.).
287. Large portions of Elizabethan Poor Law were repealed by the Poor Law Act, 1927,
17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 14 (Eng.) (repealed 1939). Also, the Elizabethan Poor Law was
superseded in 1948 upon passage of the National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6,
ch. 29, § I (Eng.), and officially repealed that same year. Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at
177 & n.10. For a history of English poor relief, see, e.g., DE SCHWEINZ, supra note 62
(detailing poor law in England from 1349 to 1942); FuRNtSS & TiLTON, supra note 23, at
94-121 (exploring years of poor relief law in England, ranging from 1601 to the 1970s);
HIM ARB, supra note 52 (concentrating on poor relief during the early industrial age);
LEONARD, supra note 108, at 21 (discussing three major factors in the development of
English poor relief orders of municipal governors, regulations of Parliament, and induce-
ment of Justices of the Peace to implement the law.); Briggs, supra note 65, at 232-46,
251-58 (describing the political and philosophical background leading to changes in British
poor relief in the 19th and early 20th centuries).
288. Poor Law Act, 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, ch. 14 (Eng.) (repealed 1939); see, e.g., id.
sched. 11 (repealing substantial portions, but by no means all of the core provisions of
the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601). See also DE SCHWEINrr supra note 62 (tracing the
history of English poor relief and its stagnancy to modem times); Riesenfeld, supra note
178, at 181 (noting that the Elizabethan poor law remained highly influential until post-
World War II reforms); cf. FuRNIss & TiLTON, supra note 23, at 94-121 (contending that
English poor law can be divided into four distinct periods of reform).
289. See MENCHmt, supra note 14, at 39-48 (noting that the English system was most
influential during the colonial period); Goebel, supra note 231 (describing English legal
and local practices during the American colonial period and the early development of poor
relief institutions in the United States); Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at 176-77 (arguing that
colonial poor law emulated the poor law of Tudor England).
290. See MENCrHER, supra note 14, at 44-48 (describing how the colonies borrowed
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colonies, this system was later adopted by virtually every state in
the Union. And, unlike Britain, which abandoned the forms if
not the underlying assumptions of stasis when the National Assis-
tance Act was adopted t American systems of state and federal
poor relief continued to build on these notions, and were subject to
the constraints inherent in the underlying system." It is to the
modem versions of these ancient forms that I turn next.
V. THE GENERAL THEORY AND ARCHETYPAL ANGLO-AMERICAN
PooR RELIEF SYSTEMS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMEN
In this section, state and local general assistance programs are
examined, and the descriptive and predictive strength of the model
is again tested. State and local governmental systems of general
assistance preserve a pure form of the structure of poor relief
heavily from the ideas developed in the administration of Elizabethan poor relief and
vagrancy law); Riesenfeld, supra note 178, at 201-33 (detailing the development of poor
law within each American colony).
291. In this respect, the adoption of the Elizabethan Poor Law traced the adoption of
the English common law in the United States. See generally Ford W. Hall, The Common
Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1951)
(accounting the reception of common law in the United States). The English model con-
tinued to be closely followed through the middle of the next century. See MENCRER,
supra note 14, at 147 (stating that post-revolutionary policy continued to "stagnate" and
reflect old English policies for many years).
292. See National Assistance Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 29 (Eng.); see also
FuRImSS & TLTON, supra note 23, at 104-21 (observing the broad change in English
poor law in the post-World War II era); MENCHER, supra note 14, at 399-400 (arguing
that the National Assistance Act reflected an abandonment of assumptions underlying
previous poor relief administration).
293. For a description of a fairly standard poor relief system in America during the
1930s, that of Alabama, and the striking parallels of that system to that of 17th century
England, see FLYNr, supra note 60, at 281-320 (describing the imposition of residency
requirements, a form of settlement, and noting that the nature of relief involved primarily
the provision of food and shelter to the poor). Flynt notes that the poor resented the
patronizing attitude of relief workers and decried the ineffectiveness of relief, the well-to-
do criticized the entire notion of relief as a handout to people who never intended to
work, and argued that the need for relief would be eliminated if laborers were prevented
from unionizing and challenging the way employers set wages. Id. at 292-93. Poorhouses
were not uncommon as the last resort of the indigent, feeble, old, and illiterate poor in
Alabama through the Great Depression. Indeed, the Department of Public Welfare was
created in 1935 in Alabama with a federal grant, in part to close the almshouses. Id. at
318-19. For an overview of state and federal programs, see generally FuRNiss & TILTON,
supra note 23, at 154-64 (depicting poor relief efforts during the progressive and New
Deal eras); Bensinger, supra note 9 (examining California's general assistance provisions);
Kravit, supra note 9 (examining the general assistance provisions of New Hampshire and
its derivations from Elizabethan Poor Law); tenBroek, supra note 9 (emphasizing the law
of California).
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which, in a more complicated (but not different) form, constitutes
the structure of federal categorical programs. State general assis-
tance programs are examined in the first section of Part V to deter-
mine how accurately the theory predicts and explains the actual
characteristics of such systems. The examination is broad in scope;
the nature and functioning of state general assistance programs
remain largely unexplored. Even this preliminary application of the
general theory to American general assistance systems confmns that
such systems remain anchored to a static conception of poor relief,
and that centuries of reformation have done little to alter the basis
upon which society creates and maintains its poor relief systems.
There follows a comparative examination of the systems of poor
relief considered thus far. I conclude that the general theory helps
us understand the (phony) nature of the evolution of poor relief is
substantially rhetorical. Indeed, the only evolution that public wel-
fare has experienced since the fourteenth century has been the
general (hyper)inflation of the words used to describe the remain-
ing system, which at its core, is essentially unchanged.
A. The Characteristics of American General Assistance Systems
Studying the pattern of state general assistance within the static
paradigm contributes greatly to understanding American systems of
poor relief. Such study reveals that a fundamental component of all
such systems is the unquestioning acceptance of income and social
inequality. Programs which advocate a significant amount of in-
come redistribution are considered radical and, are therefore, out-
side of contemporary debate 4 Likewise, poor relief programs
reinforce the behavior expected of members of society."as The
294. See, e.g., HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 33, at 8-9 (noting the power of
symbols to thwart significant structural changes to welfare policy); SHEA-EN, supra note
22, at 229-38 (supporting an extensive guaranteed income program, but acknowledging
that fundamental traditional notions must be overcome before such a program could be
seriously considered); Larson, supra note 78, at 356 (noting that several proposals for a
negative income tax as a means of income redistribution lost public appeal and were
never implemented). Advocates of systems relying in large measure on substantial redistri-
butions of income have attempted to "markef' these programs as cheaper than current
programs because the elimination of a large number of administrators under such programs
make them less redistributive than the programs they would replace. In effect, the propo-
nents of such programs are required to sell them as compatible with the basic notions of
the static paradigm, i.e., cost and savings.
295. Martha Fineman has explored the manner in which welfare policies pressure poor
women to adhere to the patriarchal model of the family, and how these policies provide a
basis for determining worthiness for poor relief. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 277-85.
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most readily acceptable programs are those which neither directly
nor indirectly effect significant changes in the social order. This
reluctance to disturb the status quo is reflected in the manner in
which we frame the state's obligation to its destitute the primary
effect of which is to limit the characteristics of acceptable poor
relief programs. The repercussions of the acceptance of societal
immutability and the value of self-sufficiency and its rewards (in-
come inequality) form the basis for constructing the general theory
of poor relief. It is to an explanation of the ways in which Ameri-
can systems of general assistance reflect and reinforce our
paradigmatic cultural assumptions that I turn to.
1. The Categorization Imperative
American general assistance systems do not make relief avail-
able to all who might wish to apply. In the first instance, aid is
provided only to those who lack something. What is it that they
need? The statutes generally tell us or imply that the needy lack
things necessary to sustain life at a level thought to be minimally
suitable. Definitions of need eligibility fall within three broad
groups. The first includes those jurisdictions that define eligibility
as a function solely of "need." '6 What does this mean? Many
Indeed, both liberal and conservative commentators link female self-sufficiency to mar-
riage. See, e.g., GiLDER, supra note 37 (arguing that poverty is a function of the aban-
donment of traditional notions of marriage and the gender roles of males and females,
which further results in the abandonment of the work ethic); WILSON, supra note 42, at
104-05 (lining the rise in Afican-American female-headed families to a rise in African-
American male joblessness). Punishing the deviance of females who depart from the social
status quo may be the intended or unintended result of governmental policy as well. See,
e.g., The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (providing for immediate income withholding for child
support). This establishment of paternity and support obligations for out-of-wedlock chil-
dren reinforces the traditional notion of male responsibility for the provision of support
for minor children. WHrr Houss WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILY, supra note 20. See
generally HANDLER & HASENraLD, supra note 33 (detailing several government efforts to
control alleged social deviance through welfare policies).
296. Fifteen states base eligibility on an applicant's "need:' See ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.25.130 (1990) (tying assistance to objective needs, not to exceed $120 per month per
person); IDAHO CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (requiring an evaluation of need
before nonmedical aid can be administered to an indigent person); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 252.25 (West 1994) (providing county relief where a person's needs are not fully met
by state and federal aid); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205.200 (Baldwin 1991) (holding that
the secretary is to promulgate need-based eligibility requirements); MD. CODE ANN., Soc.
SERv. § 65A(a) (1992) (offering aid to those temporarily in need, but not eligible for
other state or federal assistance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18, § 2 (West 1994) (pro-
viding financial assistance as needed); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-2-602 (1994) (holding that
grants of financial aid are to be need-based); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-121 (West 1993)
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jurisdictions don't tell us for sure; but a safe assumption is that
need means financial assistance. Another group of statutes nar-
row the potential definition of the need for financial assistance in
other ways-temporary need;29 immediate need;' or economic
(stating that the director of welfare is to inquire into direct and indirect causes of an
applicant's needs); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-01 (Supp. 1995) (listing eligibility require-
ments for needy applicants); OR. REv. STAT. § 411.710(1) (1993) (stating that general
assistance is to be provided on the basis of individual need); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62,
§ 432 (Supp. 1995) (defining three classes of needy persons who are eligible for aid);
R.L GEN. LAWS § 40-5-1 (1990) (mandating town relief for those in need); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 74.04.005 (West Supp. 1995) (providing aid to unemployable persons in
need); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.032(l)(c) (West Supp. 1994) (mandating monthly agency
relief payments to needy persons); Page v. City of Auburn, 440 A.2d 363 (Me. 1982)
(upholding Maine's statutory scheme that mandates consideration of need only in a wel-
fare application).
297. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.130 (1990) ("The amount of assistance for a needy
person shall be determined.. . with regard to the . . . needs of the person:); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 205.200 (Baldwin 1991) ("A needy aged person, a needy blind person, a
needy child, a needy permanently and totally disabled person, or a person with whom a
needy child lives shall be eligible to receive a public assistance grant."); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-2-602 (1994) ("Mhe staff of the county departinent shall determine grants and
changes in grants, based on the needs of each applicant"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-124
(West Supp. 1995) ("Continued assistance . . . may be provided in such a manner as to
meet any or all of the several needs of. . . the . . . persons to whom assistance is to
be granted such as the provision of food, milk, shelter, fuel, clothing or medical care.");
see also Harris v. Emory, 350 A.2d 325, 328 (NJ. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1975) (showing
eligibility under New Jersey General Public Assistance Law requires a showing that need
was not self-created).
For a discussion of the difference between public and general assistance and their
general requirements, see N.D. CaNT. CODE § 50-01-01 (Supp. 1995) ("[Elach county in
this state is obligated . . . to relieve and support persons who are residents of the county
and who are in need of poor relief."); OR. REv. STAT. § 411.710(1) (1993) ("General
assistance shall be granted . . . on the basis of need.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(3)
(West 1995) (holding that chronically needy or transitionally needy persons shall be eligi-
ble for assistance); R.I. GEN. LAWS §40-5-1 (1990) ("Every town shall be required to
relieve and support all poor and indigent persons . . . whenever they shall stand in need
of relief and support. '); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.04.005(1) (West Supp. 1995) (de--
fining public assistance as "[p]ublic aid to persons in need thereof."); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
49.032(1)(c) (West Supp. 1994) ("Each general relief agency shall determine need."); East
Orange v. McCorckle, 238 A.2d 489 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (holding that hos-
pital care provisions are public assistance and are not to be categorized as general);
Castleberry v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 387 A.2d 1360 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978) (holding that need and dependency are the sole criteria for eligibility
for public assistance); State ex rel. Sell v. Milwaukee County, 222 N.W.2d 592, 595
(Wis. 1974) (interpreting general assistance statutes as only requiring the assets of an
applicant to be eligible for benefits).
298. See IDAHo CODE § 31-3401 (Supp. 1995) ('CThe boards of county commissioners in
their respective counties shall . . . evaluate the need and provide to the indigent person(s)
nonmedical assistance in a temporary situation only when no alternatives exist."); MD.
CODE ANN., Soc. SERV. § 65A(a) (1992) ("The Social Services Administration shall
promptly establish, implement and modify as necessary a program of State funded assis-
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need?'e
A third group of jurisdictions provide a more narrow definition
of need-based eligibility as a function of some state-determined
level of subsistence3 ' The statutory definitions retain their gener-
al characteristics, speaking in terms of inability to provide for or
support oneself," insufficiency of income or resources, 3 an in-
tance payments to residents of the State of Maryland who are temporarily in need:).
299. See IowA CODE § 252.25 (West Supp. 1995) ('The board of supervisors of each
county shall provide for the assistance of poor persons in its county who are... in
immediate need:).
300. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 18, § 2(A) (West 1994) ("The department shall
provide and administer throughout the commonwealth a comprehensive public welfare
financial assistance program, including the following services: the provision of financial
assistance to those in economic need."). The Maine Supreme Court held in Page v. City
of Auburn, 440 A.2d 363 (Me. 1982), that municipalities may not prescribe eligibility
standards which permit initial consideration of factors other than immediate financial need.
See also Blouin v. City of Rockland, 441 A.2d 1008 (Me. 1982) (holding that the general
assistance program requires an investigation of the financial condition of an applicant with
mortgage payments); Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 346-47 (Me. 1982)
(holding that the municipality may look no further than an applicant's immediate financial
needs in determining eligibility).
301. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-401 (Michie 1991) (providing public assistance to
those who cannot maintain a level compatible with decency and health); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) (furnishing aid where subsistance cannot be achieved
through relatives, friends, or other state means); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 503(a) (1985)
(according aid to those who cannot meet minimum sustenance levels); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.185(l)(a) (West 1993) (bestowing aid to those who are unable to comport with
decency and health); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (granting aid
for health and well-being, plus any necessary treatment due to illness); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-709(d)(A) (1993) (detailing numerous conditions on subsistence that must be met in
order to be eligible for general assistance); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.01 (West 1994)
(conferring assistance to those who cannot maintain a given subsistence level).
302. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) ('Each person
who has not estate sufficient for his support, and has no relatives of sufficient ability
who are obliged by law to support him, shall be provided for and supported . . . at the
expense of the town."); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-2 (1993) ("No person who is able to
maintain himself by labor or who has sufficient means shall be entitled to the benefits of
the provision for the poor."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 346-71 (1985 & Supp. 1992) ('The
department of human services shall administer and provide public assistance to eligible
persons who are disabled, or are at least fifty-five years of age, or have dependent chil-
dren in the home ... and who are unable to provide sufficient support for themselves or
those dependent upon them."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.01 (West 1994) ('It is declared
to be the policy of this state that persons unable to provide for themselves and not other-
wise provided for by law and who meet the eligibility requirements. ., are entitled to
receive grants of general assistance necessary to maintain a subsistence reasonably compat-
ible with decency and health:); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.590 (Vernon 1983) ("Aged, in-
firm, lame, or sick persons, who are unable to support themselves, and when there are no
other persons required by law and able to maintain them, shall be deemed poor per-
sons."); N.Y. Soc. Srm. LAW § 62 (McKinney 1992) ("[Elach public welfare district
shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in
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ability to meet basic maintenance requirements,3°4 incompetence,
poverty, and indigence.05
Thus, need-based statutory distinctions tell us much and little at
the same time. In the more ponderous language of academia,
"need" is at once vastly indeterminate and yet quite clear in the
direction in which it points policy. While need is quite malleable, a
useful tool of policy and control, the minimalism implicit in this
choice clearly demonstrates the precision of the tone of policy, as
well as its direction. We agree that American general assistance
systems operate on the basis of large-scale and significant distinc-
its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care which he is unable to pro-
vide for himself."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 26.5 (West 1991) ("IrMhose persons who
are unable to secure employment . .. ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-310 (Law. Co-op.
1985) ("General assistance in the form of money payments shall be granted ... to handi-
capped and unfortunate persons in need who are not eligible for other forms of assis-
tance ... and are unable to support themselves because of physical or mental infirmity
and would suffer unless so provided for."); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 28-13-1.1 (1992)
("[A]n indigent or poor person is any person who does not have sufficient money, credit,
or property to furnish support or does not have anyone able to support him to whom he
is entitled to look for support or is unable to work because of illness or injury:); W.
VA. CODE § 9-1-2 (1990) ('The term 'indigent person' shall mean any person who is
domiciled in this state and who is actually in need. . . and has not sufficient income or
other resources to provide for such need.:); WYO. STAT. § 42-2-103(a) (1994) ("The
department shall provide and administer programs for public assistance and social services
in Wyoming to those individuals lacking sufficient income or resources to provide them-
selves or their families with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health
or with services necessary for their well-being").
303. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-111 (1989) ("No person shall be granted public
assistance in the form of assistance payments under this article unless . . . hie has insuf-
ficient income, property or other resources to meet his needs.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31,
§ 503(a) (1985) ("Assistance shall be granted under this chapter to any needy person who
has not sufficient income or other resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compati-
ble with decency and health:); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.185 (West 1993) ("The depart-
ment shall provide financial assistance to needy persons who . . . [dlo not have sufficient
income or other resources, as determined by the department, to provide reasonable subsis-
tence compatible with decency and health."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(A) (1993)
('To qualify for general assistance in any form a needy person must have insufficient
income or resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and
health .... "); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-129 (1990) ("The Director of Social Services
shall.. . [determine] need for public assistance on the basis of available resources:).
304. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("Financial aid in meet-
ing basic maintenance requirements for a livelihood compatible with health and well-being
: .. "); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.1 (1994) ('Whenever a person in any town is
poor and unable to support himself, he shall be relieved and maintained by the overseers
of public welfare of such town, whether or not he has residence there.").
305. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) (directing city and county to
"support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated" where subsis-
tence cannot be achieved through relatives, friends, or other state means).
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tions between people. American systems of poor relief distinguish
between people in material need of some kind (we explore this a
bit more later), and people who are not. General assistance systems
are not concerned with the latter. The former are the special and
exclusive objects of the systems' concerns. The statutes identify
them and single them out-poor people' and the indigent.3 7
However, the classification imperative of need is not limited to
the broad area of economic need. Such systems make a further dis-
tinction as between paupers who are equally in need (in an objec-
tive sense) of material things. Need empowers us to segregate the
nonproductive from the rest of us, it also permits segregation with-
in the ranks of the nonproductive. Just as American society dis-
tinguishes between the productive and the non-productive by basing
status and wealth rewards on the perceived utility of productivity
and the effort expended, American general assistance systems make
distinctions between garden-variety paupers and those worthy of
special consideration. The distinctions are considered necessary as a
matter of resource allocation. Thus, some state general assistance
programs speak in terms of limited aid to the handicapped and
unfortunate,3 " the aged, infirm, lame, or sick,3" the person un-
able to maintain himself by his own labor,"' people unable to
provide for themselves, " or unable to work because of illness or
injury.2
2. Relationship of Categorization to Aid
Who, then, is covered by state systems of general assistance?
Assuming that state general assistance programs are creatures of
the static paradigm, I have suggested that such programs should
not only respect the distinctions between paupers and everyone
else, but also the distinctions among paupers themselves. It should
also follow that since productivity is prized, such systems should
306. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.25 (West 1994) (phrasing eligibility requirements in
terms of poor people); N.HL REv. STAT. ANN. § 165.1 (1994) (same).
307. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) (phrasing eligibility in
terms of indigency); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 28-13-1.1 (1992) (same); W. VA. CODE
§ 9-1-2 (1990) (same).
308. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-5-310 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
309. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.200 (Baldwin 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.590
(Vernon 1983).
310. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-2 (1993).
311. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 62 (McKinney 1992).
312. E.g., S.D. CODIFImD LAws ANN. § 28-13-1.1 (1992).
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tend to favor those incapable of productivity, and disfavor the non-
productive. And, indeed, the tendency of general assistance pro-
grams is to weigh heavily in favor of the incapacitated. For them,
the government offers long-term relief with no obligation to work.
For the others, the government may offer no material relief at all.
To the extent that material relief is offered, it may be temporary or
reserved for immediate or emergency need. For the able-bodied, aid
more likely consists of programs designed to induce them to work
(and thereby comply with the principle assumption of stasis).
a. Aid to the Incapacitated
For a large number of states and localities, general assistance is
limited to disabled or incapacitated paupers; those unable to work
or otherwise supply their needs. Thus, these states do not provide
significant aid of any kind to people who do not otherwise qualify
for federal categorical assistance" Ohio has a separate program
313. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1988 & Supp. 1994). The statute does
not specifically state that eligibility for federal categorical assistance is a factor in deter-
mining eligibility for general assistance. However, it is evident from the statute that an
individual who would be eligible for a federal categorical aid program would also be
eligible for Arizona's General Assistance Program because only unemployable persons can
qualify for general assistance. Cf. DEE. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 505 (1985 & Supp. 1994)
(categorizing the types of assistance provided by the state: old age assistance, aid to fami-
lies with dependent children, aid to the disabled, medical assistance for the aged, medical
care and drug system assistance, and general assistance).
General assistance, however, is only available to unemployable persons. Most people
who qualify under these programs would qualify for a federal categorical aid program.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-52 (1985) (stating that an aged, blind, and permanently and
totally disabled "person shall be eligible for public assistance who meets the requirements
established by the Federal Supplemental Security Income Program or its successor agency,
provided the person is also determined needy in accordance with state standards:); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:464 (West Supp. 1995) ("No parish or parish official shall, at the
public expense, support or aid any persons as paupers, except such as are infirm, sick or
disabled.").
Massachusetts only provides aid for those it determines are "needy:' See MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 18, § 2(A) (West 1994). Other states employ a similar scheme. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 27-2-7 (Michie 1992) ("[Plublic assistance shall be provided under a gener-
al assistance program to or on behalf of eligible persons who: (1) are under eighteen and
meet all eligibility conditions for [AFDC] except for the relationship to the person with
whom they are living; or (2) are [temporarily disabled and are not receiving AFDC].");
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5-65,-310 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (making general relief programs
available only to needy families or handicapped and unfortunate persons who are not
eligible for any other type of assistance and who are unable to support themselves due to
a physical or mental infirmity.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.04.005(6) (1982 & Supp.
1995) (making general assistance available only to people who are ineligible for federal
aid assistance and who are either pregnant or incapacitated due to a physical or mental
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called "Disability Assistance" for individuals who are under the age
of eighteen, over the age of sixty, pregnant, or disabled. These
incapacitated individuals are not otherwise covered under the Ohio
general assistance program?" For such states, general assistance
programs serve the limited purpose of providing temporary assis-
tance between the time of application for relief under a federal
categorical program and the commencement of federal categorical
relief.315
General assistance might also cover those able-bodied persons
who are eligible for federal categorical aid-primarily people eligi-
ble for AFDC. Why? It reflects the view of an earlier age, that
women alone with small children were considered "disabled," that
is, unable to obtain work outside the home because their primary
responsibility was raising their children?'6 This conception of the
incapacity of women raising small children survives in several state
statutes? 7 The notion is made easier, of course, since the federal
government provides a significant portion of the funds to pay these
women through the AFDC program. However, this approach has
come under substantial attack over the last thirty years?
infirmity). The states of Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming do not have any laws
that provide for public or general assistance to indigent persons. Cf D.C. CODE ANN. §§
3-202.1, 3-205.42(a) (1981 & Supp. 1995) (providing for AFDC, General Assistance for
Children, The Emergency Shelter Family Services Program, and General Public Assistance,
but, limiting General Public Assistance to disabled persons).
314. Omo. REV. CODE ANN. § 5115-01 (Baldwin 1995).
315. Under some state schemes, this temporary aid element is only a part of the general
obligation to give alms to all who are in need. For example, in Iowa the law provides
that:
The board of supervisors of each county shall provide for the relief of poor
persons in its county who are ineligible for, or are in immediate need and are
awaiting approval and receipt of, assistance under programs provided by state
or federal law, or whose actual needs cannot be fully met by the assistance
furnished under such programs.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.25 (West 1994).
316. See BuTLER & KONDRATAS, supra note 41, at 139 ('One of the assumptions un-
derlying AFDC was the idea that a mother has an important role to play in the upbring-
ing and socialization of her children."); Lurie, supra note 4, at 826-27 (discussing the
genesis of AFDC in the mother's pension movement of the Roosevelt era).
317. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-402(c) (Michie 1991) (excluding single moth-
ers from the statutory definition of "able-bodied individual').
318. The current proposals to revise federal relief programs WARA and PRA (see supra
note 74) are based in large part on the assumption that single women with children suffer
no incapacity to work outside the home. For a discussion of the targeting of "welfare
mothers" under the new federal initiatives, see Backer, supra note 42. Modem discourse
has treated the single mother, especially the mother who is single by choice, as the
source of poverty. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 279-89 (discussing how "welfare moth-
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But even in these restrictive states, a small amount of aid is
available to the potentially productive. This aid usually comes in
the form of short-term temporary emergency assistance." 9 Massa-
chusetts has two programs that provide emergency assistance, one
for families with children'e and one for the elderly and dis-
abled?2 Other states particularly target special groups of the
able-bodied for relief?'
b. Aid to Those Who Can (Ought to) Fend for Themselves
A large number of states provide some form of formalized
general assistance to the able-bodied unemployed who do not quali-
fy for categorical federal assistance. Twenty-one states impose on
local units of government some form of general obligation to aid
resident paupers.3" Six states provide broad general assistance
ers" are particularly singled out by government leaders and social commentators as being
responsible for their position); white, supra note 17, at 1965-67 (arguing that racism
plays a large part in perpetuating the "welfare-causes-poverty" myth).
319. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 503(h) (1985) ("Emergency monetary assistance, as
shall be granted under this chapter to any needy person who has insufficient income or
other resources to provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health,
shall be paid to such needy person only in the form of a check drawn upon the State.');
HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-53(e) (1985 & Supp. 1992) ("Any recipient may petition the
department for additional assistance when the recipient's need is due to emergencies
•.. .D; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2107(b) (1992) ("[Ain applicant in immediate need of
general assistance for himself or a person dependent upon him shall be granted general
assistance on an emergency basis .... '); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-58.1 (Mlchie 1995)
("In emergency situations or in the event of delay or error in a state issuance of checks
for payments for assistance .- . , to eligible recipients, cost of foster care, or expendi-
tures for administration and services, emergency payments shall be issued by local boards
320. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. cl. 18, § 2(D) (West 1994) ("The department shall
administer a program of emergency assistance to needy families with children and preg-
nant women with no other children . ., to provide benefits to avoid destitution or to
provide living arrangements in a home.").
321. See id. at ch. 117A, § 1 ("There is hereby established within the department of
public welfare a program of emergency aid for elderly and disabled residents of the com-
monwealth found by the department to be eligible for such aid.").
322. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-281a(c) (West 1992) (determining that a
person "who is needed to care for a child under two years of age," for example, is con-
sidered unemployable).
323. See ALA. CODE § 38 (1992 & Supp. 1994); CAL. WEu.F. & INST. CODE § 17000
(West 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-12-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 23, paras. 6-I, 12-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-1-1 (West 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.381 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4307 (West
1992); MINN. STAT. § 256D.01 (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-31-1 (1993); NED.
REV. STAT. § 68-132 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.010 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
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coverage through state programs.?4 One state appears to have
both state and local poor relief programs available to the able-bod-
ied?'a
Elsewhere, however, supporting the able-bodied is not obligato-
ry. Thus, seven states rely on local units of government (primarily
counties) which are permitted, but not required, to create and fund
programs of general assistance for all of the poor, including the
able-bodied?' Of these, it can be argued that only Arizonal
Colorado,' and Utah,3  provide any assistance to the able-bod-
§ 165:1-a (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-109 (West 1993); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAW
§ 62 (McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-01 (1989 & Supp. 1995); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§ 31, 32 (West 1991); RJ. GEN. LAWS. § 40-5-1 (1990); S.D. CoD-
nuom LAws ANN. § 28-13-1.1 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.02(1M) (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994).
324. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25 (1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-401 (Michie 1991);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-7,-103 (Kanwork Program), -709(d)(A) (1993); KY. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 205.200 (Baldwin 1991); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §§ 65A(a), 65B (1991) (di-
recting the social services administration to create assistance programs); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, §§ 401-1148 (1968 & Supp. 1995).
325. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §§ 26.10, 31-32 (West 1991) (noting that the County
commissioner, as overseer of the poor, has a duty to insure that all poor persons in the
county am cared for so long as they remain a county charge).
326. See ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-136 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (empowering the State
Department of Public Welfare to create work projects for the needy, able-bodied, and
unemployed); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 30-17-102 (1989) ("Each county may provide tempo-
rary general assistance to the poor who reside in the county or to transients.") (emphasis
added); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 125.01(e) (West 1993) ("The legislative and governing body
of a county shall have the power to ... [p]rovide... health and welfare programs.")
(emphasis added); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 205.580-.850 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1995) (plac-
ing responsibility on the counties for the poor who are not able-bodied, then allowing
different classes of counties to help the able-bodied at their discretion through establish-
ment of welfare boards); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-62 (1991 & Supp. 1995) ("The county
legislative body may, if they deem it necessary and expedient to do so, . . assess and
levy a tax for... (t]he care, maintenance and relief of the indigent sick or dependant
poor persons [and] t]he temporary relief of indigent persons not having a lawful settle-
ment in the county . ... ") (emphasis added); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2691 (1992)
(stating that towns may appropriate money to social service programs which provide assis-
tance to people requiring employment to eliminate their need for public assistance); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-106 (Michle 1995) ("If a local board has exercised its option to estab-
lish a program of general relief, a person shall be eligible for such components of the
general relief program as the locality chooses to provide if he is in need of general re-
lief').
327. See AR17. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-136 (1988) (empowering the state Department of
Public Welfare to create work projects for the needy, able-bodied unemployed).
328. Each county can provide financial assistance to single employable persons on a
case-by-case basis. However, these county programs serve a small number of people be-
cause of the limited availability of funds. The 10 largest counties in Colorado do provide
some kind of temporary assistance to single employable persons. Telephone Interview with
Joan Baldwin, AFDC Specialist, Colorado State Board of Social Services (Aug. 12, 1992).
329. In Utah, the Office of Family Support offers a state-administered "Emergency Work
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led.
The fact that the programs exist does not mean that they are
generous. Indeed, the general theory would suggest the opposite.
Some programs are breathtakingly miserly in the aid offered, pro-
viding little more than temporary or emergency assistance to the
able-bodied. Some states offer temporary assistance to the able-
bodied," ° with payments capped at a stated amount,331 or limit-
ed to a single payment during any twelve-month period.' Some
states limit assistance to the alleviation of life-threatening circum-
stances,33 or to relieve immediate suffering,334 or for emergency
situations? 3 True to the static vision of productivity, this tempo-
Program" for single employable persons. In return for a biweekly payment, an applicant is
required to search for employment or perform public service work for 40 hours per week.
Telephone Interview with Kristi Carlson, Program Specialist for the Office of Family
Support (Aug. 11, 1992).
330. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-13-38 (1992):
Whenever any person entitled to temporary relief as a poor person shall be in
any county in which he has not established residency, the commissioners there-
of may, if the same is deemed advisable, grant such relief by providing the
same relief as is customary in cases where persons have established residency
in the state and county.
331. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.250 (1990) ("Mhe needy person may receive
temporary assistance in the form and *amount which the department considers necessary.
Temporary assistance for needs other than transportation and medical care may not exceed
$120 per person per month:).
332. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, par. 5 (Smith-Hurd 1993):
[When an applicant resides in the local governmental unit in which he makes
application, emergency financial assistance to alleviate life-threatening circum-
stances or to assist the individual in attaining self-sufficiency may be given to
or in behalf of the applicant . . . Emergency assistance shall not be granted
under this Section more than once to any applicant during any 12 consecutive
month period.
333. See, e.g., id.
334. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 12-14-23-4 (West 1994) ("Mh components of a
community-action program shall be designed to assist participants, including the poor and
near poor, persons with disabilities, farmworkers, the elderly, and youth.. . to...
[o]btain emergency assistance through loans or grants to meet immediate and urgent indi-
vidual and family needs:).
335. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205.810(l) (Baldwin 1991) ("There is created
within the cabinet a crisis oriented program for emergencies which shall provide money
payments to individuals who meet standards promulgated by the secretary."); TaX. HUM.
RES. CODE ANN. § 34.003(a) (West 1990) (establishing a "temporary emergency relief
fund with state and local funds, and in cooperation with other public entities and nonprof-
it organizations," in meeting the needs of individuals and families for temporary emergen-
cy relief); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2107(b) (1992) ("[A]n applicant in immediate need
of general assistance for himself or a person dependent upon him shall be granted general
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rary relief is sometimes made available in the form of employ-
mentY For long-term aid, presumably, the comfort of a pay-
check is suggested.
Where do the people for whom state aid is unavailable turn
when they need aid? The general theory suggests that static sys-
tems should tend to favor at least passive reliance on non-govern-
mental aid, primarily in the form of charity, to supplement govern-
mental programs of poor relief, the idea being that if the state is
unable to meet the need, the populace will rise up of its own
volition and fill the void 3' Some states, such as California,3
assistance on an emergency basis."); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-58.1 (Michie 1995) ("In
emergency situations or in the event of delay or error in a state issuance of checks for
payments for assistance . .. to eligible recipients, cost of foster care or expenditures for
administration and services, emergency payments shall be issued.").
336. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 26.7 (West 1991) ("The Oklahoma Emer-
gency Relief Board may provide temporary relief employment to destitute but able-bodied
persons not otherwise cared for by the federal government, state or county agencies, pub-
lic or private charity organizations or institutions:").
337. And states are quite right to see private charitable endeavors as a viable substitute
for formal governmental programs. For instance, the Gallup Organization reported to Inde'-
pendent Sector (a private group that promotes charity and volunteer work) that while
charitable donations had decreased from prior years' levels, in one study both
volunteerism and donations remained at high levels. Thus, a "national Gallup poll of
2,671 people shows 72% of U.S. households made donations last year [1991], compared
to 75% in 1989. Average annual contributions dropped from $978 in 1989 to $899 last
year." Anita Manning, Charitable Spirit Survives Hard Tunes, USA TODAY, Oct. 16,
1992, at DI; W. Dole Nelson, Charitable Donations Down, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 16,
1992, at ClO. Giving isn't limited, of course, to donations. The survey also reported that
51% of those surveyed also did some volunteer work, down from 54% in 1989. Id. How-
ever, the average numbers of hours worked by volunteers also increased slightly, averag-
ing 4.2 hours per week. Id. Whatever the weakness of the numbers presented by the
Independent Sector Gallup survey, what is apparent is that, to a substantial extent, private
charitable giving is a significant part of the manner in which our society maintains the
poor.
Whether private charitable giving is efficient or whether it best accomplishes its
purposes is, however, problematic. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable
Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1988) (surveying the prevalent "subsidy"
and "equity" theories for such a deduction); A. Kay B. Roska, Comment, Nonprofit Hos-
pitals: The Relationship Between Charitable Tax Exemptions and Medical Care For
Indigents, 43 Sw. L. 759 (1990) (considering whether private nonprofit hospitals which
no longer serve the sick poor should receive tax breaks); Christopher EFley, Jr., Season's
Seethings: I Am Not a Point of Light, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at 26 (arguing that
government aid is more efficient than individualized charity).
338. CAL. W.EL. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) ("Every county and every city
and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons ... when
such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own
means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions') (emphasis added).
County general assistance "is a program of last resort for indigent and disabled persons
unable to qualify for other kinds of public benefits:' Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.
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formally proclaim this aim in their statutes, providing aid for those
indigent not relieved by other means, including, but not limited to
private institutions. Other states, such as Texas, formally proclaim
that the reason for the provision of state aid is to supplement pri-
vate charitable efforts and local government programs in times of
special economic dislocation."9 Several states have implemented
formal or informal procedures for referring ineligible applicants to
local charitable organizations."4 Other jurisdictions, embodying an
extreme form of the passivity characteristic of the paradigm, merely
provide for the maintenance of "safe" zones for the homeless popu-
lation?"
In addition, almost every state has enacted programs of tempo-
rary or emergency relief. Many states currently have a variety of
emergency and temporary assistance programs0 2  Most of these
kinds of programs have now been targeted to the homeless, and
consist primarily of providing a little cash, overnight shelter, some
food, and perhaps some clothing. The District of Columbia has an
"Emergency Shelter Family Services Program.'' 3 The program
provides for emergency shelter family housing units for homeless
families with minor children?' Indiana permits a township trustee
to provide shelter for families needing temporary housing assistance
as part of a temporary emergency assistance program?"5 The New
Rptr. 716, 719 (Ct. App. 1986).
339. In Texas, the legislature specifically found that "local governments and non-profit
service organizations are unable to meet the increased financial burden caused by [eco-
nomic and demographic changes creating rapid increases in the number of needy and
homeless persons] in various areas of the state:' Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arL
34.001(a)(2) (West 1971 & Supp. 1993). This in turn required the state to provide some
money in addition to that already available through local and private charitable organiza-
tions.
340. Thus, for instance, the Tulsa, Oklahoma office of the Department of Human Ser-
vices routinely refers the ineligible to local charities for assistance. Interview with Toni
Wilson, Tulsa Department of Human Services, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Oct. 12, 1992).
341. Thus, Florida, which provides no aid for the able-bodied indigent population (other
than mothers with small children through the AFDC program), may not evict the home-
less from sheltered areas, public parks or streets, because doing so deprives them of mini-
mal safety and cover from the elements. See Pottinger v. City of Miani, 810 F. Supp.
1551, 1580 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (declaring unconstitutional Miami's practice of arresting
homeless individuals and seizing their property).
342. See infra text accompanying notes 460-67.
343. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.3 (1981). For an analysis of the District of Columbia's
efforts, see Frank R. Trinity, Shutting the Shelter Doors: Homeless Families in the
Nation's Capital, 23 STErSON L. REv. 401 (1994).
344. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.3 (1981).
345. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-21-1 to 12-1-21-9 (West 1994).
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York legislature created a special fund to help provide housing to
the state's large homeless population.' The state funds programs
sponsored by non-profit corporations, charitable organizations, pub-
lic corporations, and municipalities that "will expand and improve
the supply of shelter and other housing arrangements for homeless
persons." The state finances the programs by grants, loans, or
loan guarantees?' Connecticut provides a maximum of one hun-
dred days of emergency housing assistance for homeless fami-
lies. 49 Some municipalities have also implemented either formal
or informal programs of temporary emergency aid to the destitute,
providing enough cash or in-kind help to tide people over until re-
lief applications are processed or private charitable aid is pro-
cured?"°
For most of the able-bodied unemployed who are qualified for
neither general assistance nor federal categorical aid programs, such
temporary or emergency assistance provides an insignificant amount
of aid. Some programs of temporary or emergency assistance pro-
vide a small amount of cash or vouchers to individuals in
need s" Some programs provide housing and food for a short pe-
riod of time.?52 Perhaps more honestly reflecting a jurisdiction's
sense of the worthiness of the able-bodied who do not work, some
346. N.Y. Soc. SE v. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1992).
347. Id.
348. Id. § 43(3).
349. The Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance regulations which establish
temporary housing assistance rules were unsuccessfully challenged when the period during
which aid was provided was reduced to 100 days. Savage v. Aronson, 571 A.2d 696
(Conn. 1990). In Savage, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a lower court determi-
nation that the state AFDC rules required the state to support dependent children and their
caregivers in a home, and that the emergency shelters were "home." Id. at 698-99. For a
brief discussion of the necessity of meeting the immediate needs of the homeless in the
context of Savage, see Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 387 (1991).
350. In New York City, emergency cash aid is available to applicants who say they
have no money to buy food. See Welfare Applicants Who Claim Dire Need Get Emergen-
cy Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1986, at 50. In Tulsa, Oklahoma, caseworkers have set
up a food larder for what they consider extreme emergency conditions. In addition, that
office will give food stamps to applicants who qualify for funds. Interview with Toni
Wilson, Tulsa Department of Human Services, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Oct. 12, 1992).
351. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.250 (1990); DEE CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 503(h) (1985);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-53(e) (1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 6-10
(Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.810(1) (Baldwin 1991); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-58.1 (Michie 1995).
352. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 18, § 2(d) (West 1994); TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN.
§ 34.003(b) (West 1990).
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state programs assist in paying part of the transportation to the
state's border 53 Recently, the courts have also begun to get more
actively involved, requiring the state or locality to provide certain
services to the homeless or other qualifying poor 54
The structure of state and local general assistance programs
evidence a strong allegiance to the notion that relief must foster
societal work norms. In the case of state and local general assis-
tance programs, these incentives to conform to work expectations
come in the form of work requirements and the punishment of
"anti-social" behavior. "The philosophy here is unromantic: get a
job, any job, even a low-paying, unpleasant job."3"5 Thus, states
may require, as a condition to the granting of relief, that the able-
bodied pauper register for and participate in state work or work
search programs, or register with the state or local employment
office,356 or accept work offered by the state,' or actively seek
353. MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-201(4) (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2107(b)
(1992).
354. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (declaring as
unconstitutional the city's practice of arresting homeless persons and seizing their property
based upon the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments). Trinity, supra note 343, at 412-26
(describing litigation under the District of Columbia's Emergency Shelter for Families
Program).
355. de Parle, supra note 57, at 14; see Eva Donovan, Reform of Welfare System is in
the Best Interests of All, Burs. NEws, May 2, 1993, at 8 (editorial) (equating positive
welfare reform with increases in recipient productivity).
356. ALA. CODE § 38-1IA-4 (1992 & Supp. 1994) ("Every applicant for and recipient
of public assistance, except those exempted by federal law or regulation, shall be required
to register and participate in programs and activities of the Alabama welfare employment
program."); IDAHO CODE § 31-3404 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("Applicants and all household
members who are not fully employed and are capable of employment, shall be required to
file an application with the department of employment."); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-13-
1(1) (West 1994) ("A township trustee may, with the approval of the township board...
conduct for poor relief recipients in the township rehabilitation, training, retraining, and
work programs.); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205-200(7)(a) (Baldwin 1991) ("No person
shall be eligible for public assistance payments if . . . he refuses without good cause to
register for employment with the state employment service."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 4316-A(1)(B) (West 1992) ("An applicant is ineligible for assistance . . . if any
municipality establishes that the applicant, without just cause refuses to register for
work.); MD. CODE ANN., Soc. SElv. § 8A-17A-I(a) (1992) ("General public assistance
benefits shall not be given to an employable person who has not registered with the local
office of employment security:; MIcH. CoP. LAWS ANN. § 400.55a(1)(d) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1995) ("In determining the eligibility of an applicant for general assistance, and
before granting the assistance . . . the county and district departments of social services
shall ... require an employable person to work on a work relief or work training pro-
ject, or other departmental-approved activity, if available, in return for assistance given.');
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.051(3) (West 1994) ("In order to receive work readiness assis-
tance, a registrant shall cooperate with the county agency in all aspects of the work readi-
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work.358 States are not loathe to actually make use of the work
ness program, accept any suitable employment, including employment offered through the
job training partnership act, an other employment and training options, and participate in
work readiness activities... ."); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-303(a) (1994) ("As a condi-
tion of eligibility for general relief assistance, an employable recipient must register for
employment with the department of labor and industry."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1
(1968 & Supp. 1995) ("Trior to the authorization of assistance, every individual shall
register in accordance with regulations of the department for employment, training and
manpower services").
357. CAi_ WELF. & INsT. CoDE § 17200 (West 1991) ("Work may be required of an
indigent, who is eligible to receive benefits ... and who is not incapacitated by reason
of age, disease, or accident, as a condition of relief."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
281a (West 1992) ("fEimployable persons otherwise eligible for support... from any
town shall be required to perform such work or participate in such program as may be
assigned to them by the public welfare official of the town granting such support
.... "); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(B)(3) (1993) ("jTMhe secretary shall adopt rules
and regulations which establish community work experience program requirements for
eligibility for the receipt of general assistance in any form and which establish penalties
to be imposed when a work assignment under a community work experience program re-
quirement is not completed without good cause."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205.200(7)
(Baldwin 1991) ("No person shall be eligible for public assistance payments if. . .. he
refuses without good cause .. to accept suitable employment."); MF. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 4316-A (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) ("An applicant is ineligible for assistance
for 120 days . . . when any municipality establishes that the applicant without just
cause ... refuses to accept a suitable job offer under this section; refuses to perform or,
willfully fails to perform a job assigned ... •"). MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, §§ 17A1-2
(1991) ("Local social services offices shall give an assignment to unemployed employable
persons receiving general public assistance to employables. General public assistance bene-
fits shall not be given to an employable person who has ... refused after job counseling
to accept a suitable placement."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.31 (1994) ("If a person
who is receiving support. . . is physically able to work, the overseer of public welfare
... may require the person receiving aid to work for the town or city at any job which
it has available that is within the capacity of the person receiving support."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 56, § 27.3 (West 1991):
[A] government agency may enter into an agreement with the Department of
Public Welfare wherein and whereby the Department of Public Welfare may
assign unemployed employable persons who have attained the age of sixteen
(16) and who are eligible for assistance to do and perform work and labor on
behalf of said [government agency] and such person shall perform, if available,
work and labor for such [government agency] for the length of time necessary
to earn at the legal minimum wage or the going hourly rate prevailing in the
area for labor of like "idnd, whichever is higher, an amount of money equal to
the amount of assistance granted to such person and the assistance unit of
which he or his dependents is a part.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(c) (1968 & Supp. 1995) ("No person registered ...
shall refuse to accept a bona fide offer of employment or training.").
358. COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-17-103(3) (1989) ("The board of county commission-
ers ... may require that any applicant for temporary general assistance shall search for
employment and accept employment that is offered and shall also enroll with the division
of employment and training in order to be eligible to receive temporary general assis-
tance"); N.. C o CODE § 50-01-17 (1989):
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requirement provisions of general assistance. For instance, towns in
New Hampshire have adopted a program called the "Welfare Work
Program." The program requires recipients of aid to work for four
hours per day, five days per week. Recipients are assigned to vari-
ous jobs around town, such as washing police cars or helping the
county clerk's office with voter registration.359 Alameda County,
California, was considering requiring general assistance recipients to
work cleaning parks, painting, or doing other public works
jobs.?'e Poor relief programs are structured so that the failure of
the able-bodied to comply with requirements to work, apply for
work, or enroll in certain job training or other educational or voca-
tional training, can lead to the diminution or termination of bene-
fits.36"' Federal programs have been subject to the same incentive,
to tie work-attaining performance to benefits.36 And the recent
Mhe county social service board of the county in which such poor person is a
resident shall insist that those able to labor shall seek employment and such
board shall refuse to furnish any aid until it is satisfied that the person claim-
ing help is endeavoring to find work for himself. The board shall make all
possible effort to secure, for an able-bodied person claiming poor relief, em-
ployment in the county where he resides and may call upon residents of the
county to aid it in finding work for such person.
359. Telephone Interview with Joan Callahan, Welfare Administrator for the Concord
Welfare Administration, Concord, New Hampshire (Aug. 31, 1992).
360. Judy Ronnigen, Part-Time Jobs Proposed For Welfare Recipients: Alameda County
Supervisors Must OK It, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1992, at A20.
361. See IDAHo CODE § 31-3404(4) (1983 & Supp. 1995) ('Individuals voluntarily
removing themselves from the work force may be denied assistance.'); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 39-709(d)(B)(3) (1993) ("[T]he secretary shall ... establish penalties to be imposed
when a work assignment under a community work experience program requirement is not
completed without good cause:); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.200(7) (Baldwin 1991)
("No person shall be eligible for public assistance payments if... he refuses without
good cause to register for employment with the state employment service, to accept suit-
able training, or to accept suitable employment."); MD. CODE ANN., SOC. SERv. § 88A-
17A1,2 (1992) ("General public assistance benefits shall not be given to an employable
person who has not" complied with the applicable work or work registration require-
ments); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.051(3) (West 1994) ("The county agency may termi-
nate assistance to a registrant who falls to cooperate in the work readiness program.:);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-17 (1989) ("[S]uch board shall refuse to furnish any aid until
it is satisfied that the person claiming help is endeavoring to find work for himself.");
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(d) (1968 & Supp. 1995) ("Any person required to regis-
ter . .. who willfully fails to register or refuses a bona fide offer of employment or
training ... shall be ineligible for . ., assistance").
362. Thus, in Michigan, a welfare proposal called the Social Contract and Michigan
Opportunity and Skills Training Act is pending in the legislature and is to provide for
employment, job training, and education for welfare recipients. See MI S.B. 142, 87th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993). In return for public assistance, a recipient of assistance must
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change in administrations from a self-declared conservative to a
self-declared "liberal" one appears to have made no difference in
this respect."
The type of conduct required of recipients in return for aid is
not always limited to work. Many states increasingly require their
indigent population to act "responsibly," that is, to act in a manner
prescribed by statute or face reduced benefits. Thus, states now
require indigents to force their children to attend school,"6 to get
married and stay married,"s and to prevent additional pregnancies
while "on the dole."3
3. The Drive to Quarantine the Destitute: Separation, Isolation,
Self-Containment, Local Administration
Since any challenge to the social or economic status quo is
inconceivable, a politically successful system of state general assis-
tance will direct itself inward. The same notion will drive a suc-
cessful poor relief system to focus on directly manipulating the
target population rather than attempting the manipulation of the
participate for a minimum of 20 hours in employment, educational, and job training pro-
grams. Id. Failure to participate would result in a 2075 reduction of benefits or, in the
case of a parent receiving AFDC, payments on behalf of any dependant child would be
made to another person. Id.
363. In 1994, President Clinton proclaimed his intention to end welfare as presently
constituted. To that end he introduced his version of poor relief reform, WARA, which
was substantially ignored by Congress. Freed of its hyperbole, the Clinton Administration
proposed little more than greater incentives to find any job on pain of a reduction or
elimination of benefits. The new plan would have limited AFDC benefits for the able-
bodied to two years, create a national community service program for aid recipients un-
able to get a job after the expiration of their AFDC eligibility, and expand certain bene-
fits to the working poor. See Backer, supra note 42; PRoGREssIvE PoLIcy INsmruTE,
MANDATE FOR CHANGE 217-36 (Will Marshall & Martin Schram eds., 1993). The Re-
publican proposal, PRA, introduced in early 1995, adopted the same general approach. See
Backer, supra note 42.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
365. See, e.g., Isabel "Wlkerson, Wisconsin Welfare Plan: To Reward the Married, N.Y.
TMES, Feb. 12, 1991, at Al (discussing Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson's propos-
al to increase welfare payments to those who are married).
366. At the end of 1993, New Jersey was the only state which eliminated the increment
in benefits under AFDC for which a family would otherwise be eligible as a result of the
birth of a child during the time the recipient is on welfare. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:10:3.5
(West 1993). However, there were similar proposals awaiting approval in the legislatures
of Connecticut, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. See Conn. S.B.
143, Reg. Sess., (1993); Mo. H.B. 27, 87th Leg., 1st. Seas., (1993); Okla. H.B. 1492,
44th Leg., Ist Sess. (1993); Pa. H.B. 2580, 175th Legis., 1991-1992 Reg. Sess. (1991);
S.C. S.B. 308, Statewide Sess. (1993).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
system. It would be inconceivable for state general assistance pro-
grams to be constructed on the basis of any assumption acknowl-
edging that any aspect of the American socio-economic system
might well have given rise to the destitution causing the need for
state support in the first place. Consonant with this notion, there is
very little formal or informal connection between the state's poor
relief program and any other program, including, but not limited
to, its labor, commerce, health, or education programs. The link be-
tween general assistance is limited, where it exists at all, between
able-bodied paupers receiving aid and state employment offices, but
even this link is passive, requiring little more than registration and
some kind of minimal effort.36 Some states have begun to recog-
nize the lack of connectedness between programs, but take the
position that they are unable to effectively make any such connec-
tion. 65 The administrative unit, acting in virtual isolation, is thus
required to provide care and assistance for the indigent,369 and,
much as in the days of late Tudor England, to supervise the
poor 70
The state, then, is both purse-mistress and nanny to its incom-
petents and deviants. As nanny the state devotes a substantial
amount of resources to the segregation of these socio-economic
deviants. This isolation and separation is attested to by the separa-
tion between income transfers to those thought part of the produc-
367. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 31-3404(4) (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("Applicants and all
household members who are not fully employed and are capable of employment, shall be
required to file an application with the department of employment."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
305, para. 5/6-1.4 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring applicants to "register for and accept bona
fide offers of employment"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205.200(7)(a) (Baldwin 1991)
(stating that applicants must "register for employment with the state employment service");
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4316-A(1)(B) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (stating that
applicants must "register for work"); MD. CODE ANN., SOC. SERv. § 88A-17A1(a) (1992)
(requiring applicants to be "registered with the local office of employment security"); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(a) (1968 & Supp. 1995) ("IElvery individual shall regis-
ter ... for employment, training, and manpower services.").
368. NEW YORK TASK FoRcE, supra note 23.
369. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 62(1) (McKinney 1992) ("[Elach public welfare district
shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in
its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care... .;); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 56, § 32 (West 1991) ('he overseers of the poor in each county shall have the
oversight and care of all the poor persons in their county so long as they remain a coun-
ty charge, and shall see that they are properly relieved and taken care of.").
370. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-1 (1993) ("The general supervision of all pau-
pers is vested in the county governing authority."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-132 (1990)
('he county board of each county shall be the overseer of the poor and shall be vested
with the superintendence of the poor in such county:).
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tive mainstream and treated as an integrated part thereof, and the
"others." Members of the productive mainstream receive unemploy-
ment compensation, which is treated as an "earned" transfer. Devi-
ants are gifted poor relief. Productive people are thought only to
have temporarily lost a job. The productive will always be able to
obtain another one (even if it is not as good as the previous job)
because such people understand and conform to the static impera-
tive to work. They are treated as part of the labor force, temporari-
ly between jobs. Their status merits a special form of relief-short-
term unemployment "insurance."' This is a stigma-free form of
relief, earned and merited by those who work and intend to contin-
ue to do so?' In contrast, the able-bodied unemployed have
earned nothing. They are not the same kind of people. We do not
even count them, acknowledge that they exist, when we calculate
our rates of unemployment?' 3 These able-bodied do not merit un-
employment compensation; they are isolated, saved from utter
destitution and reconditioned to accept the consequences of the
prime static directive: GET A JOB.374
Self-containment can be increased by physical isolation. State
general assistance programs continue the millennia-old tradition of
administering and funding poor relief at the local level. Of the
states with general assistance provisions, twenty impose the admin-
istrative burden of general assistance on localities.75 Of these,
371. See LEMAN, supra note 3, at 43-46 (discussing unemployment insurance (Ul)).
372. "The objective of UI is to provide essential aid to workers during periods of
forced idleness. It is not viewed as an anti-poverty program, but as a protection earned
by the worker against joblessness" d. at 43.
373. The unemployment rate is estimated monthly through the Current Population Survey
of the Bureau of the Census. An "unemployed person" is defined as one who did not
work during the survey week, who made specific efforts to find a job within the past
four weeks, and who was available for work during the survey week, alternatively, one
could be considered "unemployed" if he were waiting to be called back to an old job or
report to a new one within 30 days. MURRAY, supra note 3, at 68 n.4.
374. Indeed, society tends to measure the success of even the most progressive state
experimentation with the poor relief apparatus in terms of the ability of the experiments
to induce the recipients of aid to get and maintain a job. See GUERoN & PAULY, supra
note 6, at 79-120 (discussing a number of current state experimental programs and dem-
onstration projects).
375. ALA. CONST. art IV, § 88; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-1 (1993); IDA-
HO CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-5-1 (West Supp.
1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.381 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.03(1) (West
1994); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-1 (1993); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-2-306 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 68-132 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.010 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1652 (1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-109 (West 1993); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 62(1)
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fourteen impose the primary administrative responsibility for the
maintenance of the poor on county governments.?
Five of the other seven jurisdictions impose the obligation on
towns in the Elizabethan manner.' New York imposes the obli-
(McKinney 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-02 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 32
(West 1991); R.I. GEM. LAWS § 40-5-1 (1990); S.D. CODItr LAWS ANN. § 28-13-1
(1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.02(1)(m) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
376. ALA. CONsr. art IV, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the legislature to require the
several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the
poor."); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) ("Every county and every city
and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons and those
incapacitated by age, disease, or accident . . . .); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-1 (1993)
('The general supervision of all paupers is vested in the county governing authority.");
IDAHo CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("The boards of county commissioners in
their respective counties shall ... evaluate the need and provide to indigent person(s)
nonmedical assistance... :); IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.381 (West 1994) ("The county
board shall administer general relief for the poor . .. ."); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 256D.03(1) (West 1994) ("General assistance shall be administered by the county agen-
cies."); MISs. CODE ANN. § 43-31-1 (1993) ("The board of supervisors of each county
shall have the jurisdiction and power necessary and proper for the relief and support of
the poor of its county."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-2-306 (1994) ("Except in a county that
has transferred its public assistance and protective services responsibilities to the state
under part 8 of this chapter, the county department of welfare shall be charged with the
local administration of all forms of public assistance operations in the county."); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 68-132 (1990) ("The county board of each county shall be the overseer of
the poor and shall be vested with the superintendence of the poor in such county."); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 428.010 (1989):
The boards of county commissioners of the several counties shall establish and
approve policies and standards, prescribe a uniform standard of eligibility, ap-
propriate money for this purpose and appoint agents who will develop regula-
tions and administer these programs to provide care, support and relief to the
poor, indigent, incompetent, and those incapacitated by age, disease or accident.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-02 (1989) ("The county social service board of each county
shall have exclusive jurisdiction and control of the administration of poor relief within the
county.'); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 32 (West 1991) ("The overseers of the poor in
each county shall have the oversight and care of all the poor persons in their county so
long as they remain a county charge, and shall see that they are properly relieved and
taken care of."); S.D. CODIFmD LAWS ANN. § 28-13-1 (1992) ("Every county shall relieve
and support all poor and indigent persons . . . ."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.02(1)(m) (West
1987 & Supp. 1994) ('Every county shall furnish general relief to all eligible dependant
persons within the county and shall establish or designate a general relief agency to ad-
minister general relief.").
377. CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992) ("Each person who has not estate
sufficient for his support, and has no relatives of sufficient ability who are obliged to
support him, shall be provided for and supported at the expense of the town in which he
resides."); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-5-1 (West 1994) ('The township trustee of each
township is the ex officio administrator of poor relief within the township"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 165.2 (1994) ("The administrator of town or city welfare in each town or
city shall administer general assistance to all persons who are eligible for such assis-
tance."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:8-109 (West 1993) ("IT]he administration [of public assis-
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gations on special units of local government-public welfare dis-
tricts.3" Only seven states have transferred all,' or a
portion,"se of the burden of administration to the state.
State general assistance systems also tend to favor a system of
local funding, that is funding at the county, city, or village level.
In the United States, funding obligations usually follow the assign-
ment of administrative responsibility38 Eighteen state general as-
sistance programs which impose administrative responsibilities at
the local level, also impose funding responsibility at the same lev-
el," although several states reimburse the locality for its expens-
tance] is primarily the duty of the municipalities . .2); R.L GEN. LAWS § 40-5-1
(1990) ("Every town shall be required to relieve and support all poor and indigent per-
sons.").
378. N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 62(1) (McKinney 1992) ("[Elach public welfare district
shall be responsible for the assistance and care of any person who resides or is found in
its territory and who is in need of public assistance and care").
379. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.170 (1990) ("The department [of Health and Social Servic-
es] shall decide whether the applicant is eligible for and should receive assistance, the
amount of assistance, the manner of paying or providing it, and the date on which assis-
tance shall begin."); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-201 (Michie 1991) ("The department [of
Human Services] shall administer or supervise all forms of public assistance including
general relief."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-708(c), (d) (1993) ("The secretary [of social and
rehabilitation services] shall supervise all social welfare activities of the intake offices and
area offices."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.200(2) (Baldwin 1991) ("The secretary [for
Human Services] shall, by administrative regulations, prescribe conditions of eligibility for
public assistance."); MD. CoDE ANN., SOC. SERV. § 88A-3(a) (1992) ("The State adminis-
tration shall be the central coordinating and directing agency of all social service and
public assistance activities in this State.'); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.14(2) (West
1988 & Supp. 1995) ("[A]ll powers and duties of the county social services boards to
develop, implement, and administer a program of general public relief are transferred to
the state department."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 403 (1968 & Supp. 1995) ('The depart-
ment [of Public Welfare] is responsible for maintaining uniformity in the administration of
public welfare, including general assistance, throughout the commonwealth.").
380. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.05 (Baldwin 1995) ('The department of human
services shall supervise and administer the general assistance program except that the
department may require county departments to perform any administrative function speci-
fied in the rules adopted by the department.").
381. The relationship between funding and administrative obligations holds even with
respect to federal categorical aid programs. Under such programs, the state and federal
governments share both funding and administrative (or control) obligations. For a discus-
sion of federal categorical aid programs, see, e.g., Lurie, supra note 4; JAMES T.
PATOERSON, AMERICA'S STRucGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1985, at 126-84 (2d ed.
1986).
382. See ALA. CODE § 38-8-1 (1992) ('The county commission of each county shall
have jurisdiction, power and authority necessary and proper for the relief and support of
the poor of its county ... and payment therefore shall be made out of county funds.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) ("Each person who has
not estate sufficient for his support, and has no relatives of sufficient ability who are
obliged to support him, shall be provided for and supported at the expense of the town
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es in whole or in part 83 Likewise, states that permit, but do not
in which he resides."); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-22-1 (West 1994) ('When preparing the
annual budget for a township, the township trustee and the township board shall set out
in the budget the amount of expenditures estimated to be reasonably required for current
poor relief in the following calendar year."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4307 (West
1992) ("Municipalities shall provide general assistance to all eligible persons at the ex-
pense of that municipality."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-15 (1993) ('The board of super-
visors shall annually assess and cause to be collected by the tax collector, and paid into
the general fund of the county treasury, such tax as may be necessary for the support of
the poor of the county."); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 53-2-321 (1994) ("The board of county
commissioners has jurisdiction and power . . . to provide for the care and maintenance of
the indigent sick or the otherwise dependent poor of the county; and for said purposes to
levy and collect annually a tax."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-131 (1990) ("Mhen the poor
person shall receive such relief. . . out of the treasury of the county in which he or she
has legal settlement at the time of applying for assistance"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 428.010
(1989) ('To the extent that money may be lawfully appropriated by the board of county
commissioners for this purpose ... every county shall provide care, support and relief to
the poor, indigent, incompetent and those incapacitated by age, disease or accident.");
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 165.2a (1994) ('The financial responsibility for general assis-
tance for assisted persons shall be the responsibility of the town or city in which the
person maling the application resides."); N.Y. Soc. SsttV. LAw § 69 (McKinney 1992)
('The responsibility for the administration of public assistance and care in a county public
welfare district and the expense thereof may either be borne by the county public welfare
district or be divided between such district and the towns and cities therein:).
In the manner of the Elizabethan Poor Law from which these statutes were directly
derived, a number of jurisdictions continue to indirectly impose on localities the obligation
to pay for the maintenance of the poor. See CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 17000 (West
1991) ("Every county and every city shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indi-
gent persons, and those incapacitate by age, disease or accident... :); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 36-12-1 (1993) ('The general supervision of all paupers is vested in the county govern-
ing authority."); IDAHO CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("[The boards of county
commissioners in their respective counties shall ... evaluate the need and provide to
indigent person(s) nonmedical assistance. For the purposes of funding nonmedical services
for indigent persons, boards of county commissioners are authorized to levy an ad valo-
rem tax:); IOWA CODE ANN. § 331.381 (West 1994) ("The board of supervisors of each
county shall provide relief of poor persons in its county ... ."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
56, § 33 (West 1991) ('Every county shall relieve.and support all poor and indigent per-
sons lawfully settled therein . . . 2); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-5-1 (1990) ('Every town shall
be required to relieve and support all poor and indigent persons lawfully settled therein,
whenever they shall stand in need of relief and support ...2") (Rhode Island has a
state-funded and administered public assistance program in addition to the support pro-
vided by towns.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-13-1 (1992) ("Each board of county
commissioners may raise money by taxation for the support and employment of the
poor.'); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2351(6) (West 1971 & Supp. 1993) ("Each com-
missioners court shall provide for the support of paupers, residents of their county, who
are unable to support themselves.").
383. Although the duty of administration and funding general relief programs is usually
upon counties, there are a few states where the programs are administered by the coun-
ties, but the state partially or fully funds them. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5112-
4.8 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ('[The Illinois Department of Public Aid shall] supervise the ad-
ministration of General Assistance under Article VI by local governmental units receiving
State funds."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256.051(6) (West 1994) ("The commissioner [of
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compel a local unit of government (usually a county) to create a
general assistance system, also require that county to fund whatever
system is created?84
Other states have set up alternative funding arrangements.
Among the most popular of these alternatives is full or partial state
funding of the poor law obligation. Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, and Ohio are states in which the state admin-
isters and funds general relief programs?8 Alaska and Pennsylva-
Human Services] shall reimburse 92% of county agency expenditures for providing work
readiness services including direct participation expenses and administrative costs."); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 44:8-109 (West 1993) ("W]unding of such public assistance is the responsi-
bility of the State and the administration is primarily the duty of the municipalities:);
N.D. CENT. CoDE § 50-01-09.2 (1989) ("Within limits of legislative appropriations, the
department of human services shall allocate and distribute to each county social service
board a proportionate share of funds appropriated for the purpose of assisting county
social service boards in the furnishing of poor relief."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.035(I)(d)
(West 1987 & Supp. 1994) ("The department [of social services] shall reimburse . . . a
county for up to 37.5% of the eligible costs paid by the general relief agency for general
relief....').
384. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-17-105 (1989) ("Each board of county commissioners,
upon its determination to undertake a temporary general assistance program, shall establish
a temporary general assistance account for the purpose of providing money . . . for the
temporary general assistance program in the county; and each board shall appropriate
money for such account for such purpose."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.610 (Vernon 1983)
("The county court of each county ... shall from time to time, and as often and for as
long a time as may be necessary, provide, at the expenses of the county, for the relief,
maintenance and support of such persons.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-62 (1991) ("The
board of county commissioners may, if they deem it necessary and expedient so to do,.
. assess and levy a tax for.., the care, maintenance and relief of the indigent sick or
dependent poor persons."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2691 (1992) ('At a meeting duly
warned for that purpose, a town or incorporated village may appropriate such sums of
money as it deems necessary for the support of social service programs and facilities
within that town for its residence."); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-120 (Michie 1995) ("Assis-
tance shall be paid to or on behalf of the applicant monthly, . . .by the treasurer [or]
the district fiscal officer, . . . from funds appropriated or made available for such purpose
by the board of supervisors, council or other governing body of such county or city.').
Florida imposes the county funding obligation indirectly. See F.A. STAT. ANN. § 125.01
(West 1993) ("The legislative and governing body of a county shall have the power
to ... provide ... welfare programs:).
385. ARc. CODE ANN. § 20-76-406 (Michie 1991) ("In the event any applicant is found
eligible for benefits under the present law, the applicant's case shall be certified immedi-
ately to the deputy director. . . who in turn must cause a voucher to be issued without
delay for the amount allowed the applicant."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-708c(o) (1993) ("All
moneys and property of any kind whatsoever received from the Kansas emergency relief
committee or from any other state department or political subdivision of the state shall be
used by the secretary in the administration and promotion of social welfare in the state of
Kansas."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 205240 (Baldwin 1991) ("All money appropriated by
this state ... are hereby appropriated and shall be available to the secretary for expendi-
ture consistent with the provisions of this chapter... . '); MD. CODE ANN., SOc. SEv.
§ 88-65A(a) (1992) ('he Social Services Administration shall promptly establish, imple-
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nia impose the funding obligation for state-administered general
assistance upon the state indirectly.38 Another alternative to coun-
ty funding of general assistance programs is complete or partial
state funding or reimbursement of county administered general
relief programs. For example, New Jersey's state government is
responsible for the funding of general public assistance programs
even though counties are responsible for its administration.3  In
Illinois, some local units of government fully fund the general
assistance program. However, there are local units of government
that receive state funding for the general assistance program and
are subject to the supervision of the Illinois Department of Aid.388
Minnesota and North Dakota partially reimburse the counties for
the costs of their general assistance programs.8 9
The isolation and separation of this group shows up in other
ways as well. Some states have preserved the old Tudor-Stuart
laws of settlement in addition to criminal proscriptions against
ment and modify as necessary a program of State funded assistance payments .. .");
MtcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.18(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) ("[A]ll expenditures for
a program of general public relief shall be appropriated from the general revenues of the
state."); OHZO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03(B) (Baldwin 1995) ("The department of human
services shall establish mandatory financial assistance payment amounts based upon state
appropriations.").
386. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.170 (1990) ("Upon the completion of its investigation,
the department shall decide whether the applicant is eligible for and should receive assis-
tance ... , the amount of assistance, the manner of payment or providing it and the date
on which assistance shall begin."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 205 (1968 & Supp. 1995)
("On the basis of formulae which include public or voluntary support, the department [of
public welfare] shall have the power to disburse Federal and State funds, appropriate for
the purpose, as grants and subsidies to programs in fields in which the department has
the responsibility if they meet the department's standards.").
387. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44-8-109 (West 1993) ("[Ihe funding of such public assis-
tance is the responsibility of the state and the administration is primarily the duty of the
municipalities?3.
388. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5112-3 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("As provided in
Article VI [general assistance], local governmental units shall provide the funds for and
administer the programs provided in that Article subject, where so provided, to the super-
vision of the Illinois Department."); Id. para. 5112-4.8 ("[The Illinois Department of Aid
shall] supervise the administration of General Assistance under Article VI [general assis-
tance] by local governmental units receiving State funds for the purposes of such Arti-
cle:).
389. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 265D.051(6) (West 1994) ("The commissioner [of human
services] shall reimburse 92% of county agency expenditures for providing work readiness
services including direct participation expenses and administrative costs."); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-01-09.2 (1989) ("Within the limits of legislative appropriations, the department
of human services shall allocate and distribute to each county social service board a pro-
portionate share of funds appropriated for the purpose of assisting county social services
boards in the furnishing of poor relief.").
19951 MEDIEVAL POOR LAW 991
vagranoy.39 More particularly, localities have begun to cope with
migrations of the destitute by imposing residency limitations. These
migrations are most acute between suburbs and adjoining urban ar-
eas and where large urban areas are located next to state borders,
for example places like Chicago (Indiana and Wisconsin), St. Louis
(Illinois), Philadelphia (New Jersey and Delaware), and New Or-
leans (Mississippi)?9 Related to the concept of vagrancy, state
systems of poor relief are increasingly resurrecting a modified
notion of the principal of settlement, primarily by limiting the
amount a state must pay indigents who move from other states to
no more than the amount received in the state of prior residence, if
that amount is smaller than that offered by the state of new resi-
dence23
390. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-27 (1993) (empowering county Boards of
Supervisors, by action of a constable, to prevent "the poor from strolling from one district
to another" and to "remove the pauper back to the county from which he came:); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-01-14 (1989) (stating that counties may not give aid to any person
who is not a resident of the county except for attempts to provide some sort of labor);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.015(1)(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (legislating that if a depen-
dent person is to be eligible for general relief, the person must have resided in the state
for 60 consecutive days before applying for aid, be born in the state, or have resided in
the state for 365 days in the past, or come to the state to join a close relative who has
resided in the state for 180 days upon the applicant's arrival or have come into the state
to accept an offer of employment).
In some jurisdictions, however, settlement laws are now being used not to deny
benefits, but to allocate inter-county fiscal responsibility for the maintenance of the poor.
See, e.g., Derry v. County of Rockinham, 14 A. 866 (N.H. 1888) (holding that a county
must support a poor person who cannot provide for his own support even if the person
does not have settlement in the county).
391. See MICHAEL LANG, HoMELSsNss AMnD AFFLuENc STRUCrUR AND PAR-ADox
IN THE AMIuCAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 145 (1989) (describing the practice of suburbs to
ship their vagrant populations to municipalities which provide services for the destitute).
For a description of the patterns of migration between Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and
Camden, New Jersey, see Fullen, supra note 25, at 122-24 (describing also the practice
by Atlantic City, New Jersey police of purchasing one-way bus tickets to Philadelphia for
losing gamblers and unemployed casino workers picked up for hitchhiking).
392. Prior to 1969, states freely imposed direct residency requirements as a condition of
eligibility. Thus, typically, proven residence of anywhere from six months to more than a
year was necessary in order to become eligible for assistance of any type. The Supreme
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), ruled this practice was unconstitu-
tional as an impermissible interference with the federal constitutional right to travel. Over
the last several years, several states have proposed or imposed a rule permitting state
assistance administrators to pay new resident recipients no more than the amount that they
had received in the state of prior residence. To the extent that this rule applies to federal-
ly assisted aid programs, states have been able to secure waivers from federal rules in
order to implement the plan. See Wisconsin Welfare: Second Federal Waiver Approved,
AMEUCAN POLrr-cAL NTWORK, INC. (the "Hotline"), July 28, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current file. See also Green v. Anderson, 26 F.3d 95 (9th Cir. 1994),
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4. The Right to Relief, the Right to a Specific Form of Relief
Many state poor relief statutes provide explicitly that the eradi-
cation of poverty is, indeed, the primary goal of such systems?'
These "feel-good" sentiments bear little relationship to the actual
purposes of the poor relief system-minimal provision for those
who cannot fend for themselves, and grudging provision for those
who ought to fend for themselves 94 Whether we call this mini-
mal provision (coupled with a "boot" in the pants for the able-
bodied) a right, or a privilege, whether we enshrine the obligation
in our constitutions or relegate it to municipal codes, the system
implemented will be substantially unaffected.
Indeed, there exists some variation among the states as to the
source of the obligation to maintain the poor. Three states have
held that the right to maintenance is guaranteed by their respective
state constitutions.395 Of the remaining states, all provide that, to
judgment vacated 115 S. Ct. 1059 (1995) (no jusfifiable controversy because case not
ripe) (California unsuccessfully sought to impose a provision which permitted state AFDC
payments for new residents to equal but not exceed that of the state of prior residence on
right to travel grounds).
393. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 10000 (West 1991):
The purpose of this division is to provide for protection, care and assistance to
the people of the state in need thereof, and to promote the welfare and happi-
ness of all of the people of the state by providing appropriate aid and services
to all of its needy and distressed. . . Such aid shall be [provided] as to en-
courage self-respect, self-reliance, and the desire to be a good citizen, useful to
society.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-102 (1989) ("It is the purpose of this article ... to assist
[needy] individuals and families to attain or retain their capabilities for independence, self-
care, and self-support .... "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 501 (1985) (declaring purpose
is to: "promote the welfare and happiness of all of the people of this State by providing
public assistance to all of its needy, unemployable and distressed . . . in such a way and
manner as to encourage self-respect, self-dependency and the desire to be a good citizen
and useful to society"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.01(1) (West 1994) C'The objectives of
[general assistance] are to provide work readiness services to help employable and poten-
ially employable persons prepare for and attain self-sufficiency and obtain permanent
work."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 401 (1968 & Supp. 1995) ("[A]ssistance shall be
administered in such a way and manner as to encourage self-respect, self-dependency and
the desire to be a good citizen and useful to society."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-9-101
(1991) ("Applicants and recipients . . . shall be encouraged and assisted to achieve eco-
nomic independence and self-sufficiency."). Although the issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, state general assistance systems seem less than effective in meeting such lofty
goals. This issue is explored in more detail in Backer, supra note 20.
394. For a discussion of the nature and effect of this heightened rhetoric in the context
of federal categorical aid programs, see MARMOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 50-52.
395. Three states guarantee a right to maintenance in their constitutions. See ALA.
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the extent it is offered at all, the right to general assistance is
strictly a matter of statute and completely within the discretion of
the legislature 96 In the context of static systems, the question of
whether relief to be afforded the poor is a right or a privilege, and
the limitations of the right of the state to determine benefit levels,
has been a subject of concern in only a handful of states, primarily
California.3n And even in California, the object of the battles has
been little more than one over control of the machinery for setting
minimum benefits for the poor. Why the indifference? Because the
nature and force of any compulsion to relieve the poor does not
inhibit the state from its principal task-inducing the able-bodied
poor to fend for themselves.
Since the implementation of a static system is not dependant
on the manner in which benefits are dispensed, we find that state
general assistance is dispensed in a variety of forms: cash,39 in-
kind benefits," or both.4  States can even prohibit the giving
CONST. art. IV, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the legislature to require the several coun-
ties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor."); N.Y.
CoNsr. art. XVII, § 1 (providing in relevant part that: "The aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such subdivisions,
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time deter-
mine.'); MoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) ("The Legislature shall provide such economic
assistance and social and rehabilitative services as may be necessary for those inhabitants
who, by reason of age, infirmites, or misfortune, have need for the aid of society.).
396. See supra part V.A.I.
397. See, e.g., the discussion of the California general assistance litigation in Bensinger,
supra note 9. There has been an effort in recent years to attempt to find constitutional
rights to poor relief in one form or another in state constitutions. See also articles cited
supra note 21.
398. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-1 (1985) ("Public assistance means financial assistance
to or for the benefit of persons . . . , payments to or on behalf of such persons for
medical care, and social service payments as described under the Social Security Act.");
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131a(l) (McKinney 1992) ("Such provision shall be made in
monthly or semi-monthly allowances and grants within the limits of the schedules
.. ."); Omto REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.03 (Baldwin 1995) ("General assistance shall be
given by warrant or by direct deposit . . .
399. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-409 (Mlchie 1991) ("General relief shall be material
aid or service given to any person or family not in the form of an assistance grant.");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.029(f) (West 1993) ("'Public assistance' means ... the receipt of
food stamps."); IDAHO CODE § 31-3403 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("Nonmedical assistance
means reasonable costs for assistance which includes, but is not limited to food and shel-
ter and other such necessary services."); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-16-1 (West 1994) (deal-
ing with various forms of poor relief including payment by the township trustee of water,
gas, and electric services and purchase orders for food).
400. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-702(d) (1993) ("'Assistance' includes such items or
functions as the giving or providing of money, food stamps or coupons, food, clothing,
shelter, medicine, or other materials ... "); MD. CODE ANN., Soc. SERv. § 64 (1992)
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of aid of a particular kind.' Aid can be dispensed on an insti-
tutional (indoor)' or non-institutional (outdoor)' basis. Indeed,
the hallmark of aid for the homeless has been the revival in certain
urban centers, primarily New York and California, of wholly insti-
tutional aid consisting of in-kind benefits. In some cases, these
(providing assistance "including payments toward funeral expenses of [needy] individuals,
and in the case of a recipient without a legal guardian or person legally responsible for
his support means the placement of such recipient in a suitable home or institution with
the recipient's consenf'); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-309 (1994) ("The form of relief may
include but is not limited to cash, checks, vouchers, lines of credit, in-kind goods and
services, and food commodities."); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 158 (McKinney 1992)
("Home relief means allowances .. . for all support, maintenance and need, and costs of
suitable training in a trade to enable a person to become self-supporting.'); W. VA. CODE
§ 9-1-2 (1990) ('"he term 'general assistance' shall mean cash or its equivalent in servic-
es or commodities expended for care and assistance to an indigent person.").
401. One state, New Hampshire, specifically prohibits assistance to be provided in the
form of cash payments. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:1(11) (1994).
402. Most institutional or indoor aid dispense methods have been poorhouses. See CAL.
WHIE. & INST. CODE § 17002 (West 1991) ('The boards of supervisors may establish
almshouses and county farms .. . "); COLO. REv. SrAT. § 30-17-106 (1989) ("The board
of county commissioners in each county in this state... may establish a poorhouse
. -); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-16-15 (West 1994) ('The township trustee may place
indigent individuals in the county home... ); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-714 (1993) ("It
shall be lawful for the board of county commissioners, whenever they deem it advisable,
to purchase a tract of land in the name of the county, and thereupon to build, erect,
establish, organize, and maintain a home for persons eligible to public assistance."); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-43-1 (1993) ('The board of supervisors may purchase ... land for a
county home and farm . . . ."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.650 (Vernon 1983) ("Such county
court may cause to be erected on the land so purchased or leased a convenient poorhouse
or houses . . . ."); NEv. REV. STAT. § 428.100 (1989) ("If the board of county commis-
sioners of any county thinks it proper, the board may cause to be built in the county
workhouses for the accommodation or employment of such indigents as may, from time
to time, become a county charge.").
403. Cash or in-kind benefits can be dispensed on a non-institutional basis. See supra
notes 369-71. But Lucie White has correctly noted that recent criticism of current forms
of poor relief reflects substantial anxiety about the negative effects of providing non-insti-
tutional relief to the able-bodied poor. See White, supra note 17, at 1963. This anxiety
has also been broadened to include able-bodied mothers with minor children within the
group thought to be corruptible by outdoor relief. See Fineman, supra note 17, at 280-85.
404. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 41 (McKinney 1992) ("The legislature finds that a special
fund should be established to fund capital programs sponsored by not-for-profit corpora-
tions, charitable organizations, wholly owned subsidiaries of not-for-profit corporations or
charitable organizations, public corporations and municipalities that will expand and im-
prove the supply of shelter and other housing arrangements for homeless persons:) Home-
less housing arrangements am specific facilities, including lands, buildings, and improve-
ments acquired, constructed, renovated, or rehabilitated and operated by not-for-profit cor-
porations or charitable organizations to increase the availability of housing for homeless
persons, which may include other non-housing services such as but not limited to dining,
recreational, sanitary, social, medical, and mental health services as may be deemed by
the commissioner to be essential to such a project. Id. § 42. See also MD. CODE ANN.,
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programs serve as a means of controlling vagrants found loitering
in the streets.s This type of aid has brought with it the concerns
and criticisms reserved for the poor houses of the nineteenth centu-
ry4 6
Although from the theory we understand that static systems
should be indifferent with respect to the discretion placed in the
hands of the administrators of the system, most state general assis-
tance is dispensed by a proletarianized workforce shorn of any
discretionary authority, the actions of whom are sharply limited by
statute and regulation. In this, the procedures of general assis-
tance merely mirror those mandated under the significantly larger
federal categorical aid programs.05
Soc. SERv. § 126 (1992) ("The Secretary of Human Resources shall establish a program
of crisis shelter homes for homeless women. The purpose of the crisis shelter homes shall
be to provide shelter, meals, and counseling to clients."); Id. § 133 ('The Governor is
authorized to establish a shelter, nutrition, and service program for homeless individuals.
The purpose of the program is to provide crisis and transition shelter, proper nutrition,
and adequate services to homeless individuals"). See Bell v. Board of Supervisors of
Alameda County, 28 Cal. Rplr. 2d 919 (Ct. App. 1994) (calculation of value of in-kind
relief).
405. See Robert E. Gould & Robert Levy, Psychiatrists as Puppets of Koch's Roundup
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1987, at A35 (discussing New York City's policy of using
roving teams of psychiatrists and social workers to round up homeless people deemed
dangerous to themselves or others and placing them in the city psychiatric hospital); Da-
vid Margolick, Weighing the Risks and Rights of the Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1985, at D6 (discussing critically the New York City policy of rounding up the homeless
for delivery to shelters on extremely cold nights).
406. This concern includes, among other things, fear for the personal safety of the re-
cipients. See Herr, supra note 137, at 377 (quoting a 12 yr. old resident of a New York
City welfare hotel: "My mother is afraid to let me go downstairs. Only this Saturday, my
friend, the security guard at the hotel, Mr. Santiago, was killed on my floor .... ').
Cf., Berger, supra note 9; Chackes, supra note 9. Anecdotal and press accounts routinely
describe homeless shelters as dangerous places. See, e.g., Suzanne Daley, Robert Hayes:
Anatomy of a Crusader, N.Y. TIME, Oct. 2, 1987, at BI (describing view of homeless
that shelters were dangerous places); Charles J. Gans, Immigration Aggravates
Homelessness, NEWsDAY, Aug. 5, 1993, at 56 (discussing order by a New York State
court to move homeless men from what were described as two dangerous shelters in
Brooklyn and the Bronx); Sandra Mathers, Homeless Center Also Takes in Crime: The
President of the Orlando Coalition Said Most Incidents That Occur Are not Serious, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, July 8, 1993, at B1 (describing criminal activity at an Orlando, Florida
homeless shelter).
407. The primary force' determining the manner of service delivery appears to be the
requirements of the federal categorical relief programs administered by the same state
agencies. On the nature of the incentives to reduce discretion of caseworkers administering
federal categorical relief, see Simon, supra note 13, at 1201-22.
408. See id. at 1201-19 (discussing instances of formalization, bureaucratization, and
proletarianism in AFDC).
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5. The Obsession With Cost
The general theory suggests that cost will drive the design of
American poor relief systems. Cost minimization reduces the
redistributive effects (bad) of any system of poor relief and, by
providing for minimum support under relatively unpleasant condi-
tions, increases the "rehabilitative" focus of such systems on the
poor themselves (good) who could eradicate poverty merely by
becoming more productive. Cost minimization appears in several
guises: cost shifting, aid level determination, need hierarchies and
aid (what amount of destitution is sufficient destitution to merit
aid), definitions of aid-worthiness, work requirements for the able-
bodied, restitution (repayment by recipient), group (usually family)
support obligations, and stigma, humiliation, and complexity (to
drive home the point that almost any kind of work is better than
poor relief). The object of all of this? The provision of the least
amount of aid to the smallest number of people.
a. Cost Shifting
Cost minimization by cost shifting is fairly effective and uni-
versal in the world of American general assistance. These systems
generally attempt to shift whatever costs they can to other sources
of funding. In practical terms, this results in a substantial reliance
on private charity and on other governmental units, principally the
federal government. Recall that the costs shifted are merely those
which the state or locality imposed on itself in creating basic cate-
gories of eligibility.
Shifting of the poor relief burden to private charity is accom-
plished in a variety of ways. For example, costs are shifted by
requiring, through statute or regulation, the referral of ineligible
poor to local non-governmental charitable institutions,"" or the
409. For a discussion of a plan to eliminate the entire federal welfare and income sup-
port structure for working aged persons, see MURRAY, supra note 3, at 227-33. The pur-
pose of Murray's plan is to "leave the working aged person with no recourse whatsoever
except the job market, family members, friends, and public or private locally funded ser-
vices." Id. at 228.
410. For example, Michael Espy, a Clinton Administration Secretary of Agriculture,
discovered when he sought to apply for Food Stamps in West Virginia on June 14, 1993,
that, because he was employed, it would take one month to "process" his Food Stamp
application. In the meantime, the local poor relief office was authorized to provide him
with a "food voucher at a local charity to help tide him over." Food Stamp Applications
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reference in statutes, such as that of Texas, to the role of state
government as the backup to private and local governmental ef-
forts, to be relied on only in extreme conditions" Other states
require, as part of the eligibility determination, a finding that the
need giving rise to the application for aid could not be met by any
other means 12 Some states have created formal and informal re-
lationships with local charitable organizations to which applicants
are referred on a temporary or permanent basis.413 For instance,
St. Louis, Missouri, created a system of services for the city's
homeless population by coordinating a variety of private charitable
organizations that fed, clothed, transported and provided medical
aid. In the process, the city bore only about one-third of the total
costs incurred for the services provided.4"4
Both the state and federal governments use private charity in a
variety of other ways designed to relieve governmental institutions
of the burden of providing relief to the destitute.4 We spend
significant resources justifying this type of cost shifting. Private
Confusing, Official Says, TULsA WORLD, June 15, 1993, at A20.
411. See TEx HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 34.001(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (provid-
ing that the state will contribute "money to match local and any federal money available
to provide emergency relief".
412. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 31-3401 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("The boards of county
commissioners in their respective counties shall... evaluate the need and provide to the
indigent person(s) nonmedical assistance in a temporary situation only when no altema-
tives exist."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 26.7 (West 1991) ('he Oklahoma Emergency
Relief Board may provide temporary relief employment to destitute but able-bodied per-
sons not otherwise cared for by the federal government, state or county agencies, public
or private charity organizations or institutions.).
413. See, eg., Tim HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 34.003(a) (West 1990):
The department [of health and human services] shall establish a temporary
emergency relief fund from funds appropriated for that purpose. The funds may
be used to match funds from local communities on a 50% state and 50% local
ratio basis in order to assist counties, in cooperation with other public entities
and nonprofit organizations, in meeting the needs of individuals and families for
temporary emergency relief.
414. Homelessness in St. Louis: Beyond the Crisis, FIN. WORLD, March 2, 1993, at 38.
415. Wilbur Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare under President Lyndon
Johnson and involved in the creation of the modem American welfare state at the federal
level in the 1930s, described classical views of the uses of private charity in an article
written in the 1970s. These included: serving as a source of innovation, providing recipi-
ents with a choice (and thereby limiting government complacency), providing for emer-
gency needs, and generally increasing responsiveness to the individual problems of the
poor. Cohen, supra note 4, at 660. Mr. Cohen, then Dean of the School of Education at
the University of Michigan, anticipated that private charity could usefully serve as a sub-
stitute for government in the provision of early childhood education, community education
programs, emergency social services, and services for the aging. Id. at 662-67.
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charitable efforts are said to provide a means of experimenting
with new methods of delivering aid to the poor. To that end, the
federal and state governments subsidize the experiments of such
organizations.4 '6 But for all of the delightful and inspirational lan-
guage enveloping these private experiments, none seems to have
sparked change at the governmental level. Indeed, most of these
experiments appear to be little more than variations on the basic
premise of institutional static poor relief: convincing people that
they are better off working, or finding a husband, or not having
more children, or preparing themselves better for work 7 The
other classical formulations of the usefulness of private chari-
ty-forcing efficiency, helping people who fall through the cracks,
and giving people a choice of the type of charity they ac-
cept-adhere closely to the traditional roles of private charity from
at least the Elizabethan period. The primary effect of a flourishing
trade in private charity, whatever other rationale is given, is the
reduction of the burden of the state to take care of its poor.
More direct approaches to shifting the burden have been tried.
It is common for those whom the state cannot afford to support.
Having segregated and categorized the poor, elimination by catego-
ry is easy and morally justifiable. Thus, for example, Arizona,4 5
Delaware,"9  Hawaii,42  Louisiana,42  Massachusetts," New
Mexico,'s North Carolina,424  Ohio,4' Oregon,4' South
416. A number of such experimental programs have been studied. See generally
GUERON & PAULY, supra note 6. Additionally, the Republican Administrations of 1981-
1991 were fond of lauding the experimental approaches of these private groups. See, e.g.,
Low INcoME OPPoRTUNrrY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3 (describing a number of
experimental programs judged successful).
417. See GUERON & PAULY, supra note 6, at 107-20 (describing a number of such pro-
grams and their effect).
418. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233(A)(3) (1988) (providing assistance only to per-
sons who are unemployable).
419. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 505 (1985) (limiting aid benefits to the elderly, families
with dependent children, the disabled, and the unemployables).
420. HAW. REV, STAT. § 346-52 (1985 & Supp. 1992) ("Afn] [aged, blind, and perma-
nently and totally disabled] person shall be eligible for public assistance who meets the
requirements established by the Federal Supplemental Security Income Program or its
successor agency, provided the person is also determined needy in accordance with state
standards.").
421. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:464 (West 1982) ("No parish or parish official shall, at
the public expense, support or aid any persons as paupers, except such as are infirm, sick
or disabled").
422: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 18, § 2(A) (West 1994) (limiting aid programs to
families, children, unmarried parents, the elderly, and individuals as needed).
423. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-2-7 (Michie 1992) (offering aid to the temporarily dis-
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Carolina,427  Tennessee,42s Washington, 429  West Virginia,430
Wyoming,43 and the District of Columbia432 do not provide sig-
nificant aid of any kind to people who do not otherwise qualify for
federal categorical assistance. The notion is that these people, ineli-
gible for federal or state aid, will either have to turn to private
charitable organizations or learn to fend for themselves. Privatiza-
tion is also attempted, for example, by shifting the responsibility
for job training and creation to the private sector.433 More finan-
cially strapped jurisdictions might well privatize the entire burden
of the relief of certain portions of the population in the belief that
the decrease in governmental expenditures will be made up by
abled).
424. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108(A).28, .41 (1994) (limiting aid to persons at least 65
years old or between 18 and 65 who are permanently disabled).
425. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.02-.032 (Baldwin 1995) (limiting the program to
persons between 18 and 60 years old).
426. OR. REv. STAT. § 411.740 (1993) (allowing the Family Service program to pre-
scribe eligibility requirements).
427. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 43-5-65, -310 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (permitting assistance only
to needy families or handicapped and unfortunate persons not eligible for any other type
of assistance and unable to support themselves due to a physical or mental infirmity).
428. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 71-5-102, -201, -302, -401, -1101 (1987) (allowing only
medical assistance, community clinics, food stamps, energy assistance, and job opportunity
programs).
429. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.04.005 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (permitting gen-
eral assistance only to people ineligible for federal aid assistance, and who are either
pregnant or incapacitated due to a physical or mental infirmity).
430. W. VA. CODE §§ 9-6-1, 9-6-8 (1990) (providing no public or general assistance to
indigent persons). But see Hedge v. Giusberg, 303 S.E.2d 245 (W. Va. 1983) (interpreting
§§ 9-6-1 and 9-6-8 as providing for emergency housing, food, and medical care for
homeless state residents).
431. WYO. STAT. § 42-2-103 (1994) (providing no public assistance program except for
AFDC, but stating that programs are to be provided to individuals who lack sufficient
income or resources to provide for themselves).
432. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-202.1 to -205.42a (1981) (providing AFDC, General Assis-
tance for Children, Emergency Shelter Family Services, and General Public Assistance).
433. Nathan Glazer has suggested that the best means to deal with social problems,
such as poverty, is to "think of ways to meet needs with a lesser degree of dependence
on public action." GLAZER, supra note 67, at 139. This need is driven in large part by
the perceived necessity of cost containment and has given rise to the interest in the pri-
vatization of social services, and reliance on private philanthropic efforts. Id. at 125-26,
139. Alan Houseman argued that a significant trend that developed during the 1980s was
the increased role of the private sector through privatization of governmental services and
through the creation of a number of public-private joint ventures. See Houseman, supra
note 172, at 839. See also Bovbjerg & Kopit, supra note 147, at 892-93 (discussing with
respect to medical indigence, the limitations of efforts to privatize health care coverage);
Weinberg, supra note 27, at 419, 431-32 (arguing that the workfare requirements imposed
under the Family Support Act of 1988 effectively privatizes the responsibility to assist the
indigent).
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private voluntary contributions.
General assistance programs also shift a substantial part of
whatever relief obligation they have placed upon themselves by
structuring their programs to take maximum advantage of available
federal funds. Because federal aid is available only for certain
categories of the needy, the general theory suggests that states will
tend to craft their poor relief programs in a manner that takes the
greatest possible advantage of available federal funds. The easiest
way to do this is to directly limit the availability of poor relief to
persons qualified to receive federal categorical relief"3 The result
has been that most state general relief resources are devoted to
supplementing federal payments. The state programs, in effect, be-
come nothing more than conduits for federal programs.
The result: Federal categorical aid programs, such as A.FDC,
which originated as a federal supplement to state general assistance
programs, have become the primary focus of state relief efforts,
and state general assistance programs have withered.43 Since fed-
eral categorical aid programs, at least as originally envisioned, were
geared to aid those whom society deemed incapable of work-
ing,' the effect has been to reinforce the static tendency to dis-
criminate against those whom ought to be fending for themselves
and in favor of the incapacitated; the disabled. The paradigm thus
provides a useful framework for understanding the cost minimizing
basis of this approach. Since the federal government partially funds
programs of public assistance to all but the able-bodied poor, and
since, for static system builders, poor relief to the able-bodied is
troubling, some states or localities restrict their own aid programs
434. This is essentially what cities like St. Louis, Missouri do when they farm out their
relief efforts. See Homelessness in St. Louis: Beyond the Crisis, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 2,
1993, at 38; see also Abrams & Scbitz, supra note 167, at 36 (arguing that increased
governmental expenditures crowd out, at least to some extent, private charitable giving).
435. See discussion supra, part V.A.2.a.
436. Indeed, because of the size of the federal categorical relief burden in most states,
and the limited availability of state aid to people not eligible for federal categorical relief,
most states devote much of their resources to the administration and funding of their part
of federal categorical aid programs. See LEMrAN, supra note 3, at 28-30 (discussing ag-
gregate cost and cost sharing between the federal and state governments); MARMOR Er
Al, supra note 6, at 84-96 (discussing the nature of expenditures on federal programs).
437. See MARMOR Er Ai-, supra note 6, at 99 (arguing that federal aid programs target
the aged, blind, children, and disabled poor); Liebman, supra note 119, at 833 (arguing
that ad hoc societal welfare legislation has produced inequitable determinations of disabili-
ty); Lurie, supra note 4, at 828-29 (noting that the original objective of AFDC was to
provide aid to families "incapable of supporting themselves").
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to those funded, in whole or in part by the federal government.
The resulting incentive to states is then, in effect, to deny all aid
to those determined to be at least theoretically capable of fending
for themselves.O'3 The pernicious effect is apparent-the states
bask in the glory of a "generous" poor relief program for which
they must pay only a fraction of the cost.
b. Aid Level Determination
The aim of poor relief is not to eradicate poverty, in the sense
that it will act as a means of eradicating a substantial amount of
income inequality. It is geared only to ameliorate some, but not all,
of the conditions of the destitute (lest they starve). Corresponding-
ly, the statutory mandates for the construction of systems of gener-
al assistance do not speak in terms of eradication or rehabilita-
tion.439 Rather, these statutes describe the obligation of govern-
ment to the destitute as one of "relie[f] and support' when support
by any other means is unavailable, or as an obligation to re-
438. Arizona's approach is perhaps typical of this method of static system building
limiting assistance to, among others, people who are not employable, as such term is de-
fined by the state. ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1994). DES
regulation R6-3-701 defined eligibility for assistance to include all people "physically or
mentally incapacitated to the degree he is unemployable:' Any person, therefore, who is
not incapacitated to the degree he or she is unemployable is not eligible for aid. See
Herrera v. Jamieson, 602 P.2d 514 (Ariz. 1979) (concluding in part on the basis of that
regulation, that the statute was not vague.).
The approach of Illinois, Oregon, and Utah are very similar to Arizona's. In Illinois,
to be eligible for assistance, an individual must be chronically needy. Chronically needy
persons are persons who are "too impaired to work but are not disabled enough to quali-
fy for Supplemental Security Income or have substantial barriers to being employable
... :' ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5/6-11(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993). The Illinois De-
partment of Public Aid proscribes rules for determining whether a person is chronically
needy. Id. In Oregon, although the statute providing for general assistance does not specif-
ically state employable persons are not eligible, the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Smith
v. Peet, 564 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Or. CL App. 1977), stated that by departmental rule, the
Public Welfare Division granted public assistance to unemployable persons only with a
few exceptions. Utah also limits general assistance to unemployable persons. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-9-114(2)(a) (1991).
Some states have limited this approach a bit. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.015
(1989). In Nevada, the board of county commissioners must set eligibility standards. Id.
However, the Supreme Court of Nevada held, in Clark County Soc. Serv. Dep't v.
Newkirk, 789 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1990), that counties, in establishing eligibility criteria,
cannot automatically exclude employable persons from eligibility.
439. Many statutory provisions do express certain lofty hortatory goals for the poor
relief system in place. These feel-good pronouncements are generally observed, if at all,
only in the breach. For a discussion of the differences between the vision and reality of
poor relief goals, see Backer, supra note 20, at 1050-70.
440. See, eg., CAL. WEU. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) ("Every county and
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lieve and maintain the poor,"' or to support the poor.m "2 These
statutory mandates reflect the fundamental understanding that pov-
erty is a mark of individual deficiency or incapacity caused by
forces beyond the power of the individual affected, 3 or the re-
sult of a deliberate repudiation of societal work requirements.'"
Cost minimization results in systems of minimums. The mini-
mum which is extremely consonant with static notions of rewarding
productivity involves the setting of benefit levels. State systems, by
statute or regulation, or case law, do not require jurisdictions to
provide more than the minimum required to sustain the poor, as
this minimum is calculated by the jurisdiction. Thus, state statutes
every city shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, [and] indigent persons ...
when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their
own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions."); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-273 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) ("Each person who has not estate suffi-
cient for his support, and has no relatives of sufficient ability who are obliged by law to
support him, shall be provided for and supported . . . at the expense of the town in
which he resides."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.010 (1989) ("[Elvery county shall provide
care, support and relief to the poor. . . lawfully resident therein, when those persons are
not supported or relieved by their relatives or guardians, by their own means, or by state
hospitals, or other state, federal or private institutions or agencies:); TMX. LOCAL GOW"T
CODE ANN. § 81.028(6) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995) ('Each commissioners court may...
provide for the support of paupers ... who are unable to support themselves.").
441. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 88 ("It shall be the duty of the legislature to
require the several counties of this state to make adequate provision for the maintenance
of the poor.'); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:1 (1994) ("Whenever a person in any town
is poor and unable to support himself, he shall be relieved and maintained . . .. '
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 32 (West 1991) ("The overseers of the poor in each county
shall have the oversight and care of all the poor persons in their county so long as they
remain a county charge, and shall see that they are properly relieved and taken care of
. . .); R.L GEN. LAws § 40-5-1 (1990) ('Every town shall be required to relieve and
support all poor and indigent persons ... .'); S.D. CODImED LAws ANN. § 28-13-1
(1992) ("Every county shall relieve and support all poor and indigent persons ... ").
442. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-15 (1993) ("The board of supervisors shall
annually assess and cause to be collected by the tax collector, and paid into the general
fund of the county treasury, such tax as may be necessary for the support of the poor of
the county.").
443. See MONT. CONST. art. XU, § 3(3) ("The legislature may provide such economic
assistance and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age, infirmi-
ties, or misfortune, have the need for the aid of society.").
444. Thus, a New Jersey legislator could, in support of modifications to the state's
AFDC requirements, claim without much opposition that "the most useful thing welfare
can do for the poor is to press middle class values upon them.' Paul Taylor, Carrots and
Sticks of Welfare Reform: Author of Landmark Federal Bill Hears Why States are Going
Their Own Way, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at A13. Likewise, a popular conservative
representative of the popular press notes that any indigent person who refuses to take any
available job because it might be demeaning is in need of substantial "re-education"
Geyer, supra note 132, at D1.
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mandate in terms such as "adequate provision," "reasonable
subsistence,"' 8 "support,"" 7  "properly relieved and taken care
of,"'  a minimum benefit equal to some amount at or below the
federally established poverty level,"9 the "needs and resources" of
the applicant 5 a "reasonable and decent low-income standard of
445. The Alabama Constitution requires that the legislature impose the duty upon the
counties to give "adequate provision for the maintenance of the poor." ALA. CONSr. art.
IV, § 88. In New York, the duty of the social service officials is to "provide adequately
for those unable to maintain themselves" by administering "such care, treatment and ser-
vice as may restore such persons to a condition of self-support or self-care." N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 1992). The state department of Social Services determines
an applicant's eligibility according to a standard of need set at $112.00 for one person.
Id. §§ 131-a(1), -a(2)(a). The maximum amount of aid granted to one person is also
$112.00. Id. § 131-a(3)(a).
446. The aim of Alaska's general relief statute is to provide needy persons with funds
for reasonable subsistence. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.130(a) (1990). The amount of aid given
to a recipient may not exceed $120.00. Id. Other statutes have similar provisions. See,
e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-76-407 (Michie 1991) (providing that the amount of assistance
is determined by the amount needed to provide a "reasonable subsistence' compatible with
decency and health); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 512(3) (1985) (stating that the Depart-
ment of Social Services makes periodic surveys of the cost-of-living factors in relation to
the needs of recipients of assistance and welfare services so that they "may be reasonably
sufficient to provide recipients with a subsistence compatible with recognized scientific
standards"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(A) (1993) (making general assistance available
to persons who have insufficient income or resources to provide a "reasonable subsistence
compatible with decency and health"); MD. CODE ANN., Soc. SERv. § 88A-66 (1992)
(stating that the amount of assistance shall be sufficient to provide an applicant with a
"reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-110
(Michlie 1995) (providing that the amount of aid is sufficient if it provides a person with
a reasonable subsistence).
447. See, e.g., CAL. WaW. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) (requiring each county
to support its poor); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-12-1, -2 (1993) (making counties responsible
for the supervision of paupers and providing aid to those unable to financially support
themselves); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:464 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) (providing state-
imposed mandatory duty on parishes to "support or aid" infirm, sick, or disabled paupers);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-31-1 (1993) (stating that supervisors of each county must support
the poor); RL GEN. LAws § 40-5-1 (1990) (obligating towns to relieve and support the
poor).
448. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 56, §§ 31, 32 (West 1991) (stating that county com-
missioners have the duty to oversee and care for all poor persons in their county so long
as they remain a county charge, and to see that they are "properly relieved and taken
care of").
449. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-53 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (stating that the amount of
assistance should be based on 62.5% of the federally established poverty level). The maxi-
mum amount of assistance disbursed to one recipient is limited to $I00.00 per week.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 26.16 (West 1991) (stating that the amount of assistance
must not be less than $10.00 and may not be more than the maximum amount standard
for AFDC); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-9-120 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (providing that the
amount of the general assistance grant be calculated the same as AFDC).
450. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.210() (Baldwin 1991) (stating that assistance should
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living,""45 "minimum decency and health, ' 452 or meeting "the
costs of necessary maintenance and services." 3 Payments are cal-
culated and made on the basis of poverty lines and related mini-
mums. The thrust of the public policy underlying these statutory
mandates is clear. Irrespective of the level at which benefits are
set (and adjusted) the redistributive potential of this transfer is thus
substantially muted.
Cost minimization can also manifest itself by permitting the
relief entity to base the aggregate amount of relief on a variety of
factors other than the anticipated need of the entire potential pool
of eligible applicants. The more discretion a poor relief system is
given to set benefit levels, the more likely costs (including the cost
of taxation on the taxing groups) will dominate considerations of
aid levels. Some courts, principally in California, have recently
limited a locality's discretion in this regard.454 One can, in fact,
see the direct connection between the Canon Law notion that the
donor is solely responsible for setting the amount of aid he is to
give,"' and the (unsuccessful) arguments of the California coun-
ties that they ought to be free to determine the amount of aid
be determined according to the "needs and resources of the applicant" as prescribed by
regulation provided that there are available funds during the budgetary period).
451. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 208.150(1)(a) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1995) (stating that
the amount of assistance for AFDC recipients be determined by the average need for each
eligible person which includes "the cost of basic needs required to maintain a child or
children in the home at a reasonable and decent low-income standard of living.").
452. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(A) (1993) (making general assistance available
to persons who have insufficient income or resources to provide a reasonable subsistence
compatible with decency and health); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-133(2) (1990) (stating that
counties must adopt written standards of assistance to poor persons which "[p]rovide a
schedule of goods and services necessary for the maintenance of minimum decency and
health"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.031(A)(3) (Baldwin 1995) (making the monthly
standard of need the minimum monthly income required for the assistance group to main-
tain health and decency as determined by the department).
453. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-102 (1989).
454. See Poverty Resistance Ctr. v. Hart, 271 Cal. Rptr. 214 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that county boards must consider actual subsistence costs in making a determination of
minimum levels of assistance); Boehm v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 720-21 (Ct.
App. 1986) (setting for determining this minimum standard). See also Bensinger, supra
note 9, at 533 (arguing that the courts' interpretations compel counties to survey cost of
living before setting guidelines minimum subsistence needs); Blanton, supra note 9, at 46
(observing that several California courts used evidence obtained through studies to deter-
mine subsistence levels).
455. See AQUINAS, supra note 196, at 546 ("Yet it would be inordinate to deprive
oneself of one's own in order to give to others to such an extent that the remainder
would be insufficient for one to live in keeping with one's station and the ordinary oc-
currences of life .. .
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available based on their budgetary constraints.45 Not surprisingly,
there was a strong effort to eliminate judicial restrictions on a
county's benefit determination, led by the Governor of the state
which led to the passage of legislation nullifying such judicial
restrictions:4
Despite the opinions of the California courts, many other state
general assistance systems are permitted a substantial amount of
discretion in determining benefit levels for the eligible poor. Ii-
nois provides an example of the manner in which the system ac-
commodates this need.458 Kentucky provides another example; the
poor there must make due with a pro rata portion of the benefit
otherwise payable if there are insufficient funds allocated in the
budget to cover aggregate need.459 We feel badly for the poor,
however, as the general theory suggests, while their need may
serve as the motivation for poor relief, it can not serve as the
actual basis on which relief is allocated.
c. Need Hierarchies and Aid (What Amount of Destitution is
Sufficient Destitution to Merit Aid?)
As the general theory suggests, states tend to devise programs
that discriminate against the able-bodied, in a number of significant
respects. The drive to minimize costs increases the incentives to
minimize aid to the able-bodied. Since the able-bodied are the most
likely to be able to fend for themselves, over-aiding them inappro-
456. See Boehm, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 722 (stating that "budgetary constraints cannot justify
excluding from minimum subsistence grants to the indigent allowance for each of the
basic necessities of life"); Mooney v. Pickett, 483 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Cal. 1971) (rejecting
the county's argument that narrowing the definition of eligibility to exclude employable
single males was justified by reason of budgetary constraints).
457. For a discussion of the California proposal, Proposition 165, its relationship to
static notions of system reform, and the reasons for its defeat, see Backer, supra note 20,
at 1070-82. Despite the defeat of Proposition 165, the California legislature enacted WAF.
& INST. CODE § 17000-5, which "overrules previous judicial authority which required the
standard of aid to be based upon a specific factual study of actual subsistence costs of
living in each county . . . and authorizes counties to adopt a 'general assistance standard
of aid' equal to 62% of the 1991 federal official poverty line:' Gardner v. County of Los
Angeles, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 273 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Oberlander v. County of
Contra Costa, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (CL App. 1992)).
458. In llinois the amount of aid given to a recipient may be determined by local
budget standards in localities which do not receive state funds. Local government units
receiving state funds must set aid levels in accordance with state standards. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 305, para. 516-2 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
459. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.210(1) (Baldwin 1991).
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priately increases the costs of the poor relief effort in a way that
magnifies its income redistributive effects to a portion of the popu-
lation to which such distribution is at best problematical.'
Thus, cost minimization adds another layer of incentive in
Western society to restrict aid to the able-bodied, tends to those
whose need places them near the top of the need hierarchy (in
terms of the immediacy of the need), and limits the type of aid
available which will effectively move the able-bodied down the
need hierarchy. Thus, aid to the able-bodied tends to be temporary,
and for the relief of life-threatening or other extreme emergency
situations. 4 ' Such assistance is usually provided in the form of
food or vouchers for private charitable relief or small amounts of
cash 2 in a quantity sufficient to ensure that the recipients can be
temporarily fed and housed. It tends to be limited to those to
whom failure to provide it could result in injury to the appli-
cant. It is not meant to be permanent, the way that aid to the
incapacitated is likely permanent.' And in the jurisdictions
where a general obligation to provide for the able-bodied poor
exists, it is also coupled with work requirements.O '5
Also, more common now, as state budgets become squeezed, is
the establishment of explicit queuing, and need hierarchies, even
within the categories of poor universally considered deserving of
aid. The example of Florida's recent attempt to ration health care
for the poor on the basis of status is telling. However, the abil-
460. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-121(5) (1994) (differentiating between benefits
to the employable and the unemployable for the purpose of allocating scarce welfare
resources to the most needy).
461. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 516-10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ('Mo alleviate
life-threatening circumstances or to assist the individual in attaining self-sufficiency...
[elmergency assistance shall not be granted under this Section more than once to any ap-
plicant during any 12 consecutive month period:); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-201(4)
(1994) (providing assistance "in cases of extreme necessity and destitution"). See supra
text accompanying notes 330-36, 342-50.
462. Alaska, for instance, limits all assistance of this type to $120.00. ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.25.250 (1990).
463. See supra part V.A.2.b.
464. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., SOC. SERV. § 88A-65(a) (1992) ("'The Social Services
Administration shall promptly establish, implement and modify as necessary a program of
State funded assistance payments to residents of the State of Maryland who are temporari-
ly in need but are not eligible for any other State or federal category of assistance.").
465. See infra part V.A.5.e.
466. Florida, in an effort to reduce the cost of running state-maintained public health
clinics, has proposed implementing a system whereby all clients would be placed in one
of seven ranked categories. Categories would be divided by status, such as age, sex, and
pregnancy. The category consisting of pregnant women and infants would have top rank-
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ity to manipulate in this manner is not limitless and the state
courts have, on occasion, imposed broader interpretations on the
concept of incapacity.
d. Definitions of Aid-worthy Categories
I have spoken about the way in which the cost minimization
imperative of poor relief systems results in cost shifting to the
federal government, and how that provides a basis for limiting the
scope of some state poor relief systems. But cost shifting is not the
only way to minimize costs. In jurisdictions where the obligation to
aid paupers does not extend to the able-bodied, costs also can be
reduced. The extent of the obligation to relieve the poor can be
limited by narrowing the definition of incapacity. This is an easy
way of limiting the size of the eligible population. This technique
also is effective in jurisdictions in which the obligation to relieve
and maintain the poor extends to the able-bodied. There is incen-
tive to narrow the definition of incapacity since the able-bodied
recipient can be made to work for his aid (reducing the cost there-
of, theoretically, of course) where the disabled recipient cannot.
The manipulation of the definition of incapacity and its ant-
onym takes several forms. Since the fundamental critical assump-
tion of stasis is the work imperative, the general theory suggests
that definitions of incapacity might directly turn on an ability to
ing, and the bottom ranking would consist of people 65 years of age or older. Those in
the higher-ranked categories would have preference for limited state health dollars over
those in the bottom categories. Florida Plan Would Ration Health Care, TULSA WORLD,
Oct. 17, 1992, at As. The rationale for ranking the elderly at the bottom is also
quintessentially static; since the elderly usually qualify for Medicare, it makes sense, from
the state's perspective, to force the federal government, through the Medicare program, to
shoulder a greater proportion of the health care costs of the elderly. Thus, Florida's plan
forces "those eligible for Medicare, such as the elderly, to deal directly with federal
Medicare providers rather than state-funded clinics." Id. Florida is not alone in the attempt
to create need hierarchies. Oregon recently attempted, unsuccessfully, to ration health care
by rating medical procedures in importance and funding them on that basis. The highest-
ranked procedures were eligible for the most funding; the lowest-ranked got no funding at
all. This plan was halted by the Federal government on the basis of a suggested violation
of Federal Health Care Guidelines. Id.
467. In Missouri, although only aged, infirm, lame, blind, or sick persons can be eligi-
ble for assistance, the court in Jennings v. City of St. Louis, 58 S.W.2d 979 (Mo. 1933)
held that an able-bodied man who is unable to obtain employment due to severe econom-
ic conditions was entitled to relief. Note, however, that the case was decided in the midst
of the Great Depression when it was commonly assumed that even the willing able-bodied
could not find work, and starvation was a real possibility.
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work. A number of states classify incapacitated individuals as those
who are not employable: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and Utah." So defined, the term is flexible
enough to permit the state broad latitude in determining the size of
the eligible population by "refining" the meaning of the term "em-
ployable." The key concept is one of total disability, that is, the
total inability to perform any kind of work. The fact that the dis-
ability makes it impossible to perform work for which the claimant
had been trained is irrelevant. Thus, the skilled lifeguard is not
unemployable because of the loss of a limb; he might still find
employment as a file clerk or on a sales staff. This can be quite
useful when budgetary constraints are tight, and accords with feder-
468. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1988 & Supp. 1994) (No person shall be
entitled to general assistance who does not meet and maintain the following requirements:
Is not employable according to the findings of the state department."); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-281a(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) ("Each town shall separate the persons it
is liable to support ... into either the category of employable recipient of general assis-
tance or the category of unemployable recipient of general assistance."); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 31, § 505(4) (1985) (General assistance is "granted to all other needy persons ...
who are not employable"); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-2 (1993) ("No person who is able to
maintain himself by labor . . . shall be entitled to the benefits of the provisions for the
poor.'); IDAHO CODE § 31-3405 (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("A recipient of nonmedical assis-
tance shall be classified as either employable or medically unemployable."); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 305, para. 5/6-11(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ('The Illinois Department or local
government unit shall determine whether individuals under State Transitional Assistance ae
chronically needy. Individuals shall be considered chronically needy if they are too im-
paired to work, but are not disabled enough to qualify for Supplemental Security Income
or have substantial barriers to being employable.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(A)
(1993) ('CTo qualify for general assistance in any form a needy person must. . . be a
member of a family in which a minor child or a pregnant woman resides or be unable to
engage in employment."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-3-215 (1994) ("For purposes of eligi-
bility, a recipient of general relief must be classified as either employable or unemploy-
able. Unemployable persons may receive general assistance for as long as they remain
eligible:'); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44-8-109 (West 1993) ("It is hereby declared to be the
public policy of this State that every needy person shall, while in this State, be entitled
to receive such public assistance as may be appropriate . .. to the need of a category of
persons and whether or not such persons are employable."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, §
32 (West 1991) ("It shall be the purpose of this act [state-funded general assistance] to
provide aid and assistance for destitute and/or unemployable citizens of the state.. .. ");
.!L GEN. LAws § 40-6-3.1(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994) ("General public assistance shall be
provided to . . . individuals age eighteen (18) or older, provided that . . .they are deter-
mined by the department in accordance with this chapter and departmental regulations to
be unemployable"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 28-13-1, -1.1 (1992) ("Every county
shall relieve and support all poor and indigent persons. An indigent or poor person is any
person who . . . is unable to work because of illness or injury.'); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 62A-9-114(2)(a) (1991) ("General assistance may be provided to individuals who
are ... unemployable according to the standards of the department:).
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al disability requirements as well. 9
Several states classify the incapacitated as disabled individuals:
Arkansas, District of Colombia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, New
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Washington classify
the incapacitated as disabled individuals.470 This medical (physi-
cal) incapacity definition is refined by Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, which define incapacity as a
person over age sixty-five, blind, or permanently and totally dis-
abled person, or a needy dependent child."l The California and
469. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)C2)(A) (1991) (requiring that a social security disability
claimant demonstrate an inability to perform any substantial gainful activity); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(c)(3) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (stating similar requirements for proof of disability for
receipt of SS.1. benefits).
470. AK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-404 (Michie 1991) ('Whenever any person makes appli-
cation for an assistance grant or for general relief and states . . . that he is physically
disabled and unable to support his family or himself, then the claim must be proved to
the satisfaction of the appropriate division of the Department of Human Services:); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 3-205.42a (1981 & Supp. 1995) ("[Ain individual shall be eligible for GPA
benefits only if the individual has a disability."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.1 (West 1946)
(granting county general relief to "poor persons" who are persons that "are unable, be-
cause of physical or mental disabilities, to earn a living by labor"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:461 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995) ('Parish governing authorities shall provide for the
support of all infirm, sick and disabled paupers residing within the limits of their respec-
tive parishes ... "); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.05(1) (West 1994) ("Each person or
family whose income and resources are less than the standard of assistance. . . shall be
eligible for and entitled to general assistance if the person is a person suffering from a
professionally certified permanent or temporary illness, injury, or incapacity... ."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 27-2-7 (Miechie 1992) ("[Plublic assistance shall be provided under a gener-
al assistance program to or on behalf of eligible persons who are over the age of eigh-
teen and are temporarily disabled ... :); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A.41 (1994) ("Assis-
tance shall be granted to any person who is 65 years and older, or is between the ages
of 18 and 65 and is permanently and totally disabled."); S.C CODE ANN. § 43-5-310
(Law. Co-op. 1985) ("General assistance in the form of money payments shall be granted
•.. to handicapped and unfortunate persons in need who are not eligible for other forms
of assistance . . . and who are unable to support themselves because of physical or men-
tal infirmity and would suffer unless so provided for.'); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
74.04.005 (1982 & Supp. 1995) ("General assistance is aid to persons in need who are
either pregnant or... incapacitated.").
471. ALA. CODE § 38-4-1 (1992) ("Public assistance shall be payable ... to or on
behalf of any person who is a needy blind person . . . . or is a needy person over the
age of 65 .. . , or is a dependent child . . . or who is permanently and totally dis-
abled..... .); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-2-104 (1989) ("The state department shall establish
public assistance programs consisting of assistance to eligible individuals, including but
not limited to old age pensions, aid to families with dependant children, aid to the needy
disabled, and aid to the blind.); HAW. REv. STAT. § 346-71 (1985 & Supp. 1992) ("The
department of human services shall administer and provide public assistance to eligible
persons who are disabled, or are at least fifty-five years of age, or have dependent chil-
dren in the home not otherwise provided for... .2); KY. REo STAT. ANN. § 205-200(1)
(Baldwin 1991) ('A needy aged person, a needy blind person, a needy child, a needy
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Nevada statutes include people who are incapacitated by age, dis-
ease, or accident while Pennsylvania covers people who are unable
to work due to medical, social, or related circumstances.4n In
Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska, incapacity is limited to certified
medical incapacity to perform any kind of work.¢ In addition, it
can also include people who are taking care of the medically inca-
pacitated at home, and in Arkansas, includes mothers potentially
eligible for AFDC.474 Note the similarities between the definitions
permanently and totally disabled person, or a person with whom a needy child lives shall
be eligible to receive a public assistance grant... :); MD. CODE ANN., Soc. SERv.
§ 88A-65(a) (1992) ("The Social Services Administration shall establish, implement and
modify as necessary a program of State funded assistance payments to residents . . .
who ... are aged, blind, or disabled as required under Title XVI of the Social Security
Act and, but for income, would receive cash benefits under that title."); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 205.580, .590 (Vernon 1983) ("Aged, infirm, lame, blind or sick persons, who are
unable to support themselves . . . shall be deemed poor" and are supported by the coun-
ty.).
472. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 17000 (West 1991) ("Every county and every city
and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those
incapacitated by age, disease, or accident."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 428.010 (1989) ("[E]very
county shall provide care, support and relief to the poor, indigent, incompetent and those
incapacitated by age, disease or accidenL"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(3) (1968 &
Supp. 1995) (Needy persons who are chronically needy shall be eligible for assistance.
"Chronically needy persons are those persons chronically in need who may be eligible for
an indeterminate period as a result of medical, social or related circumstance.").
473. IDAHO CODE § 31-3403(13) (1983 & Supp. 1995) ("'Medically unemployable'
means a physical or mental disability to the extent it prevents an individual from partici-
pation in employment and such disability is certified by one or more licensed physicians
andlor psychiatrist or psychologist."); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3-109(6), (16) (1994):
'Employable' means the condition of a person who is not unemployable.
'Unemployable' means the condition of a person who is at least 55 years of
age and has a limited ability to obtain or retain suitable employment because
of advanced age, has a serious physical, emotional, or mental handicap that is
medically certified and that prevents him from being employed in any substan-
tial gainful employment, or suffers from a permanent or temporary illness,
injury, or incapacity that is medically certified and that prevents the person
from working in any substantial, gainful employment.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 68-153 (1990):
Employable recipient shall mean any individual who is eighteen years of age or
older, who is not engaged in full-time employment or satisfactorily participating
in an approved program of vocational, rehabilitation, or job training, and who
is not rendered unable to work by illness or significant or substantial mental or
physical incapacitation to the degree and of the duration that the illness or
incapacitation prevents the person from performing designated vocational, reha-
bilitation, or job training activities.
474. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 20-76-402(c) (Michie 1991):
'Able-bodied individual' shall be defined as all individuals between eighteen
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of medical incapacity sufficient to qualify for aid in the state stat-
utes, and that of disability under federal law. 5 The potential for
institutions to use the indeterminacy of these definitions to enforce
shifting public policy has been explored in the federal context.
e. Work Requirements for the Able-bodied
States and localities that actually make provision for the able-
bodied destitute impose work requirements on the recipients. Since
all systems of general assistance accept the underlying notion that
those capable of it must work, most state systems of general assis-
tance require the able-bodied poor to labor for their maintenance.
Fifteen states officially require such labor as a condition of the
receipt of relief.4n Another nine permit the governmental institu-
years of age and sixty years of age, except for those individuals who are medi-
cally certified by a licensed physician as incapacitated; or whose presence in
the home is required because of the medically certified illness or incapacity of
another member of the household; or who are mothers or other relatives of a
minor under twelve years of age who are caring for the child.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 26.5 (West 1991):
The word 'unemployable,' is hereby defined as meaning those persons who are
unable to secure employment by reason of physical or mental disability, infirmi-
ty or temporary illness, or other disability which prevents such person from
securing ordinary employment, or who are unable to secure employment by
reason of Federal Relief Administration rules as to age requirements or work
relief programs; or due to being ineligible for worker's compensation insurance;
and persons who are unable to leave their homes to procure employment be-
cause of illness of a person in their care requiring constant supervision and
attention.
475. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1991) (requiring a claimant for social security dis-
ability to prove that his inability to obtain work is a result of a medically determinable
illness or injury); id. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (holding that a social security
disability claimant must demonstrate an inability to perform any substantial gainful activi-
ty); id. § 1382(c)(3) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (making similar requirements for proof of dis-
ability for receipt of S.S.I. benefits).
476. See Liebman, supra note 119, at 844-47. "The variety of individual reactions to
illness and injury presents the Social Security Administration with a large number of
difficult qualification questions. The SSA often concludes that an individual is not medi-
cally disabled because for many other persons a similar injury or illness is compatible
with work." rd. at 844.
477. AJLA. CODE § 38-I1A-4 (1992 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-281a
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 31-3404 (1983 & Supp. 1995); lu.. ANN.
STAT. ANN. ch. 305, paras. 516-1.4, 6-1.6 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-
13-1(1) (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(D)(3) (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 205.200(7) (Baldwin 1991); M. RE V. STAT. ANN. lit. 22, § 4316A (West 1992); MD.
CODE ANN., SOC. SERV. §§ 88A-17A-1, -17A-2 (1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
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tion dispensing aid to require work from those recipients who are
capable.478 Kansas, in addition to community work experience
programs, enacted the "Kanwork Act" which provides for a work
experience and training program for public assistance recipients 79
However, some states requiring labor do not enforce the provisions
because there are insufficient funds 3  Other states have aban-
doned their work programs because they have been unwilling to
bear the financial risks and expenses of employing recipients risks
which, somewhat ironically, the same states blithely mandate pri-
vate employers to bear (along with the moral obligation to hire the
unemployed).
The labor required of those capable is not meant to provide a
permanent occupation for the recipients of aid.' Rather, it is pri-
marily meant to serve the purpose of repayment to the state of the
§ 91(1)(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MJNN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.051(3) (1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 53-3-303,-304(3), -304(4) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-01-17 (1989);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 27.3 (West 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1 (1968 &
Supp. 1995).
478. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 17200 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-17-
103(3) (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.27 (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-9
(1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.700 (Vernon 1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 68-154.01 (1990
& Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.31 (1994); S.D CODWIED LAWS ANN.
§ 28-13-20 (1992); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 49.05(l)(g) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994).
479. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-7,-101 (1993).
480. Although counties in Connecticut must require general assistance recipients to work
in return for aid, only two-thirds are actually required to work. The counties would like
to provide training that would help recipients obtain meaningful employment, but the pro-
grams are too expensive to fund. Telephone Interview with David Frascarelli, General
Administrative Analyst, Connecticut Department of Social Services (Feb. 11, 1994). Gen-
eral assistance recipients in Maine are also required to work in return for aid, however,
there are no specific work or training programs available. Telephone Interview with Gary
Veilleux, General Assistance Supervisor, Augusta Department of Human Services (Aug. 31,
1992). Work relief programs are, of course, always dependent on the availability of state
funds. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-11A-3 (1992 & Supp. 1994) ("Program size, require-
ment, benefits and services shall be contingent upon the availability of funds.").
481. Iowa provides an interesting example. The workfare program for general assistance
recipients was abandoned in that state in the 1980s as a result of a workers compensation
lawsuit. The risk of additional liability from similar future lawsuits created the perception
that such programs were too risky and not cost-effective. Telephone Interview with Mike
Freilinger, Department of Social Services, Polk County, Iowa (Aug. 13, 1992).
482. State administrators are well aware of the limitations of the work programs they
are required to administer. Thus, administrative officials in one state concede that, al-
though all labor required of aid recipients is temporary in nature, attempts have been
made to provide training to recipients that would help them obtain meaningful employ-
ment. However, such programs are rarely successful because of inadequate funding. Tele-
phone Interview with David Frascarelli, General Administrative Analyst, Connecticut De-
partment of Social Services (Aug. 13, 1992).
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aid given, to curtail crime by keeping the otherwise idle busy, and
also to impress on the able-bodied that his or her maintenance is
dependent on his or her own efforts. When work is available for
aid recipients, it is usually in the form of menial labor, such as
janitorial services." In several states the labor provisions are lim-
ited by provisions designed to protect the jobs of permanent state
employees. Indeed, states sometimes make no effort to consider
even the physical ability of recipients in assigning work. This
conscious use of employment as a cost saving device survives
undiluted from the Elizabethan Poor Law."6
In addition to reducing the cost of aid by working for it, the
able-bodied are also required to obtain permanent non-institutional
employment. Thus, fifteen states require those capable of it to
work for their maintenance. A number of states require, in lieu
of or in addition to the work requirement, that the employable poor
483. Telephone Interview with Gary Veilleux, General Assistance Supervisor, Augusta
Department of Human Services (Aug. 31, 1992). Cf. Ronnigen, supra note 360, at A20
(describing proposal to give single welfare recipients part-time jobs doing park mainte-
nance, painting, or child care to help establish job histories).
484. Several states which require aid recipients to work specifically prohibit the employ-
ment of an aid recipient to replace a regular employee. See IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305,
para. 5f6-1.7 (Smith-Hurd 1993) C'Each such local governmental unit shall assure that...
(t]he taxing district or private not-for-profit organization does not use a person selected to
work... to replace a regular employee:); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-11-1(g) (West 1994)
("A poor relief recipient may not be assigned to work that would result in the displace-
ment of governmental employees or in the reduction of hours worked by governmental
employees."); M. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 17(b) (1991) ("[Elmployable persons shall be
assigned for work in full-time jobs ... , but no person shall be assigned to a job in
which he would replace regular workers or duplicate or replace an existing service.');
ND. CENT. CODE § 50-01-17.3(2) (1989) ("Any community work experience pro-
gram ... must provide ... [t]hat the program does not result in displacement of per-
sons currently employed."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 27.7 (West 1991) ('The work
performed on a community work and training program by a recipient of public assis-
tance ... .must not displace regular workers or result in the performance by such per-
sons of work that would otherwise be performed by employees of public or private agen-
cies, institutions or organizations ... ."); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(c)(2) (1968 &
Supp. 1995) ('In order to be a bona fide offer of employment, there must be reasonable
assurances that... [t]he offer of employment will not result in any displacement of
employed workers.").
485. Thus, a 102 lbs., 59-year-old recipient was assigned to move reffigerators in
Washtenaw County, Michigan. When the recipient refused, AFDC benefits were terminated
and not reinstated until after a hearing. VESELY ET" AL., supra note 96, at 44.
486. With respect to the Elizabethan Poor Law, tenBroek, notes that "the state, which
was then assuming a public obligation for the support of the able-bodied unemployed as
well as of the impotent, might by this method minimize its expenditures while at the
same time accomplishing its objective." tenBroek, supra note 9, at 276.
487. See supra note 477.
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register for work with state or private employment referral agen-
cies,"8  vocational or training programs, 9 or other employment-
related programs."
f. Restitution
Cost savings are also effected by requiring the poor who re-
ceive general assistance to repay the state for any aid received if
they later come into any money or property. Eleven states, by
statute, pennit the administering body to recover its expenses from
the recipient or his estate, at least up to the amount of the aid
actually dispensed.49 ' Three states allow those administering the
488. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 31-3404(4) (1983 & Supp. 1995) (requiring application
with the department of employment); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 516-1.4 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (stating regulations pertaining to the registration for and acceptance of bona fide
work offers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205-200(7)(a) (Baldwin 1991) (discussing registra-
tion with the state employment office); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4316-A(1)(B)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (discussing registration for work); MD. CODE ANN., SOC.
SERv. § 88A-17A-I(a) (1992) (discussing registration with local employment security of-
fice); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405.1(a) (1968 & Supp. 1995) (requiring registration for
employment, manpower, and training services).
489. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-281a (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (defining
employable persons for purposes of "work readiness programs"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 4316-A(l)(0) (West 1992) (defining training, educational, or rehabilitation programs).
490. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-I1A-4 (1992) (stating that every non-exempt applicant
or recipient of public assistance must register and participate in the employment program);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(d)(B)(3) (1993) (requiring a community work experience pro-
gram); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.051(3a) (West 1994) (requiring a work readiness pro-
gram).
491. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.220 (1990) ("The total amount paid in assistance to a
recipient constitutes a claim against the recipient and the recipient's estate.'); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-283(a) (West 1992) ("Any person who receives relief from any town or
municipality of this state shall be liable to reimburse such town or municipality for any
moneys or relief received"); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-20-27-1 (West 1994) (stating that a
claim may be filed "against the estate of a poor relief recipient who: (1) dies leaving an
estate; and (2) is not survived by a spouse or a dependent child less than eighteen years
of age; for the value of aid or assistance given the recipient"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-
719a (1993) ("Any assistance paid shall be recoverable by the secretary as a debt due to
the state."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4318 (West 1992) (allowing recovery of "the
full amount expended for that support either from the person relieved, or for any person
liable for the recipient's support, their executors or administrators, in a civil action"); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 77 (1991) ("On the death of any recipient, the total amount of
assistance paid under this subtitle shall be allowed as a claim against the estate."); MNCH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 400.77 (West 1988) (empowering the government "to collect and
receive funds to reimburse the county for expenditures made on behalf of recipients of
any form of aid or relief. . . from such recipients . . . or from the estates of recip-
ients"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165:20-b (1994) (stating that a locality may recover
amounts paid in relief from any person "who is returned to an income status after receiv-
ing the assistance" which allows the recipient to reimburse the locality); N.D. CENT.
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relief to contract with the recipient to repay the relief granted. 4
Eight states are given the authority to seek reimbursement from
those relatives of a recipient who are statutorily liable for sup-
port 40 Several states also require the prospective recipient to re-
pay from future earnings or out of any property the recipient might
have gained while receiving general assistance.494 Several states
CODE § 50-01-21 (1989) ("County funds used for subsistence, medical, hospital, or burial
expenses of county indigents may not be considered as gifts, and the county shall have a
preferred claim against the estate of any person for funds expended for such person
.... "); OR. REV. STAT. § 411.795(l) (1993) ("The amount of any general assistance
paid under this chapter is a claim against the property or any interest therein belonging to
and a part of the estate of any deceased recipient.. . "); S.D. CoDmm LAWS ANN. §
28-14-1 (1992) ('When any county shall furnish relief to any person ... . such county
shall have a claim against the person so relieved for the value of such relief. . .
492. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-13-20 (1992) ('IThe board may require the recip-
lent of assistance to enter into a contract for the repayment of all or part of the assis-
tance he receives."); WAsH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 74.04.005(10)(f)xn)(A) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1995) C(Mhe department may provide grant assistance... from the date the
agreement is signed ... [pirovided, [t]hat ... It]he applicant or recipient signs an
agreement to repay the lesser of the amount of aid received ... .") (emphasis added). In
Maine, the court in Oliver v. Petit, 432 A.2d 428, 431 (Me. 1981) upheld a contractual
promise by a recipient to reimburse a municipality for general assistance which was dupli-
cated by later benefits.
493. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (1990) ("Every designated person who fails to support
the needy person when directed by the department to do so, . . . shall reimburse the state
or a municipality for the funds expended . . . for the relief. . .of the needy person,
and these sums with interest and costs may be recovered... :); CAL. WE.F. AND INST.
CODE § 17300 (West 1991) ("All aid rendered by the county under this part shall be a
charge against the responsible relative or relatives of the recipient thereof, and the county
rendering aid shall be entitled to reimbursement therefore.); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-3
(1993) ("Any county having provided for such pauper upon the failure of such relatives
to [support the pauper] may bring an action against such relatives of full age and recover
for the provisions so furnished."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.13 (West 1994) ("Any county
having expended money for the assistance or support of a poor person .. . may recover
the money from [the person, the person's estate or relatives]."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. L
22, § 4318 (West 1992) C'A municipality or the State, which has incurred general assis-
tance program costs for the support of any eligible person, may recover the full amount
expended for that support from ... any person liable for the recipient's support, ....
in a civil action.); MICH. CoN'. LAws ANN. § 400.77 (West 1988) ("The county depart-
ment of social welfare is hereby authorized and empowered to collect and receive funds
to reimburse the county for expenditures made on behalf of recipients of any form of aid
or relief... from . .. their relatives legally responsible . . . "); N.D. CENT. CODE §
50-01-19 (1989) ('Te county may recover for necessaries furnished to an indigent person
from his father, mother, or adult children."); OR. REv. STAT. § 416.170(1) (1993) ("If the
relative fails to [support or contribute to the support of an indigent], the division may
cause to have issued ... a warrant directed to the sheriff... commanding the sheriff to
levy upon and sell the real and personal property of the relative found within that county,
for the payment of the amount of the contribution . . .
494. CAL. WELay. & INST. CODE § 17403 (West 1991) ("If a person for the support of
whom public moneys have been expended acquires property, the county shall have a
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have given themselves the right to place a lien on property ac-
quired by an aid recipient 95
Despite the broad power to seek reimbursement, a number of
states with the power to seek reimbursement rarely pursue the
matter. The states' reluctance to pursue reimbursement from former
clients can be explained by a variety of factors. Foremost among
them is the notion that the cost to the state of obtaining reimburse-
ment may exceed the amount sought to be reimbursed. This is
particularly true when the amount to be reimbursed is small and
the former client refuses the reimbursement request, requiring the
governmental entity to seek recoupment through legal action. Thus,
reimbursement provisions can serve more as in terrorem measures,
indirectly reducing costs by discouraging applications for relief,
than as a direct means of recovering costs. Additionally, since
stasis rewards productivity and abhors redistribution, static systems
tend to avoid situations where recoupment results in
claim against him to the amount of a reasonable charge for moneys so expended ... D;
MD. ANN. CODE art 88A, § 76 (1991) ("Any assistance paid before the recipient has
come into possession of such property or income and in excess of his need shall be
recoverable by the county department as a debt due:); N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 104
(McKinney 1992)::
A public welfare official may bring an action or proceeding against a person
discovered to have real or personal property, or against the estate or the execu-
tors, administrators and successors in interest of a person who dies leaving real
or personal property, if such person .... received assistance and care during
the preceding ten years, and shall be entitled to recover up to the value of
such property the cost of such assistance or care.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.08 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) ("If any person is the owner of
property at the time of receiving general relief ... , or if such person becomes self-
supporting, the authorities charged with the care of the dependent, . . . may sue for the
value of the general relief from such person or the person's estate . . . ."). Wages are
included in the definition of property for repayment purposes. City of Madison v. Lange,
408 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Wis. CL App. 1987).
495. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4320 (West 1992) ("A municipality or the State
may claim a lien against the owner of real estate for the amount of money spent by it to
provide mortgage payments on behalf of an eligible person under this chapter [general
assistance] . . . ."); N.H. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 165:28 (1994) ("The amount of money
spent by a town or city to support an assisted person under this chapter shall, except for
just cause, be made a lien on any real estate owned by the assisted person:); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAws ANN. § 28-14-1 (1992) ('When any county shall furnish relief to any per-
son . . . , such county shall have a claim against the person so relieved for the value of
such relief, which may be enforced against any property, not exempt from execution,
which such person may have or later acquire:"). In Illinois, a township may require a
property owning aid recipient to agree to a lien or a charge upon his property as a
means to recover non-medical general assistance benefits. Libertyville Township v.
Woodbury, 460 N.E.2d 66 (l1. App. Ct. 1984).
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reimpoverishment. This is recognized by statute in some states."'
The courts of other states, such as California, Colorado, and Mary-
land, have also modified the government's power to recoup from
after-acquired income or property.4  The effect of these determi-
nations do not affect the primary cost minimizing effect of the
principle of restitution-to the extent that recipients acquire wealth
or income, amounts received as poor relief ought to be treated as a
loan (the funds returned thereafter useable to provide for the needs
of other paupers), collectable to the extent that collection will not
result in a renewed need for relief.
But even states that do not, as a routine matter, seek reim-
bursement, do so on occasion when the prospects of recovery are
good. For instance, some states seek reimbursement only after the
recipient or former recipient becomes a judgment creditor, or re-
ceives money in settlement of a dispute.493 Some states also re-
cover upon the occurrence of more extraordinary financial events.
California and Connecticut, for instance, seek reimbursement from,
or terminate aid to, recipients who come into windfalls, such as a
lottery winning.9
496. See, eg., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165.20-b (1994) ("Any town or city furnishing
assistance to any person who is returned to an income status after receiving the assistance
which enables him to reimburse the town or city without financial hardship may recover
from such persons the amount of assistance provided.") (emphasis added).
497. The California Supreme Court held in County of San Diego v. Muniz, 583 P.2d
109 (Cal. 1978), that the county could not recoup prior assistance payments from the
wages of a former recipient necessary for the support of such person. The Colorado Su-
preme Court in Denver Dep't of Welfare v. Gomer, 346 P.2d 1016 (Colo. 1959), held
that the provision which requires reimbursement of aid from after-acquired property does
not apply when a deed is released and authorities had full knowledge of such property.
Further, in Maryland, the court in Worcester Ct. Welfare Bd. v. Wyatt, 150 A.2d 435
(Md. 1959) held that for the county to have a claim for recovery of assistance from a
recipient's estate, the recipient must have been receiving assistance at the time of his
death. The court also stated recovery would not be allowed against a husband's estate for
assistance given to his wife. See generally Blanton, supra note 9, at 43-44.
498. Connecticut and California, for example, will generally attempt to recover prior
assistance payments from recipients recovering sums in litigation. Telephone Interview with
Alan Kaplan, Connecticut Department of Social Services, Hartford, Connecticut (Aug. 13,
1992); Telephone Interview with Ms. Rifkin, Department of Social Services, San Francisco
County, California (Aug. 24, 1992) (discussing assistance recovery only if the county
should learn of the litigation recovery); see also Lynne Tuohy, Lawyers To Supply Re-
cords, HARTFORD COURANT, July 2, 1991, at C3 (stating that lawyers in a personal injury
firm were required to turn over to the state information on 52 cases involving welfare
recipients obligated to reimburse the state from their legal "windfalls").
499. See Tuohy, supra note 498 (discussing that recipients are obligated to reimburse
the state for welfare payments from lottery winnings); Nancy Skelton & Jerry Gillam, Lot-
tery Winners May Be Bumped Off Welfare Rolls, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1985, at A3 (not-
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g. Group (Usually Family) Support Obligations
As a system of minimums, a system of last resort, the general
theory suggests that poor relief systems will tend to impose the
relief obligation on others. I have discussed how this manifests
itself in cost shifting to private charities and the federal govern-
ment. But cost shifting of this kind also manifests itself in the
tendency to assign fiscal responsibility for adult paupers to a large
range of individuals-primarily relatives."to Why relatives? Be-
cause they are the individuals on whom it is easiest to impose the
obligation, -if for no other reason than the long tradition in Western
religion and culture for imposing mutual obligations for support on
a unit composed of relatives by blood or marriage, at the head of
which was the father."0 ' This obligation is in addition to the gen-
eral family law style obligation requiring a parent to support his or
her minor children."ta
State general assistance systems, then, tend to place generous
ing that anyone owing the state money will have debts deducted from winnings and win-
ners will have their state or county benefits reduced or terminated upon winning the lot-
tery).
500. This cost shifting is not an unconscious act by government. See, e.g., Pyke v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 453 N.W.2d 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), where the court stated
that the policy of considering a spouse's income in determining eligibility for general
assistance for the other spouse was rationally related to the state's interest of allocating
funds among welfare recipients. Cf Dempsey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 404
A.2d 1373 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (noting that an inquiry into the potential resources of
a legally responsible relative is proper in determining an applicant's eligibility for public
assistance).
501. On the origins of modem Western family structure, see generally JAMES A.
BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEx, AND CIUSTIAN SOCIrfY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1987); SUZANNE
DIXON, THE RoMAN FAMILY (1992); FRANCES & JOSEPH GIms, MARRAGE AND THE FAM-
ILY IN TIE MIDDLE AGEs (1987). Medieval Christian notions of charity turned in large
measure on the imperative of intr-family unit responsibility. See supra part IV.A.
502. See, e.g., F.A. STAT. ANN. § 856.04 (West 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C-24-5
(West 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4 (West 1991) ("The parent entitled to the
custody of a child must give him support and education suitable to his circumstances:.).
Some jurisdictions also require some form of parental support of adult children. See, e.g.,
OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 12 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) ("It is the duty of the father
and the mother of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to main-
tain such person to the extent of their ability.'). But see Sharum v. Sharum, 225 P. 628
(Olda. 1924) (holding that a grandfather need not support a minor dependent of his indi-
gent son). For a discussion of the general obligation to support minors, see Minow, supra
note 17, at 827-34. On the implicit notions of patriarchy, and control of women inherent
in systems which assume that a male is required for the support of children, and which
underlies much family law and welfare discourse, see Fimeman, supra note 17, at 277-89;
White, supra note 17, at 1986-90, 1999-2000 (describing control through domestic vio-
lence).
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financial obligations on relatives to support their family members.
Indeed, the questions of identifying the poor and determining the
extent of the imposition of familial support obligations are some-
times fused by the courts in interpreting the scope of state general
assistance provisions. °  These support obligations are enforceable
by the state. Generally, the agency which was required to make
poor relief payments to an indigent is allowed to recover the
amounts paid from these responsible relatives5 °4 Some statutes
give the poor relief agency the power to seek to compel a respon-
sible relative to make future support payments to the pauper.5 °5
503. See, e.g., Atkins v. Curtis, 66 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 1954) (determining that a person
is not "poor" and therefore eligible for relief if there exists a legally liable relative who
possesses sufficient income and resources to maintain the applicant).
504. See, e.g., CAL. WELl. AND INST. CODE § 17300 (West 1991) ("All aid rendered
by the county... shall be a charge against the responsible relative or relatives of the
recipient thereof. . . :); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)
(stating that the court can "enforce orders for payment of support against any person who
neglects or refuses to furnish necessary support to [a relative], according to his or her
ability to furnish such support"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 511 (1985) (imposing sup-
port obligation on parents, children, and spouses); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5110-2
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (noting that responsible relatives "shall be liable for any financial aid
extended under this Code to a person for whose support they are responsible"); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4319 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a state can recoup
general assistance costs from legally responsible spouses or parents); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 117A, § 7 (West 1994) (holding that parents are bound to support children in
proportion to ability); Mimcr. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 401.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995)
("Upon the failure of any relative of a poor person to relieve and maintain the poor
person, the county department of social services. .. shall apply.., for an order to
compel the relief."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.15 (West 1994) (imposing financial re-
sponsibility on certain relatives of recipient); Muss. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (1993) (noting
that relatives of a pauper are liable to any governmental entity which supports that per-
son); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 165:19 (1994) (requiring certain relatives to "assist or
maintain such person when in need of relief"); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 101 (McKinney
1992) (stating that relatives are liable to public welfare district or non-profit institution for
care of medically indigent person); OR. REv. STAT. § 416.110 (1993) (noting that the
state subrogated to the right of indigent to prosecute a relative for support); R.L GEN.
LAWS § 40-5-13 (1990) ("The kindred of any poor person.., shall be holden to support
the pauper in proportion to their ability."); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-127 (Miche 1995)
('The local board may proceed in the manner provided by law against any person who is
legally liable for the support of an applicant or recipient of assistance to require such
person, if of sufficient financial ability, to support the applicant or recipient."); W. VA.
CODE § 9-5-9 (1990) ('he relatives of an indigent person, who are of sufficient ability,
shall be liable to support such person in the manner required by the department of wel-
fare .... "); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 49.90(1)(a)l (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) ("lhe parent
and spouse of any dependant person who is unable to maintain himself or herself shall
maintain such dependant person... .- ).
505. See Freitas v. County of Contra Costa, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Ct App. 1994) (stat-
ing that when a responsible adult is defined by the state statute, the county may not
impose financial responsibility on family members not covered by the statute). See also
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However, given the redistributive potential of family support, courts
have tended not to broaden the reach of these statutory obliga-
tions.50
Of course, the more inclusive the definition of family group,
the more likely the state will be able to find an individual who
will be well-off enough to assume the financial burden of main-
taining the pauper. Generally, since the institution of Elizabethan
Poor Law, legally responsible relatives have included the parents,
grandparents, and children of the potential aid recipient.N Con-
temporary general assistance provisions show surprising little varia-
tion from the Elizabethan ideal. Thus, several states continue to
impose financial liability for paupers on parents, children, grand-
children, grandparents, siblings, and spouses.50 8 Maine imposes
the obligation only on parents and spouses, but not on siblings.5°
In contrast, West Virginia imposes the burden on children, parents,
and siblings, but not grandparents or grandchildren ° Other states
limit the obligation to members of the immediate family5" The
infra text accompanying notes 569-71.
506. See, e.g., Anchor v. State Soc. See. Comm'n, 191 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. Ct. App.
1945) (holding that a granddaughter or an adult child is under no obligation to support a
grandparent or parent); Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Pierce, 519 S.W.2d (Tex. Civ. App.
1975) (stating that adults have no legal obligation to support their parents).
507. See discussion supra part IV.B. On the origins of the parental obligation to support
minor children, particularly the support of bastards, see tenBroek, supra note 9, at 284-86.
For modem commentary on the necessity for such obligation and the efficacy of its en-
forcement, see generally Payne, supra note 178; Creech, supra note 178.
508. ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (1990) (holding spouse, children, parents, grandparents,
grandchildren, or siblings of the needy person responsible for support); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 252.2 (West 1994) (holding father, mother, children responsible for support of the needy
person), id. § 252.5 (presenting an alternative to section 252.2, grandparents and grand-
children are also responsible for support); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 43-31-25 (1993) (holding
responsible "[tihe father and grandfather, the mother and grandmother, and brothers and
sisters, and the descendants of any pauper not able to work"); R.J. GEN. LAWS § 40-5-13
(1990) (holding the father or grandfather, mother or grandmother, children or grandchil-
dren, by consanguinity, or children by adoption responsible for support); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 17-14-2 (1991) (holding children, parents, siblings, grandchildren, grandparents
responsible for support).
509. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4319 (West 1992) (stating that parental liability
for support of a child ends when the child reaches 25 years of age; grandparents and
siblings may be liable for rental payments).
510. W. VA. CODE § 9-5-9 (1990) (holding that a mother's obligation follows a
sibling's, while a father's precedes a sibling's).
511. CA1 WELF. & INST. CODE § 17300 (West 1991) (holding spouse and parent of a
minor child responsible for support); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1995) (holding that support should be provided for the pauper spouse and children
under 18); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 511 (1985) (holding the parent, child, or spouse
responsible for support); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-3 (1993) (requiring support by father,
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financial responsibility is sometimes prioritized in accordance with
the degree of relation between the pauper and the financially re-
sponsible relative In Iowa, the prioritization creates a right of
contribution in favor of those-grandparents and grandchil-
dren-farther down the line of financial responsibility1 Several
states, by statute, also limit relative responsibility by the obvious
condition that those responsible have the financial means to comply
with the support obligation 4 And some states limit the obliga-
tion of parents to support adult children 51
mother, and child of any pauper); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 305, para. 5110-2 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (holding the spouse and parents of recipient responsible); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 117A, § 7 (West 1994) (holding parents responsible); MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 401.3 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (holding husband, wife, father, or mother responsible);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256D.15 (1994) (holding for support for the pauper spouse, parent
of adult child residing with parent); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 101 (McKinney 1992)
(holding the spouse parent of a child under 21 years of age responsible); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 165:19 (1994) (holding the father, mother, stepfather, stepmother, son,
daughter, husband, or wife responsible); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-10 (1989) ("holding
the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person" responsible); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 416.010 (1993) (holding responsible the husband, wife, father, mother, son, or daughter
21 years of age or over); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968) ("The husband, wife,
child, father and mother of every indigent person . .. .'); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-90.1
(Mlchie 1995) (holding the person who lives in the same home of a child and co-habits
as husband or wife with the parent of the child responsible); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.90(1)(a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (holding responsible the parent and spouse of
dependant).
512. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 252.5 (West 1994) (holding grandparents and
grandchildren responsible only if no nearer relative is able to support the pauper); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (1991) (holding children, parents, siblings, grandchildren, and
grandparents responsible-in that order); W. VA. CODE § 9-5-9 (1990) (holding children,
father, siblings, and mother responsible-in that order).
513. This, of course, increases the expenses of the relatives while decreasing the expens-
es of the state. Thus, the unfortunate grandparent or grandchild is given the opportunity
(by lawsuit, if all else fails) to require nearer relatives to (in turn) reimburse them for
moneys paid to the state. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 252.5, 252.15 (West 1994). See also
ALASKA STAT. § 47.25.230 (1990) (unposing support obligations on grandparents and
grandchildren).
514. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-12-3 (1993) (holding relatives responsible only if
"sufficiently able"); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 117A, § 7 (West 1994) (holding rela-
tives responsible "in proportion to their ability'); ND. CENr. CODE § 14-09-10 (1989 &
Supp. 1995) (holding relatives responsible "to the extent of [their] ability"); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968) (holding relatives responsible "if of sufficient financial abili-
ty"); W. VA. CODE § 9-5-9 (1990) ('The relatives of an indigent person, who are of
sufficient ability, shall be liable to support such person in the manner required by the
department of welfar... :).
515. See, e.g., CAL. WT.F. & INST. CODE § 17300 (West 1991) (holding parents of
minor children responsible for support); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215 (West 1992
& Supp. 1995) (holding parents responsible for children under 18); MINN. STAT.
§ 256D.15 (West 1994) (stating that support is limited to minor children and adult chil-
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The theoretical obligation of relatives is sometimes enforced
only in the breach-it, again, may cost more to enforce than the
value of the recovery. For instance, although Iowa interprets the
relative financial liability provision very liberally, it makes little
effort to actively seek repayment from the recipient or from rela-
tives liable for the support of the indigent relative. Counties en-
force the provision by requiring a parent to house the poor person
if possible. The county will deny general assistance to an applicant
if he or she can stay with a parent."6 Alaska considers the in-
come of spouses, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, or
siblings as an available resource to an aid recipient if he or she is
living with them and they will be subject to a civil action for
reimbursement if they fail to support the poor person. However, if
a responsible relative is not living with the indigent, the provision
is not enforced.5 7 Other states have similar approaches to the rel-
ative liability provisions 18 Additionally, some states have explic-
itly limited the force of these provisions by judicial interpretation
of the statutory obligation 9
dren living with parent); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1992) (holding support
is limited to children under 21); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-90.1 (Michie 1995) (holding
support is limited to children living at home).
516. Telephone Interview with Mike Freilinger, Iowa Department of Social Services,
Polk County, Iowa (Aug. 13, 1992).
517. Telephone Interview with Rick Hanby, Eligibility Technician, Alaska Department of
Health and Social Services (Feb. 25, 1994). See also ALASKA STAr. § 47.25.230 (1990):
Every needy person shall be supported while living and upon dying, shall be
given a decent burial by the spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchil-
dren, or siblings of the needy person when directed by the department to do
so, in the order named. Every designated person who fails to do so, or fails to
give the needy person a decent burial shall reimburse the state or a municipali-
ty for the funds expended by either the state or the municipality for the relief
or burial of the needy person, and these sums with interest and costs may be
recovered by the state or a municipality of the state in a civil action.
518. In California, counties expect spouses and parents to take financial responsibility
depending on their ability to do so, but do not enforce the law requiring relatives to
support poor persons. Telephone Interview with Ms. Rifkin, Department of Social Services,
San Francisco County, California (Aug. 24, 1992). In Connecticut, towns usually do not
force relatives to financially support their poor relatives despite the relatives' legal obliga-
tion to do so. Telephone Interview with David Frascarelli, General Administrative Analyst,
Connecticut Department of Social Services (Feb. 11, 1994). In West Virginia, the relative
liability provisions were enforced at one time, but are currently enforced only to the
extent that a parent is compelled to support minor children. Telephone Interview with
Rondel Spruce, Economic Assistance Supervisor, West Virginia Department of Human
Services (Aug. 12, 1992).
519. California provides a good example of a state with a traditional form of general
assistance statute, CAL. WtF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 1991), which has been inter-
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h. Enveloping Aid in Stigma, Humiliation, and Complexity
To the extent that the poor relief system is able to inculcate
the "work ethic" among its potentially eligible destitute population,
the system will reduce the cost to maintain that group (the group
is now smaller). One way to inculcate this ethic, while affirming
the notion that poor relief is "bad" (drive home the point that
almost anything, i.e. any kind of work, is better than poor relief),
is to surround the process of obtaining aid with sufficient stigma,
humiliation, and complexity that some of the otherwise eligible
poor will be discouraged from taking advantage of the aid (at least
theoretically) offered.
Stigma, humiliation, and complexity are achieved in a variety
of ways. First, the instructions and procedures for obtaining relief
can be made quite complex. Thus, plaintiffs in City of Los Angeles
v. County of Los Angeles alleged that the application procedures
for general assistance in Los Angeles County were unreasonably
onerous, including an initial oral screening, the completion of a
twelve-page application, interviews, and fraud investigations 0 '
Even the most trivial failure to comply can result in loss of eligi-
bility or denial of benefits, and the obligation to start the process
preted by the state's courts to limit the ability of the county to force parental support.
Mooney v. Pickett, 483 P.2d 1231 (Cal. 1971); Bernhardt v. Alameda County Bd. of
Supervisors, 130 Cal. Rptr. 189 (Ct App. 1976). The courts proceeded from the proposi-
tion, expressed in Mooney, 483 P.2d at 1237-39, that an entire class of persons could not
be excluded if some of the class members might be eligible for aid, to the determination
of the court in Bernhardt, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 193, that regulations which deemed that
parental resources must be counted in determining the eligibility of teenage applicants for
general assistance were invalid. As a result of the holding in Bernhardt, the county would
be required to make individual determinations of actual support before the county would
be empowered to deny relief. In effect, the family obligation provisions of CAL. WELF. &
INsr. CODE § 17300 (West 1991) have been made more difficult to enforce. The effect of
these rulings is to weaken the ability of the state to aggressively enforce the parental
support obligations provided in the general assistance provisions, increasing both the cost
of administration of the general assistance system and the aggregate amount of aid given.
In this sense at least, the decisions seem to go against the static paradigm. Importantly,
however, the courts did not determine that the county was prohibited from requiring rela-
tives from supporting their indigent family members; rather, the county was prohibited
from presuming the existence of this obligation in cases where the child might be an
adult. Note, however, that there may be little support for this view in the statute itself,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10000 notwithstanding. See Bensinger, supra note 9, at 522
& n.201 (outlining county's arguments rejected by courts); Blanton, supra note 9, at 38-
39 (listing roles of statutory regulations used by California courts to interpret the general
assistance laws).
520. First Amended Complaint, supra note 13, JM 6-41.
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over again. ' Second, the institutions designated for the process-
ing of requests for state charity retain the hierarchic characteristics,
the rigid status boundary between donor and recipient, master and
servant, which traditionally formed part of charitable giving. As a
consequence, the recipient is expected to be humble, patient, and
grateful; the donor can be excused its rudeness, insensitivity, and
arbitrariness?' z The donor's conduct constitutes yet another form
of the message society sends to the recipient- "Is the paycheck
worth the humiliation? Wouldn't you rather be working for mini-
mum wage than receiving this treatment?"5' But, as Professor
White has discussed, it is easier to talk about getting a job, than it
is actually getting a job that does not, in turn, carry humiliations,
discriminations, and the potential for violence any less severe than
that suffered at the hands of the archetypically mean, slothful, petty
bureaucrats which seem to inhabit a number of general assistance
offices nationwide.
521. See THm MouN PLEASAT REPoRT, supra note 17, at 91-101; VESELY Er Ai-,
supra note 96, at 41-44. Anecdotal actounts also abound in the popular press. See, e.g.,
Melinda Henneberger, Kingston Journal: Real Faces of Welfare at Meeting, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1993, at B6. For a description of the daunting complexity of federal categorical
programs, see Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-01.
522. There are a number of studies and reports which document the negative relation-
ship between recipients and the staffs of state social services agencies. See, e.g., THE
MOUNT PLEASANT REPORT, supra note 17; VESELY Er AL., supra note 96, at 41-44
(Report of Project Fair Play, a project conducted by the Human Services Design Laborato-
ry of the School of Applied Sciences at Case Western Reserve University between Nov.
1980 and Sept. 1981, the purpose of which was to study the administration of AFDC in
selected welfare departments in the Midwest, train advocates for AFDC recipients, and
bring problems to the attention of the appropriate officials.).
The Project Fair Play Report grouped the offensive conduct into four categories,
giving examples of instances of each at the sites studied. The categories included rude-
ness, insensitivity, arbitrariness, and inflexibility. Rudeness included bouts of shouting and
abrupt conduct (so abrupt that the social worker accompanying the recipient feared asking
questions of the staff person for fear of jeopardizing the benefits of the recipient).
VEsELY ET AL., supra note 96, at 42. Worker insensitivity was marked by lack of con-
cern for the individual needs of recipients (for example, children in the hospital), and lack
of timely action upon a change of circumstances, (the example given was of a recipient
who was entitled to increased benefits, whose increase was delayed several months be-
cause the state employee had not had the time to "get around to it.") Id. at 43. Arbitrari-
ness was evidenced by petty power acts by state employees-the denial of benefits be-
cause the worker believed the recipient was not watching her child, or because the case-
worker thought the recipient's boyfriend ought to support her. Id. at 43-44. Inflexibility
was marked by a mindless adherence to the letter rather than the spirit of the rules-the
denial of benefits to a 59 year-old, 102 lbs. recipient who refused a work assignment
moving refrigerators. Id. at 44.
523. See White, supra note 17, at 1979-85 (discussing the bleak job prospects of a
middle-aged African American woman on welfare).
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Another effective means of stigmatizing the poor is through
education. Education is meant to teach us to recognize the norm,
and to pattern our lives on that basis. Western education teaches us
status-it helps all of us internalize the basic assumptions of our
culture. Our norms require that we all provide for our own main-
tenance. Our norms also require that all non-majority racial, ethnic,
and religious groups adhere at least to the major tenets of domi-
nant group cultural patterns. Education is meant to teach us all to
adhere to these norms without question 24 Society ensures adher-
ence to its norms through tremendous social pressure. It trains
people to believe that they are useless, lazy, and unproductive
when they seek welfare benefits. 5 And then it seeks to prove
the point by resort to all manner of scientific, sociological, and
religious studies.5  Indeed, much like cultural anthropologists
venturing into the forests of New Guinea before the Second World
War, late twentieth century social scientists have ventured into the
worlds of American cities to "describe" the sex codes of the poor
"inner-city" (that is, African-American) youths and how it contrib-
524. In this sense, at least, Karl Marx may have been right in discussing the British
attitude towards the education of the lower classes in the 19th century, and in the 20th
century as well.
The actual meaning of education in the minds of the philanthropic economists
is this: Every worker should learn as many branches of labor as possible, so
that if, either through the application of new machinery or through a changed
division of labor, he is thrown out of one branch, he can easily be accommo-
dated in another.
Karl Marx, Wages, lecture delivered before the German Working Men's Association in
Brussels, Belgium (Dec. 1847) in NEUE RHEINISC-E ZEITUNG, Apr. 5-7, and 11, 1849,
and reprinted in VI T1E KARL MARX LBRARY (ON EDUCA7TON, WOMEN, AND CML-
DREN) 25 (Saul K. Padover ed. & trans., 1975). Today, we speak of vocational education
and coping skills training for our young people. Of course, the Western non-Marxist
world does not have a monopoly on this conception of the role of education. See STALUN,
supra note 136 (Soviet Union); Read, supra note 136 (Cuba).
525. For example, one woman trapped in welfare for lack of better alternatives de-
scribed herself as lazy, though it is difficult to understand how she might better her cir-
cumstances. White, supra note 17, at 1971-97 (approaching the problem through the words
of Elaine Preston about her life trapped on welfare).
526. Rosemary L. Bray, a former editor of the New York Tunes Book Review, and the
product of growing up on AFDC, perhaps recently said it best:
But all manner of sociologists and policy gurus continue to equate issues that
simply aren't equivalent-welfare, race, rates of poverty, crime, marriage and
childbirth-and to reach conclusions that serve to demonize the poor.
Rosemary L. Bray, So How Did I Get Here: In Recounting Her Hard Fought Passage
from Welfare to Writing, the Author Tells How She and Her Family Beat A System De-
signed to Mire Them In Failure, N.Y. Tihms MAO., Nov. 8, 1992, at 35, 39.
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utes to their inability to fend for themselves as the rest of society
might expect 27 Education, thus, reinforces the notion that racial
groups, and women, both overrepresented among the poor, are
inferior," or adhere to inferior modes of family organization,529
or fail to properly train their children in the need to adhere to
fundamental social rules (particularly the rule that everyone must
labor for their maintenance), s0 It is a view that holds to the no-
tion that:
One does not require a deep sociological imagination to
sense the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of grow-
ing up in an impoverished household where there is no
activity associated with the world and a household that, in
turn, is spatially embedded in a commercially abandoned
locality where pimps, drug pushers, and unemployed street
527. An example: Professor Anderson recently described the manner in which inner-city
youth express themselves, and the causes of this behavior due to the inability of inner-
city adolescents to attain the traditional mark of American "manhood," that is, the power
to form economically self-reliant families.
Partially in response, the young man's peer group emphasizes sexual prowess as
a mark of manhood, at times including babies as its evidence. A sexual game
emerges and becomes elaborated, with girls becoming lured by the boys' often
vague but convincing promises of love and marriage. As the girls submit, they
often end up pregnant and abandoned, but eligible for a limited but sometimes
steady income in the form of welfare, which may allow them to establish their
own households and, at times, attract other men in need of money.
Elijah Anderson, Sex Codes and Family Life Among Poor Inner-City Youths, 501 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 59 (1989) (quoted from the abstract). For a discussion
which reverses the order, see RicHARD POSNER, SEX AND REASON 167-68, 264 (1992)
(discussing the relationship between welfare and single parenthood; welfare induces women
to carry their pregnancies to term).
528. Arthur R. Jensen, How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?, 39
HARv. EDuc. REV. 1 (1969).
529. MOYNIHAN, supra note 17; WILLIAM . WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:
THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERmCLASs, AND PUmuc POLICY 104-05 (1987) (considering
marital status an appropriate objective to be fostered by public policy).
530. See, e.g., Kasarda, supra note 42, at 44-45 (noting that at the root of the concern
is the link between female headship and welfare dependency). Richard I. Murnane, Educa-
tion and the Well-Being of the Next Generation, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCR iP-
TIONS FOR CHANGE 289, 296-97 (Sheldon H. Danziger et a. eds., 1994):
But it is important to keep in mind that the roots of the low achievement of
many American children lie in the circumstances of poverty in which they live.
Consequently, educational policy changes not accompanied by policies that
significantly reduce the poverty that dominates many children's lives will have
only a modest influence on their academic achievement.
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people have replaced working fathers as predominant so-
cializing agents53
Complexity, stigma, and humiliation are augmented by punish-
ment. As in the time of the Tudor monarchy, those able-bodied
poor who refused to work for their keep, whether the work is
provided by the state or otherwise, will be punished. Punishment is
generally meted out in one of two ways. As an initial matter, most
states retain laws criminalizing conduct which in an earlier age
would have been subsumed under the vagrancy statutes.z This
type of conduct is usually characterized as disorderly conduct, and
includes sleeping in the streets or parks, or on public or private
property without permission, and public urination or intoxication,
public bathing, eating, or congregating, or blocking the free move-
ment of persons in a public place 3  Significantly, a number of
states have proscribed the act of begging to a greater or lesser
extent, with uneven success.5u The other favored means of pun-
ishing the non-compliant is by reducing benefits. A good example
of the use of rules to force "self-sufficiency": the federal
government's search for the means to transform welfare by limiting
531. Kasarda, supra note 42, at 44.
532. See POUND, supra note 90, at 53-57; Rosenheim, supra note 108, at 512-18.
533. Many of the ordinances under which this type of control is effected are local. All
are on the books of many localities. For a description of the use of the ordinances to
control the activities of the unemployed able-bodied poor, see Pottinger v. City of Miami,
810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Norman Siegel, Homelessness: Its Origins, Civil
Liberties Problems and Possible Solutions, 36 Via. L. REV. 1063, 1067-81 (1991); Si-
mon, supra note 9, at 631-33, 645-47; Baker, supra note 9, at 425 n.43.
534. New York City has banned begging in the subway system. 21 N.Y. Comp. R. &
REGs. tit. 21, § 1050.6 (1989) (upholding constitutional attack in Young v. New York
City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990); see Zur,
supra note 110, at 383-93. However, the federal courts have declared a New York City
law generally proscribing panhandling to violate the Federal Constitution. Loper v. New
York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). California has proscribed the ac-
costing of others to solicit alms. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1991) (codifying as a
misdemeanor accosting a person in a public place "for the purpose of begging or solicit-
ing alms"). This statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal court, Blair v.
Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that the statute was unconstitu-
tional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution), but was
enforced as constitutionally sound by the California state courts, Ulmer v. Municipal
Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1976); People v. Zimmerman, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1993). See also Panhandlers Hope Supreme Court Will Be Gener-
ous, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1990, at AIS. The District of Columbia proscribes begging on
the Capital grounds, D.C. CODE ANN. § 9-110 (1981 & Supp. 1995), and has attempted
to prevent begging in affluent neighborhoods. Upset by Beggars, Washington Arresting
Them, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1990, at A20.
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the time a recipient can remain on welfare and creating incentives
to marry and bear children within the marriage relationship after
the completion (at least) of high school53
But punishment can also come in a variety of other, more
subtle ways. Subsidizing the cost of the food to be purchased by
the poor and then limiting the choice of food is one way. The
poor are told, in effect, that they are too incompetent to decide for
themselves matters as simple as what to eat and where to buy
it."' The poor are also punished by being forced to live in places
which are generally held up to contempt and derision. Living in
welfare hotels, low-income housing, and in housing in the poorer
parts of the city may constitute a significant humiliation for those
who have to disclose the location of their residence to others. And
federal, state, and local laws may effectively prevent the dispersal
of the poor."' -
B. American General Assistance, Elizabethan Law, Ecclesiastical
Poor Law: Aren't We Talking About the Same System?
Current systems of general assistance in the United States are
demonstrably static. They are also strikingly similar to each other
in basic conception and implementation, as well as to those dusty
and irrelevant old systems each claimed to displace. While the
Elizabethan Poor Law and contemporary American general assis-
tance programs have each, in turn, added layers of sophistication
and complexity to the programs as implemented, the basic core and
the spirit animating such systems remains substantially the same.
Its sources are our birthright, our reality. An understanding of the
static paradigm and the general theory of poor relief brings these
similarities into stark focus. Let me highlight these similarities.
The three systems seem to share a fondness for an understand-
ing of poverty in cultural terms. This makes judgments of deviance
and relative worth easy to make and easier to defend at the level
of the unconscious. This is no surprise; we have no reason to
really question the underlying assumption that people have an
535. See discussion of these proposals in Backer, supra note 42.
536. See, e.g., 900 Stores Cut From Food Stamp Program, TuLSA WoRLD, Dec. 10,
1992, at A18 (describing the actions of the Department of Agriculture which determined
that the poor ought not to use food stamps at convenience stores "because they sell too
many sodas and snacks and not enough milk and bread").
537. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CH.-KENr L
REv. 795, 831-47 (1991).
1028 (Vol. 44:871
MEDIEVAL POOR LAW
obligation to fend for themselves, those who fail to do so are dif-
ferent; deviants in the fully critical and unpleasant sense of the
terms. This concept has ancient roots. In the medieval period it
was assumed that the habitually needy poor were different; the
poor were supposed to be different in a strict hierarchical soci-
ety538 While the poor were thought inferior, only the able-bodied
who refused to work, and thereby violated the class and status
norms of medieval society, were despised as deviants and punished
as beggars, thieves, and vagabonds. 9 The only ground for refusal
to aid the poor was the presumption that almsgiving would encour-
age vagrancy and idleness and in effect encourage the violation of
status norms; the habitually idle were to be kept from starvation;
no more."
This was the conceptualization of the problem that came to
dominate a substantial part of the Elizabethan Poor Law and the
American conceptions of poor relief.541 Indeed poverty as a cul-
tural crime can tend to dominate public policy for extended peri-
ods. By the time of the New Poor Law (the Poor Law Act of
1834) in Britain, the notion that not all the poor were bad, just
vagrants and mendicants (status outlaws in the old hierarchical
society), was extended to include all of the poor, even the working
poor. The commonly held notion was that if a person was desti-
tute, he was probably idle and he deserved his fate. These policy
notions have carried over to our own day, when homeless males
are usually instructed to simply shape up and get a job,42 even
by those who were once homeless themselves (perhaps this is not
surprising since the zeal of the converted usually exceeds that of
old believers). Society widely believes that all of the poor are
basically idle, and that the only way the poor can be induced to
work is to make the process of aid to the needy as humiliating and
difficult as possible 3
While the intensity of the policy implications of poverty as a
culture crime modulates over time, the underlying notion that pov-
erty is in the hands of the poor does not. Thus, consider the Brit-
538. See TIERNFY, supra note 36, at 58.
539. Id.
540. Roch, supra note 202, at 510; see AQuiNAS, supra note 196, at 544; Tiaat-:,
supra note 36, at 61.
541. MEN HER, supra note 14, at 39-53; PottN, supra note 90, at 39-76.
542. See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 43.
543. See HMIELPARB, supra note 52, at 147-76. See also Briggs, supra note 65, 232-
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ish reforms of the early twentieth century, when the view emerged
linking poverty not merely to individual irresponsibility, but also to
social maladjustment. While this maladjustment might be the result
of societal incentives, and therefore, not the "fault" of the malad-
justed-it was still clear that the poor would have to find some
way to relieve themselves of this condition. In a sense then, social
maladjustment was defined as normal-the system (regrettably to
be sure) was supposed to work this way. Thus, even if not their
fault, it was the poor and not society which was maladjusted, and
it would have to be the poor, and not society which would have to
change. The only change required of society would be to prevent
the existence of incentives to maladjustment.5"
Religious teaching mirrors the civil notion of the social malad-
justment of the destitute. Through the end of the twentieth century,
God has not yet been heard to lift the command to be self-suffi-
cient, delivered at the time of the expulsion from the Garden of
Eden. Sloth is sin; the taking of alms when one could work is
theft (from the giver as well as from the deserving who would
now have to make do without), and is therefore, a double sin. Pov-
erty is still a sign of sin, to be remedied by greater devotion to
religious teachings and greater application to work. Destitution of
the able-bodied was the mark of the hellfire to come. Though
perhaps less luridly expressed today (in some religious circles, at
least) than a century ago, or even a millennium ago, the underlying
belief has not changed. "A couple of millennia after the Apostle
Paul announced his welfare policy-'If anyone will not work, let
him not eat'-it has become the most popular idea of the 1992
Presidential campaign."'  Indeed, government still occasionally
calls on general religious (moral) principles to justify the core
value of the static paradigm.5" Thus, the 1990s have witnessed a
return to religiously or morally based arguments respecting the
poor and societal obligations to and from them.547
544. See Briggs, supra note 65, at 251-55 (discussing the changing focus on the nature
of the problems of the poor in early 20th century Britain).
545. Stephen Chapman, Clinton, Bush and Welfare: Beyond the Promises, CHIC. TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 1992, at C3. But see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note
224, at 83-105 (addressing the need to "require fundamental changes in social and eco-
nomic structures that perpetuate glaring inequalities and cut off millions of citizens from
full participation in the economic and social life of the nation") Id. at 93.
546. "Thus, providing the means and opportunity to enter the economic mainstream is
both morally right and economically sound." NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at
2.
547. A typical expression of this modem form of belief is represented by Gertrude
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But modem folk do not rely on religion alone. While in an-
cient times the culture of poverty might have referred to the taste
of some people for sloth and the life of a thief or rogue, in mod-
em times people have tended to find medical and scientific basis
for the existence of a culture of poverty. Thus, Oscar Lewis
described the traits commonly thought to be shared by the poor
which might be responsible for their own inability to overcome
their miserable economic conditions:
Other traits include high incidence of maternal deprivation,
of orality, and of weak ego structure; confusion of sexual
identification; lack of impulse control; strong present time
orientation, with little ability to defer gratification and to
plan for the future; sense of resignation and fatalism; wide-
spread belief in male superiority; and high tolerance for
psychological pathology of all sorts0"
The modem version of this notion, that the poor are somehow
different and inferior from the rest of us is also tinged with racial
and ethnic overtones; and the inferiority highlighted is evidenced
by the subjects' lack of economic success, because to be normal
means to be successful, or at least stable and upwardly mobile 50
Himmelfarb, who writes:
We are now confronting the consequences of this policy of moral
"neutrality." Having made the most valiant attempt to "objectify" the problems
of poverty, criminality, illiteracy, illegitimacy and the like, we are discovering
that the economic and social aspects of these problems are inseparable from the
moral and psychological ones. And having made the most determined effort to
devise remedies that are "value-free," we find that these policies imperil the
material, as well as the moral, well-being of their intended beneficiaries-and
not only of individuals but of society as a whole.
Gertrude Hiimmelfarb, A De-Moralized Society, FORBES, Sept. 14, 1992, at 120 (footnote
omitted). See also GILn, supra note 26, at 72-74 (reflecting on the importance of faith
in the creation of a lower-class capable of ridding itself of the 'disease" of poverty).
548. In secularized form, this was certainly the view of the authors of the New Poor
Law in 1834 Britain. The only difference is that the notion that poverty was an indication
of the worthlessness of the poor individual (or at least a sign of his or her laziness and
unfitness for civil society) was wrapped in scientific terminology, first the theorems of
Malthus, and then the Social Darwinism of the late Victorian period. For a discussion of
the development of these notions in the 19th century, see HiMmELFARB, supra note 52, at
100-44.
549. Lewis, supra note 27, at 191-92.
550. See generally, AULErrA, supra note 27; GALBRAIrH, supra note 44; HARRiNGTON,
supra note 26; JENCKS, supra note 27; EDWARD M. KArrz & HERBERT H. HYMAN, UR-
BAN PLANNING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE: A MODEL CmEs APPROACH (1970); MoyNm,
supra note 17; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 20; WILSON, supra note 529; WILSON,
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For women, being normal also means being married, and submit-
ting to the dictates of patriarchy implicit in the status quo that is
fundamental to the static paradigm 55' This is a touchy subject,
especially when the suggestion is made that the means to success
and upward mobility are denied on the basis of factors other than
ability or willingness,552 or that it ought to be because ability is
tied to race or ethnicity,5  or gender 4
Indeed, modem conservatives share the vision of the poor as
different (inferior), but they tend to take the characterization a bit
further. For "conservative" commentators, the difference is not
altogether benign or unconscious. They argue from the perspective
of intentional conduct. The poor are basically lazy at heart (or at
least would prefer to receive money from the government rather
than work at a disagreeable job for the same amount of money)
and require the rigor of little or no governmental aid in order to
induce them to work for a living55  But even people who are
supra note 42.
551. The consensus is that the behavior of women is responsible for their welfare de-
pendency. What behavior? Raising children out-of-wedlock, and preferring the dole to a
humiliating and wholly inadequate job? See Mimi Abramovitz, Why Welfare Reform is a
Sham, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 1988, at 24 (stating that welfare officials in California
conceded that working women required a wage of $11.00 per hour to stay off the welfare
rolls, but the average wage of graduates of the state workfare program was $6.50 per
hour). This notion of the deviance of poor women, and the impediments of patriarchy on
their efforts to become self-sufficient on their own terms has been critically explored
recently. See FImeman, supra note 17, at 289-93; Law, supra note 17.
552. Contrast BELL, supra note 79; Karst, supra note 17 with MURRAY, supra note 3.
See NEw YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 23, at 44 ("Government has a responsibility to
use its position as regulator, employer, and purchaser to influence the labor market condi-
tions confronting disadvantaged groups.").
553. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 528 (suggesting that Afican-Americans are incapable
of the type of achievement that Caucasian-Americans enjoy because the basis of their
intelligence lies elsewhere). Cf. RICHARD J. HEmNsTtN & CHARLEs MURRAY, THE BELL
CURvF: INTELuGENCE AND CLAss STRucrutt IN AMEmRc LIFa 317-40 (1994) ("The
persisting gap in family income between blacks and whites is reflected in the poverty data
.... Controlling for IQ shrinks the difference between whites and other ethnic groups
substantially but not completely.") Id at 326.
554. The double binds facing poor women, especially poor women of non-dominant
ethnic and racial groups has been explored recently by Professor White. See White, supra
note 17, at 1971-97 (approaching the problem through the words of Elaine Preston about
her life trapped on welfare).
555. See, e.g., GILDER, supra note 26, at 64-74 (arguing that poverty can be explained
as the result of the abandonment by the poor (as a result of the pernicious effects of
modem welfare programs) of the central tenets of success-work, monogamous hetero-
sexual family structure with traditional gender roles, and faith represented by traditional
Western moral codes); MURRAY, supra note 3 (stating that everyone is lazy at heart, but
the poor have been given a means, through modem systems of institutional relief, to
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thought more "liberal" succumb, especially when dealing with the
poverty of women who have the temerity to bear children without
the benefit of a husband. 5 The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
understood the historical and religious basis of society's categoriza-
tion of the poor and stigmatization of large groups of them. Unfor-
tunately, in advancing a proposal for a nationwide guaranteed an-
nual income, he hoped in vain that such notions had disappeared
when he said:
Now early in this century this proposal would have been
greeted with ridicule and denunciation, as destructive of
initiative and responsibility. At that time economic status
was considered the measure of the individual's ability and
talents. And, in the thinking of that day, the absence of
worldly goods indicated a want of industrious habits and
moral fiber. We've come a long way in our understanding
of human motivation and of the blind operation of our
economic system. Now we realize that dislocations in the
market operations of our economy and the prevalence of
discrimination thrust people into idleness and bind them in
constant or frequent unemployment against their will. To-
day the poor are less often dismissed, I hope, from our
consciences by being branded as inferior or incompe-
tent.5w
Indeed, twenty-five years after that speech, an American President
could, in addressing Congress and the nation, invoke the imagery
of welfare as "a narcotic and a subtle destroyer of the spirit...
passed on from generation to generation like a legacy" to advance
a poor relief program based on time-honored distinctions of pro-
ductivity and moral worthiness for relief!"
The general theory suggests that all systems of poor relief
categorize; that is their basic nature. I have demonstrated just how
pervasive the imperative to categorize the poor has been since at
capitalize on their laziness at the expense of those who work, with what Murray considers
awful consequences for the recipients of this largesse).
556. Professors Fineman and White have recently explored the manner in which com-
mentators across the political spectrum have united to condemn the deviant woman on the
dole--as lazy, without the sense to get and keep a man. Fineman, supra note 17, at 283-
85.
557. King, supra note 28, at 247.
558. George H. Bush, State of the Union Address, Address before the Congress of the
United States (Jan. 28, 1992), in N.Y. TOMEs, Jan. 29, 1992, at A14.
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least the fourth century. The categories of Ambrose of Milan might
have been a crude basis on which to build a poor relief system,
compared to modem categorization, but the fact of categorization
as a foundation for the provision of relief has not changed. Indeed,
the whole basis of federal relief in the United States starts from
the notion of categorization. 9 The federal government has al-
ways been quite picky about what types of destitute it is willing to
aid. State programs traditionally have been less picky, but "monkey
see, monkey do." Federal categorical aid has resulted in a narrow-
ing of the categories of destitute thought to merit state and local
aid.
Americans, like their Elizabethan and medieval counterparts,
continue to despise their poor. We have discussed the religious and
economic basis of this disgust; the needy have violated a core
cultural taboo. Traditionally, they were permitted not to starve. In
contemporary society, they are still thrown to private charity or
made to work. The able-bodied are frequently denied general as-
sistance on the basis that they are able to work. The able-bodied
are ineligible for assistance in fourteen states.W Of those states
that do provide aid to the able-bodied, twenty-four states have
provisions which require or may require able-bodied recipients to
work in return for aid given.
But we also despise the worthy poor who actually aggressively
pursue the aid made available to them. In the seventeenth century
they were considered riff-raff, professional beggars, and worse.ea
In contemporary America, we reserve a substantial amount of re-
vulsion for the "welfare-wise;" 563 "welfare queens" are hounded
into marriage." Men who father children without the benefit of
559. BARTH, Er AL., supra note 14, at 32-34; LEVrrAN, supra note 3, at 22-56;
MARMOR ET AL., supra note 6, at 166-72.
560. For a discussion of the Elizabethan approach, see supra part IV.B., for the current
American approach, see supra part V.A.
561. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 477-90.
562. See POUND, supra note 90.
563. This is the welfare recipient, whose knowledge is limited to an ability to "milk"
the system for all the benefits Congress or the state legislature has made available. See
Ken Neal, The Welfare Prison: Society Punishes Rather than Rewards Those Who Find
Jobs, TULSA WORLD, June 13, 1993, at D1 (describing the reaction of the President of
the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, an administrator of
public housing in Pueblo, Colorado).
564. See, e.g., Miri Abramovitz & Martha Davis, Wedfare or Welfare? Proposals Seek
to Control Behavior, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at A-15 ("A recent spate of legislative
proposals in states across the country seeks to use welfare programs to control the be-
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marriage and then permit their offspring to be supported by the
state are condemned as the wellsprings of crime, drug abuse, and
intergenerational poverty; such conduct is even offered up to "ex-
plain" (but certainly not "approve") the rationality of racism against
certain groups of non-dominant peoples. The destitute can't
win-society really doesn't even want them to take what is of-
fered; it wants them to fend for themselves.
Our poor law system continues to rely on charity to provide
aid to the indigent. The Canon Law system relied heavily on chari-
table contributions from those who had the benefits of status and
property and the church. s The Elizabethan Poor Law system was
also characterized by heavy reliance on private charitable ef-
forts.' Private charity is still seen as the only truly general sys-
tem of relief-the last resort for people who are found to be ineli-
gible for state or federal aid.s'
Before the age of the individual, there were groups. The medi-
eval period thought in terms of family and local allegiances, and
this extended to the obligation to provide material support. The
Ambrosian system of preferences stressed the obligation of family
to support indigent relatives. 5 9 While the religious basis for this
obligation has given way to more secular rationales, these obliga-
tions remain enforceable. Family support obligations became en-
forceable by the state under the Elizabethan system of poor re-
lief.L° In contemporary America, twenty-two states impose a duty
upon certain relatives to support their indigent relatives.&t
Because all systems of poor relief categorize, they all require a
means of enforcing the categories created. The general theory hy-
havior and family structure of poor women:). The "marriage" bonus also suggests that
poor women should accept a marriage regardless of its safety and security just to survive.
Id. See also Fineman, supra note 17, at 279-89; White, supra note 17, at 1986-90 (de-
scribing the hazard of domestic violence).
565. See, e.g., GDzER, supra note 37, at 79-85 (analyzing the "tangle of pathology" in
the inner city); MuRRAY, supra note 3 at 56-142. Even liberal commentators speak in
terms of the immorality of men who do not "stand by" or "provide" for "their" women,
or the need to foster the patriarchal family group. See, e.g., HAVEmAN, supra note 26, at
69-70, 71-77 (discussing the problems of single-parent (female-headed) families and noting
the absence of these problems in the traditional two parent family); Wmso, supra note
529, at 104-05.
566. See supra part IV.A.
567. See supra part IV.B.
568. See supra part V.A.5.a.
569. See supra part V.A.
570. See supra part IV.B.
571. See supra part V.A.5.g.
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pothesizes, and the structure of Anglo-American poor relief systems
from the medieval period to our own day demonstrates, that en-
forcement of the drive to categorize is effected through a system of
local administration of poor relief. We no longer permit parish
priests to administer state relief programs. However, like the Eliza-
bethans, we have cultivated a taste for town and county administra-
tion. Eighteen state general assistance programs impose administra-
tive and funding responsibilities at the local level?5 However,
some states have either fully or partially taken the administrative or
funding obligation away from the local units.'
Implementation of the goals of poor relief systems requires a
central theme, and cost minimization would seem to have been the
theme for a millennium. It underlies everything, from the determi-
nation of benefit levels,574 to the emphasis on enforcement of aid-
worthiness categories, to the creation of aid-categories themselves.
It reinforces the incentives for these poor relief systems to be
passive, rather than active instruments of policy, to make the pro-
cess of receiving aid as humiliating and difficult as possible. 5
There is only a difference of degree between petitioning the local
priest for a handout in 1393, requesting aid of the local administra-
tors of relief in London or Hartford in 1693, and applying for
general assistance in the United States in 1993 6
And underlying all of the complexity, and all of the sameness
of poor relief systems is the bedrock assumption of the static para-
572. See supra part V.A.3.
573. Id.
574. There is little difference between the discussions of Aquinas respecting the nature
of individual "superfluities," see supra note 203, and the arguments of California counties
that they be allowed to set benefit levels based on the availability of funds. See Boehm
v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 722 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "budgetary
constraints cannot justify excluding from minimum subsistence grants to the indigent al-
lowance for each of the basic necessities of life!).
575. President Reagan's Low Income Opportunity Working Group reported that while
"[b]ureaucratic rules were created to ensure that welfare flows only to those society con-
siders truly needy, My]et an inspection of how the rules work in practice reveals a system
that is so complicated it often undermines that goal." Low INcOME OPpoRTuNrry WORK-
ING GROUP, supra note 3. Indeed, that in part, is its purpose. See First Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 13, j 6-41 (detailing the complex procedure for obtaining general
assistance in Los Angeles, California); Cf. Simon, supra note 13, at 1200-01.
576. The report prepared by President Reagan's Low Income Opportunity Working
Group is replete with comments from humiliated users of the poor relief system. Low
INCOME OPPORTUNITY WORKING GROUP, supra note 3, at 19-20; VESELY Er AL., supra
note 96, at 41-44 (describing the forms of humiliation suffered by recipients); Briar, supra
note 96, at 374-77.
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digm-the social and political order as immutable, and income or
wealth inequality as necessary." We can take from the produc-
tive, but not too much; we can provide for the poor, but not in
excess amount. The social order is good and radical change is bad,
especially when it masquerades as something else. Of course, every
society believes it is good-that belief gives cohesion to the social
framework. The implication for poor relief systems, however, is
that they do not change in any fundamental respect.
We have laid bare the essence of these systems-static, pas-
sive, reactive systems-and this despite loud statutory protestations
to the contrary. These systems are not, in truth, particularly active
in creating substantial means of integrating the poor into productive
society. Nor should they be, on the basis of accepted notions about
the people requiring assistance. As in Tudor England, the generally
accepted parameters of relief remain to induce work from those
who would labor, punish those who would labor not, and provide
sustenance for those who cannot labor. Static system builders are
comfortable with the parameters so stated. And why not? The able-
bodied poor have made a lifestyle choice-they refuse to secure
one of any number of jobs just waiting to be filled. That these
jobs don't pay an amount the unemployed deem acceptable, or are
boring or demeaning or dirty or dangerous is irrelevant. That these
jobs are the only ones available because of your race, sex, or eth-
nicity is of little concern as well.
Much like the thirteenth century parish priest, our state general
assistance administrators are charged with making sure that the
poor do not starve. With respect to the incapacitated, the state
administrator can rely on the modem day equivalent of the
King-the federal government provides some amount for the care
of most of the incapacitated. The king and the priest might argue
over definitions, but that is a technical matter. With respect to the
able-bodied, the state administrator, like the parish priest, must rely
on relatively insignificant local governmental revenues, and mostly
on the kindness of the wealthy. The state administrator understands
that vague promises to the wealthy about the need to force the
poor to do their duty and work will increase the size of donations,
577. See supra part I.
578. But it can be of concern, if the state so desires. See NEW YORK TASK FORCE,
supra note 23, at 44. Racism and sexism may affect the ability to maximize productivity.
under the static conception, however, minimal production (bare self-sufficiency) is all that
is required.
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and he is willing to oblige, through hortatory legislation, if neces-
sary. But, then again, the state need only keep the able-bodied
unemployed from starving. That, in itself, is a large enough task.
VI. COMMENTARY IN THE FORM OF A CONCLUSION
American programs of general assistance present an interesting
conundrum. These programs are said to be required to contribute
significantly to the eradication of poverty in the United States; that
is their primary purpose. However, these programs do not contrib-
ute in any material respect to the eradication of poverty. They are
fundamentally incapable of making any such contribution. These
programs merely contribute a minimum amount of alms to people
deemed deserving of such assistance by the providers thereof, and
nothing more.
So what is it, exactly, that we seem to have created? The
general theory supplies a simple answer; not much and, also, a lot.
We are proud of the products of the "New Deal," and of the social
welfare system which our mythology teaches us emerged from the
economic catastrophe of the Great Depression. We have been
taught to believe that this period marked the beginning of a time
in which society opened more opportunities to those who had
previously been denied; it created the basis of our "kinder, gentler
nation." 9 It was also, however, the formative period for the
emergence of political and economic systems, the fundamental goal
of which was control of the populace. I suggest that the most
significant transformation of poor relief in twentieth century Ameri-
ca was not its goals, nor purpose, nor fundamental structure; in
that respect the general theory confirms that we have not "pro-
gressed" or accomplished much or moved forward. Rather it has
been in the creation of a huge, intrusive, efficient governmental
machine for the accomplishment of traditional goals that modem
poor relief systems have made significant strides. We don't ap-
proach poor relief differently than our medieval or Elizabethan
ancestors, we merely approach the problem infinitely more effi-
ciently and with an institutional provider (civil government) sub-
579. George H. Bush, Address at the Republican Party Convention Accepting the Re-
publican Party Nomination for President of the United States, New Orleans, Louisiana
(Aug. 19, 1988), in WASH. PoS, Aug. 19, 1988, at A-28. Even as President Clinton
delivered a welfare reform proposal which cut benefits to long-term beneficiaries he could




stantially more powerful than anything conceivable five hundred or
more years ago. For it is in the twentieth century that American
society has managed to assert a degree of control over the mechan-
ics of poor relief (and the dispensing thereof) unknown in earlier
times. And it has done so without renouncing the traditional basis
on which poor relief is conceived or dispensed. American society
has managed to implement increasingly sophisticated mechanisms
with respect to the relief of the poor, and it has done little else.
And so we argue about matters of efficiency and implementa-
tion and power. We seek to define the poor. We speculate about
what it is we ought to or need to provide the poor. We ask our-
selves what are we required by whim, expediency, natural law,
ethical command, divine stricture, or any number of other related
systems of ordering things to provide for the poor? We temper our
generosity, such as it is, with control; control over all sorts of
things-the manner of giving aid, the determination of qualification
for relief, the conditions for relief (since we pay, they should
dance to our tune), the things for which such aid ought to be used.
We "empower" the poor, we give them some things of our own
choosing and let them play with them until they demonstrate that
they don't know how to use them (that is, they don't play the way
we envisioned), and then we educate and train them (in the Mao-
iste sense of these terms). None of this is bad or good, but the
rules governing these arguments will have been set before the argu-
ments have begun. They will have unconsciously limited the ac-
ceptable range of argumentation, and that is my point.
The stationary progression from ecclesiastical systems of poor
relief to Elizabethan poor relief to contemporary American systems
of general assistance demonstrates the strength of the static para-
digm and the general theory. The differences between the systems
are more illusory than real; the differences demonstrate the growing
sophistication of the system of poor relief on which Anglo-Ameri-
can society has relied for almost a millennium. And yet the illu-
sion is powerful. Society has for some time been content with the
notion that its poor relief efforts are somehow painlessly
transformative. Society has written laws telling itself so, even as
such laws entrench themselves ever more strongly in traditional
580. See YEH CH'ING, INSIDE MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT AN ANALYICAL BLUEPRINT
OF HIS ACTIONS 247-83 (Stephen Pan et al. eds. & trans., 1975) (discussing the use of
education as a tool of indoctrination to the social and political goals of the ruling ideolo-
gy and the bending of technical education to the service of that vision).
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visions. ' And so, in the name of progress and compassion, and
for the sake of the poor themselves, we have, as we end the twen-
tieth century, managed to perpetuate our medieval poor relief, but
with an increasingly cruel twist.
And yet, American society is weaned on the notion of prog-
ress, on the transformation of the manner in which society succors
its destitute, on how the contemporary poor relief product (for all
its faults) is a radically different and better product than those of
the uncaring cultural barbarians in either, say, the thirteenth or
seventeenth centuries.' This, perhaps, more than anything else,
demonstrates the power of the paradigm and the manner in which
it restricts its conception of reality, rather than receiving instruction
from it.553 Critical thinking about the underlying imperatives of
our conception of poor relief, therefore, provides the clarity of
thought necessary to intelligently consider the issue of relieving the
poor and the manner thought best to respond to the problem.5 '
For those who wish to continue the process of refining our essen-
tially ecclesiastical system of poor relief, the field is rich. The
system can always stand to be refined, adding elements of control,
more sophisticated methods of determining eligibility, less expen-
sive ways of delivering aid, better methods of policing compliance
with the need requirements of eligibility, more intelligent means of
tinkering with eligibility criteria. And depending on the proclivities,
581. For a discussion of the limiting manner in which poor relief reform is framed, see
Backer, supra note 20.
582. "The evolution of public welfare has been from public "charity" towards social
justice." Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695, 701 (Cal. 1985) (quoting County of
Los Angeles v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., 637 P.2d 681, 687 (Cal. 1981)).
583. This notion of the fundamental contradiction of paradigms, at once irrelevant in an
objective sense, and yet, in a subjective sense, providing a powerful vehicle through
which we distort, or at least bend, the shape and limitations of perceived reality, is de-
rived from the works of Thomas S. Kuhn. KUHN, supra note 29. As Steinbruner has
noted:
Ptolemaic astronomy formed a paradigm which governed science for many
centuries, and men in those centuries held it to be just as compelling as we
now hold the governing paradigms of modem science to be. The Ptolemaic
paradigm, however, was ultimately discarded as other powerful ones have been,
and that experience emphasizes the degree to which even hard science imposes
its views on reality rather than receiving instructions from it
STENERUNER, supra note 19, at 10 & n.5.
584. See UNGrM, supra note 119, at 97-102 (discussing the idea that critical evaluation
refutes "the tacit identification of abstract institutional endeavors, such as democracy or
the market, with the concrete institutional forms that these endeavors happen to take in
the contemporary world"). Id. at 98.
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outlook, politics, world view, or agenda of those seeking refine-
ment, this process, and the value of the underlying systems them-
selves, can be infused with notions of "goodness" and "evil"--such
abstract concepts still "sell." But all of these issues beg the funda-
mental question-is there value to the concept that everyone is
responsible for fending for oneself? Fundamental change, for good
or ill,"' can come only when the paradigm itself is scrutinized,
changed, or rejected in favor of another. Students of social and
legal practices-including the practices of poor relief-can illumi-
nate the real issues which the language of our arguments dis-
guise.' But scrutiny will lead to fundamental change, and it
need not inevitably lead to such change, only if cultural and soci-
etal mores change, when the critical assumptions of a new para-
digm emerges. And so it goes.
585. And perhaps fundamental change, when it comes, and it always comes in the long
run, will always be "good" (at least that is what the new dominant reaching will inculcate
in its citizens) in the beginning, and always "bad" (im need of change) in the end. For an
interesting discussion on this point4 see Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of
the PubliciPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982).
586. See Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELOS 79, 83-85 (1986) (describing
how scholarship ought to strive to explain the manner in which legal divisions evidence
the internal dynamic of a legal culture contingent on historical preferences for a set of
critical assumptions and values).
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